This is NOT the current work-in-progress (WIP) Chapter 1 draft.
The latest draft is now here.
Translation process
First Draft: Tom's draft of 20091009 mainly focused on meaning, written for clarity.
This is the Second Draft of Chapter 1. Tom’s draft is being revised here by John, to work through the phrasing and also to look again at the meaning. The style of English phrasing is intended to enhance clarity and flow and meaning.
This draft includes Tom’s notes: [John’s notes] [undecided options in green] [preferred options]
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JR incorporating 1894 text as Work in Progress (WIP) @ 20091227
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Chapter 1 Glossary
natural laws uniformity of natural law [uniform continuity of natural law] compatible determinism characterological disposition [innate necessity of character/disposition of character/character traits] scientific thinking necessity Gemüt: the heart’s sensibility motive Vorstellung: mental image/picture mind knowing doer: one who acts out of knowledge [Do we act out of knowledge or consciousness of the motive? PoF definition of knowledge: to be conscious of something? Is this terminology clear enough in the heading of 1.5? It needs to be explicitly linked to the chapter title. Chap1: Conscious – Chap2: Knowledge. ] conditional causality
Intellect
Reason
Analogy
Note: could use a chapter glossary at beginning of chapter. This is a technical reading comprehension point.
[Instead of just a glossary, which is a good idea, how about inserting a descriptive overview or abstract on the facing page before each chapter that includes terminology explanations for reading support? Example: In this chapter absolute determinism of human thinking and action is questioned. Determinism means that…]
That would be nice though it may be difficult. [Let’s try!] |
[1894 Chapter 2] Chapter 1: Conscious Human Action
The Question of Freedom
[1] Is the human being free in thought and action, or inescapably controlled bynatural laws cast iron/absolute necessity? Few questions have been the focus of so much ingenuity. The idea of freedom of the human will has found both enthusiastic supporters and stubborn opponents in abundance. Some, with a high moral tone, label as narrow-minded anyone who denies the obvious fact of freedom. Others who oppose them consider that it is the peak of unscientific thinking for anyone to believe that the uniform continuity of natural law is broken in the field of human action and thought. One and the same thing is proclaimed to be humanity's most precious possession as often as it is called its most harmful illusion. Endless insignificant distinctions have been used to explain how human freedom can be compatible with determinism in nature, because the human being is so clearly a part of nature. No less effort has been put into explaining how this delusion has arisen. It must be obvious to anyone who is not wholly superficial in character that we are dealing here with one of the most important questions of life, religion, conduct and science.
[1] Is the human being free in thought and action, or inescapably controlled by
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In chapter 3.0 Whether this activity of mine is really an expression of my own independent being, or whether modern physiologists are right in saying that we cannot think as we will, but rather have to think exactly as determined by the thoughts and thought-connections that happen to be present in our minds at any given moment, is a question that will be the subject of a later discussion.
[Is the human being an essentially free individual in thought and action, or inescapably controlled by natural laws? I have come to recognize the meaning of this sentence thus: Is the human being able to direct his thinking and doing directly from his own spiritual I, emancipated from any other influences, or is he perpetually locked into the absolute laws of physics, chemistry, biology, human physiology and psychology? This is not suitable for our translation as it employs terms that are not from Steiner’s book. However it serves me as a benchmark against which to evaluate the options.] [Shall we drop the word ‘entirely’/absolute/nothing but? We would omit the German rein (adj. pure, unsullied, pristine, absolute). Is rein significant enough to attempt to keep it? Older options for the opening sentence: Is the human being free in thought and action, or inescapably controlled by Are human beings free in their thinking and action, or inescapably controlled by entirely natural laws? Is the human being in thought and action a free thinker, or inescapably controlled by natural laws? Does the human being have any capacity for freedom in thinking and action, or are we inescapably controlled by entirely natural laws? Is the human beinga free thinker and doer / free to think and act/ a free spirit/agent in thought and action, or inescapably controlled by entirely natural laws?] Original opening to POF, which precedes chapter 1 and begins: I believe I am indicating correctly one of the fundamental characteristics of our age when I say that, at the present day, all human interests tend to centre on human individuality. An energetic effort is being made to shake off every kind of authority. Nothing is accepted as valid, unless it springs from the roots of individuality. Everything which hinders the individual in the full development of his or her powers is thrust aside. |
1.1 Freedom of Indifferent Choice
A sad indication of the superficiality of contemporary thinking can be found in a book that aims to develop a ‘new faith’ from the results of recent scientific research, and which contains nothing on this question but these words:
“There is no need to go into the question of freedom of the human will. The supposed freedom of indifferent choice has been recognized as an empty illusion by every reputable philosophy. The determination of moral value in human conduct and character remains untouched by this question.”
(David Friedrich Strauss: Old and New Belief)
I do not quote this book because I consider it to be particularly significant, but I believe this passage expresses the only view that most contemporary thinkers can reach on this question. Everyone who claims to have advanced beyond elementary science classes seems to know that freedom cannot consist of neutrally choosing, entirely at will, one or the other of two possible actions. There is always, so we are told, a quite specific reason to explain why we carry out one particular action from among several possibilities.
A sad indication of the superficiality of contemporary thinking can be found in a book that aims to develop a ‘new faith’ from the results of recent scientific research, and which contains nothing on this question but these words:
“There is no need to go into the question of freedom of the human will. The supposed freedom of indifferent choice has been recognized as an empty illusion by every reputable philosophy. The determination of moral value in human conduct and character remains untouched by this question.”
(David Friedrich Strauss: Old and New Belief)
I do not quote this book because I consider it to be particularly significant, but I believe this passage expresses the only view that most contemporary thinkers can reach on this question. Everyone who claims to have advanced beyond elementary science classes seems to know that freedom cannot consist of neutrally choosing, entirely at will, one or the other of two possible actions. There is always, so we are told, a quite specific reason to explain why we carry out one particular action from among several possibilities.
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[Freewill: the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies
Listening to Tom’s feedback, I can see the need for precision of terminology. Do we want to revisit arbitrarily: for no reason? No, neutrally is better.] [The more I live with this section, the more I find myself questioning whether indifferent really implies that there is no reason (arbitrary or neutral choice) or no consciousness of the reason (blind or ignorant choice).] |
1.2 Freedom of Choice
[2] This seems obvious. Yet the main attacks of today’s opponents of freedom are only directed against freedom of choice. Even Herbert Spencer, whose opinions gain ever wider acceptance, says:
“That everyone is at liberty to desire or not to desire, as they will, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free will, is refuted by everyone's own introspective observation as much as by the contents of the preceding chapters.” [*] (The Principles of Psychology, 1855)
[2] This seems obvious. Yet the main attacks of today’s opponents of freedom are only directed against freedom of choice. Even Herbert Spencer, whose opinions gain ever wider acceptance, says:
“That everyone is at liberty to desire or not to desire, as they will, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free will, is refuted by everyone's own introspective observation as much as by the contents of the preceding chapters.” [*] (The Principles of Psychology, 1855)
[* Herbert’s original: “That every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived as much by the internal perception of every one as by the contents of the preceding chapters.”]
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Revisions from an original English text must remain visible. I suggest the original is included as a footnote. Herbert’s original language dates it in the reader’s experience. No bad thing to counter the outdated comment of Steiner: “whose opinions are gaining ever wider acceptance”. I considered putting in the original publication date of PoF in square brackets after that sentence.]
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1.3 Free Necessity of One's Own Nature
Others who refute the concept of free will start from the same standpoint. The seeds of all such arguments can be found as early as Spinoza. What he brought forward against the idea of freedom so clearly and simply has since been repeated countless times, usually cloaked in such hair-splitting and theoretical doctrines that it is hard to recognize his plain line of thought, which is all that matters. Spinoza writes:
Others who refute the concept of free will start from the same standpoint. The seeds of all such arguments can be found as early as Spinoza. What he brought forward against the idea of freedom so clearly and simply has since been repeated countless times, usually cloaked in such hair-splitting and theoretical doctrines that it is hard to recognize his plain line of thought, which is all that matters. Spinoza writes:
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Tom: We are in Realism (external world) so you find words like combat/fighting
[Refuting means to overthrow or overturn the argument of another. It is totally combative.] |
“I call free that which exists and acts out of the pure necessity of its nature; I call compelled that existence and activity determined in an exact and fixed way by something else. For example, God is free, although with necessity, because He exists solely out of the necessity of His own nature. In the same way God knows Himself and everything else freely, because it follows solely out of the necessity of His nature that He knows everything. So you see that I locate freedom, not in a free decision, but in a free necessity.
[3] “But let us come down to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way. To see this more clearly, let us imagine a very simple case. A stone, for example, receives a certain momentum from an external cause that makes contact with it so that, after the impact of the external cause has ceased, the stone necessarily continues to move. The continued motion of the stone is compelled by the external impact and not by any necessity within the stone’s own nature, because [the continuing motion] has to be defined by the thrust of an external cause. What is true here for the stone is true for everything else, no matter how complex and multifaceted it may be. Everything is determined with necessity by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way.
[4] “Now please assume that the stone, while in motion, thinks and knows that it is striving to the best of its ability to continue moving. This stone is conscious only of its own striving, to which it is not at all indifferent, and it will believe that it is absolutely free to continue moving for no other reason than its own will to continue. Yet this is the human freedom that everybody claims to possess, and it consists entirely of the fact that people are conscious only of their desires and ignorant of the causes that determine them. Thus the child believes it freely desires milk; the angry boy believes he freely demands revenge; and the coward believes he freely chooses to run away. A drunk believes he says things of his own free will that, when sober again, he will wish he had not said; and since this bias is inborn in everybody, it is difficult to free oneself from it. Even though experience teaches us often enough that people can moderate their desires least of all, and that when moved by two opposing passions they see the better and pursue the worse; yet they still consider themselves free because they desire some things less intensely, and there are some desires that can be easily inhibited by becoming preoccupied with memories of something else.” (Letter of October or November, 1674)
[5] Because this view is so clearly and precisely expressed it is easy to uncover its fundamental error. Human beings are supposedly compelled to carry out an action when driven to it by any cause with the same necessity as a stone that carries out a specific movement after an impact. It is only because human beings are conscious of their action that they regard themselves as the free originator of it. But in so doing they overlook the causes driving them, which they must obey unconditionally. The error in this line of thought is soon discovered. Spinoza and all who think like him are overlooking the fact that human beings can be conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes that guide them. Anyone can see that a child is not free when it desires milk and that a drunk is not free who says things he later regrets. Neither knows anything of the causes working deep within their organism that exercise an irresistible control over them. But is it right to lump such actions together with those of human beings who are conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes of their actions? Are the actions of human beings really all of one kind? Should the actions of a warrior on the battlefield, a research scientist in the laboratory or a diplomat involved in complex negotiations be placed/filed in the same scientific category as those of a child who desires milk? It is no doubt best to seek the solution of a problem where the conditions are simplest. But the inability to see distinctions has often caused endless confusion. There is certainly a profound difference between knowing and not knowing why I act. At first sight this seems to be an entirely obvious truth. Yet the opponents of freedom never ask themselves whether a motive of action that I recognize and understand is to be designated as a compulsion for me in the same sense as the organic process which causes a child to cry for milk.
[3] “But let us come down to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way. To see this more clearly, let us imagine a very simple case. A stone, for example, receives a certain momentum from an external cause that makes contact with it so that, after the impact of the external cause has ceased, the stone necessarily continues to move. The continued motion of the stone is compelled by the external impact and not by any necessity within the stone’s own nature, because [the continuing motion] has to be defined by the thrust of an external cause. What is true here for the stone is true for everything else, no matter how complex and multifaceted it may be. Everything is determined with necessity by external causes to exist and to act in a fixed and exact way.
[4] “Now please assume that the stone, while in motion, thinks and knows that it is striving to the best of its ability to continue moving. This stone is conscious only of its own striving, to which it is not at all indifferent, and it will believe that it is absolutely free to continue moving for no other reason than its own will to continue. Yet this is the human freedom that everybody claims to possess, and it consists entirely of the fact that people are conscious only of their desires and ignorant of the causes that determine them. Thus the child believes it freely desires milk; the angry boy believes he freely demands revenge; and the coward believes he freely chooses to run away. A drunk believes he says things of his own free will that, when sober again, he will wish he had not said; and since this bias is inborn in everybody, it is difficult to free oneself from it. Even though experience teaches us often enough that people can moderate their desires least of all, and that when moved by two opposing passions they see the better and pursue the worse; yet they still consider themselves free because they desire some things less intensely, and there are some desires that can be easily inhibited by becoming preoccupied with memories of something else.” (Letter of October or November, 1674)
[5] Because this view is so clearly and precisely expressed it is easy to uncover its fundamental error. Human beings are supposedly compelled to carry out an action when driven to it by any cause with the same necessity as a stone that carries out a specific movement after an impact. It is only because human beings are conscious of their action that they regard themselves as the free originator of it. But in so doing they overlook the causes driving them, which they must obey unconditionally. The error in this line of thought is soon discovered. Spinoza and all who think like him are overlooking the fact that human beings can be conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes that guide them. Anyone can see that a child is not free when it desires milk and that a drunk is not free who says things he later regrets. Neither knows anything of the causes working deep within their organism that exercise an irresistible control over them. But is it right to lump such actions together with those of human beings who are conscious, not only of their actions, but also of the causes of their actions? Are the actions of human beings really all of one kind? Should the actions of a warrior on the battlefield, a research scientist in the laboratory or a diplomat involved in complex negotiations be placed/filed in the same scientific category as those of a child who desires milk? It is no doubt best to seek the solution of a problem where the conditions are simplest. But the inability to see distinctions has often caused endless confusion. There is certainly a profound difference between knowing and not knowing why I act. At first sight this seems to be an entirely obvious truth. Yet the opponents of freedom never ask themselves whether a motive of action that I recognize and understand is to be designated as a compulsion for me in the same sense as the organic process which causes a child to cry for milk.
1.4 Free from External Influences
[6] Eduard von Hartmann asserts in his Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness that the human will depends on two main factors: motives and character. If we see people as all alike, or at least having negligible differences, then their will appears to be determined from outside by the circumstances that come to meet them. But if take into consideration that different people adopt an idea as a motive of action only if their characteris such that a particular idea arouses a desire in them, then the human being appears to be determined from within and not from outside. But because an idea given to us from outside must first be adopted as a motive according to our character, we believe that we are free and independent of external influences. However, according to Eduard von Hartmann the truth is that,
“Even though we must first adopt an idea as a motive ourselves, we do not do this arbitrarily, but rather according to our characterological disposition [the disposition of our character]; which means that we are anything but free.”
Here again, thedifference distinction [Unterschied/Umstand] is completely ignored between motives that I allow to influence me only after I have consciously made them my own, and motives that I follow without any clear knowledge of them.
[6] Eduard von Hartmann asserts in his Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness that the human will depends on two main factors: motives and character. If we see people as all alike, or at least having negligible differences, then their will appears to be determined from outside by the circumstances that come to meet them. But if take into consideration that different people adopt an idea as a motive of action only if their characteris such that a particular idea arouses a desire in them, then the human being appears to be determined from within and not from outside. But because an idea given to us from outside must first be adopted as a motive according to our character, we believe that we are free and independent of external influences. However, according to Eduard von Hartmann the truth is that,
“Even though we must first adopt an idea as a motive ourselves, we do not do this arbitrarily, but rather according to our characterological disposition [the disposition of our character]; which means that we are anything but free.”
Here again, the
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characterological disposition describes the entity that controls us as a "necessity".
[I remain skeptical about the obscure word characterological – it has a dictionary meaning that is not compatible with its use here.] I wonder if we can get away with using the word idea rather than "mental picture" in section 1.4. The same Vorstellung will need to be mental picture later. [OK. I find it blurs the connection from this quote to the later text in 1.10. Another option here is notion.] |
1.5 Action Resulting from Conscious Motive
[7] This leads straight to the standpoint from which the subject will be considered here. Can the question of freedom be directed only one-sidedly towards the will? And if not, what other question needs to be linked to it?
[7] This leads straight to the standpoint from which the subject will be considered here. Can the question of freedom be directed only one-sidedly towards the will? And if not, what other question needs to be linked to it?
[8] If there is a difference between a conscious and an unconscious motive of action, then the conscious motive will result in an action that must be judged differently to one resulting from blind impulse. Our first question will consider this difference. This inquiry will then determine the approach we need to take toward the question of freedom itself.
[9] What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one's actions? Too little attention has been given to this question because unfortunately the indivisible whole that is the human being has always been torn in two. The doer has been separated from the knower, while the one who matters the most has been overlooked: the knowing doer who acts out of knowledge.
[9] What does it mean to have knowledge of the motives of one's actions? Too little attention has been given to this question because unfortunately the indivisible whole that is the human being has always been torn in two. The doer has been separated from the knower, while the one who matters the most has been overlooked: the knowing doer who acts out of knowledge.
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note: "knowing doer" sticks with you. [OK]
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1.6 Free When Controlled by Reason
[10] It is said that human beings are free when they are controlled only by their reason and not by animal passions. In other words, freedom means being able to determine one’s life and actions according to purposeful aims and deliberate decisions.
[11] Nothing is gained by such assertions. For the question is whether reason, purpose and decisions merely exercise the same kind of control over a person as animal passions. If, without any effort on my part, a rational decision arises in me with the same urgent need as the onset of hunger and thirst, then I must obey it and my freedom is an illusion.
[10] It is said that human beings are free when they are controlled only by their reason and not by animal passions. In other words, freedom means being able to determine one’s life and actions according to purposeful aims and deliberate decisions.
[11] Nothing is gained by such assertions. For the question is whether reason, purpose and decisions merely exercise the same kind of control over a person as animal passions. If, without any effort on my part, a rational decision arises in me with the same urgent need as the onset of hunger and thirst, then I must obey it and my freedom is an illusion.
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Note: I read that being in "control" is very important to people.
[Control can be used in other instances of exercising compulsion.] [Replaced emerges with arises here.] |
1.7 Free to Do as One Wants
[12] Another claim is made that freedom does not mean being able to determine what one wants, but being able to do what one wants. This thought has been sharply outlined/expressed by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will.
“The human being can certainly do what he wants, but he cannot determine what he wants, because his will is determined by motives! He cannot determine what he wants? Let us look at these words more closely. Do they make any sense? Is free will, then, being able to want something without having grounds, without a motive? But what does wanting mean other than having grounds/a reason for doing or trying to do this rather than that? To want something without grounds, without a motive, would be to want something without wanting it. The concept of wanting is inseparable from the concept of motive. Without a determining motive the will is an empty faculty; only through the motive does it become active and real. Therefore, it is entirely correct that the human will is not ‘free’ to the extent that its direction is always determined by the strongest motive. But, in contrast to this ‘unfreedom’, it is absurd to speak of a possible ‘freedom’ of the will that amounts to having the ability to want what one does not want.”
[12] Another claim is made that freedom does not mean being able to determine what one wants, but being able to do what one wants. This thought has been sharply outlined/expressed by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will.
“The human being can certainly do what he wants, but he cannot determine what he wants, because his will is determined by motives! He cannot determine what he wants? Let us look at these words more closely. Do they make any sense? Is free will, then, being able to want something without having grounds, without a motive? But what does wanting mean other than having grounds/a reason for doing or trying to do this rather than that? To want something without grounds, without a motive, would be to want something without wanting it. The concept of wanting is inseparable from the concept of motive. Without a determining motive the will is an empty faculty; only through the motive does it become active and real. Therefore, it is entirely correct that the human will is not ‘free’ to the extent that its direction is always determined by the strongest motive. But, in contrast to this ‘unfreedom’, it is absurd to speak of a possible ‘freedom’ of the will that amounts to having the ability to want what one does not want.”
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[The use of ‘determine’ at the top of the quote certainly makes sense. Never mind that we lose the play on words.]
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[13] Here too, only motives in general are discussed without considering the difference between unconscious and conscious motives. If a motive affects me and I am compelled to act on it because it proves to be the ‘strongest’ of its kind, then the idea of freedom ceases to have any meaning. Why should it matter to me whether I can do something or not if I am forced by the motive to do it? The primary question is not whether I can or cannot do something after a motive has influenced me, but whether any motives exist other than those that control me with absolute necessity. If I must want something, then I may be completely indifferent as to whether I can also do it. If a motive that I think is unreasonable is forced upon me because of my character or the circumstances prevailing in my environment, then I will have to be glad if I cannot do what I want.
[14] The question is not whether I am able to carry out a decision once it is made, but how the decision comes about within me.
[14] The question is not whether I am able to carry out a decision once it is made, but how the decision comes about within me.
1.8 Unconditioned Will
[15] Rational thinking fundamentally distinguishes human beings from all other living beings. Activity we have in common with other organisms. Nothing is gained by seeking analogies in the animal kingdom to clarify a concept of freedom that applies to the actions of human beings. Modern natural science loves such analogies. When scientists have successfully identified something similar to human behaviour among animals, they believe they have touched on the most significant question of the science of humanity. This opinion leads to misunderstandings such as the example in Paul Rée’s book The Illusion of Free Will, which says the following about freedom:
[15] Rational thinking fundamentally distinguishes human beings from all other living beings. Activity we have in common with other organisms. Nothing is gained by seeking analogies in the animal kingdom to clarify a concept of freedom that applies to the actions of human beings. Modern natural science loves such analogies. When scientists have successfully identified something similar to human behaviour among animals, they believe they have touched on the most significant question of the science of humanity. This opinion leads to misunderstandings such as the example in Paul Rée’s book The Illusion of Free Will, which says the following about freedom:
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[An example of the misunderstandings resulting from this opinion appears]
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“It is easy to explain why the movement of a stone appears to come about by necessity, while the will of a donkey does not. The causes that set a stone in motion are external and visible, while the causes that determine a donkey's will are internal and invisible. Between us and the place of their activity is the skull of the donkey… The conditional causality is not seen, so it is thought to be nonexistent. Then an explanation is given that the will, which is the cause of the donkey’s turning around, is itself unconditioned; it is an absolute beginning [(a first cause and not a link in a chain of events). But a presumption of this kind is contradicted by experience and the universal validity of the law of causality.]”
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Note: I looked up this quote and added [one] more of Rée's sentences because the freedom involved was unclear.
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Here too human actions in which there is consciousness of the motives are simply ignored for Rée declares that “Between us and the place of their activity is the skull of the donkey.” These words show that Rée has no clue that there are actions -- not a donkey's actions, to be sure, but human actions -- where a motive that has become conscious lies between us and the action. Rée demonstrates his blindness again, a few pages later, with these words:
“We do not perceive the causes that determine our will, and so we believe it is not causally determined at all.”
[16] Enough now of examples proving that many who fight against [dismiss/dispute]freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
“We do not perceive the causes that determine our will, and so we believe it is not causally determined at all.”
[16] Enough now of examples proving that many who fight against [dismiss/dispute]freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
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But enough of examples proving that many who argue against freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
All the other translators have a similar version like this which I think captures Steiner's spirited "attitude". We don't want to tame the rebel do we? [Doch is absolutely emphatic – not easy to capture this in pure English! Revised to avoid any German idiomatic accent. Enough! These examples are ample proof that many know absolutely nothing about the freedom that their arguments dismiss. This is too explosive. Surely these examples are enough proof that many who refute freedom know absolutely nothing about the freedom they dismiss. There is no but implied in the German.] |
1.9 Knowledge of The Motive
[17] It is obvious that an action cannot be free if the doer carries it out without knowing why. But what about the freedom of an action when its motives [are known] have been considered? This leads us to the question of the origin and significance of thinking.For without knowledge of the thinking activity of the mind, it is impossible to form a concept of what it means to know anything, including what it means to have knowledge of an action. When we realize what thinking in general means it will be easy to see clearly the role thinking plays in human action. Hegel is right when he says that “only thinking turns the soul, which animals also possess, into spirit.” It will also be thinking that gives human action its distinguishing features.
[17] It is obvious that an action cannot be free if the doer carries it out without knowing why. But what about the freedom of an action when its motives [are known] have been considered? This leads us to the question of the origin and significance of thinking.
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[erkennen does not mean understand. This distinction may seem obscure and unnecessary to the English reader, but it is significant to the German reader therefore to the author. Discarded option: fully understand.]
A study of chapter 3 should be enough to understand what thinking "in general" means without "fully" understanding. POF is a complete structure of thought (a product independent thinking) so we should find its word definitions within itself. Referring to Steiner's later mission work for others needs to be done very cautiously as skeptics rather than followers. [Wholeheartedly agree. It would be missing PoF’s point to avoid defining PoF in its own terms.] |
1.10 Action Springs from the Heart
[18] I certainly do not intend to imply that all our actions flow only from the sober deliberations of our reason. Actions that follow from abstract judgment alone are far from being the only actions that I would call human in its highest sense. But the moment our conduct lifts itself above the satisfaction of purely animal desires, our motives are always shaped by thoughts. Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that do not allow themselves to be reduced to cold rational concepts of the understanding. It is said that this is where heart-felt sensibility prevails. No doubt. But the heart and its sensibilitydo not create the no motives of action. The motives are already established earlier before being taken up in the realm of the heart. Compassion enters my heart only after the mental image/picture of a person arousing compassion appears in my consciousness. The way to the heart is through the head.
[18] I certainly do not intend to imply that all our actions flow only from the sober deliberations of our reason. Actions that follow from abstract judgment alone are far from being the only actions that I would call human in its highest sense. But the moment our conduct lifts itself above the satisfaction of purely animal desires, our motives are always shaped by thoughts. Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that do not allow themselves to be reduced to cold rational concepts of the understanding. It is said that this is where heart-felt sensibility prevails. No doubt. But the heart and its sensibility
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The meaning to aim for: Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that are not rationalized or understood through reductionist thinking.
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1.11 Formation of Mental Picture/Image
Love is no exception to this. If it is not merely the expression of the vulgar/base sexual drive, then it depends on the mental images/pictures we form of the loved one. The more idealistic are these mental pictures/images, the more blissful is our love. Even here, thought is the father of feeling.
Love is no exception to this. If it is not merely the expression of the vulgar/base sexual drive, then it depends on the mental images/pictures we form of the loved one. The more idealistic are these mental pictures/images, the more blissful is our love. Even here, thought is the father of feeling.
1.12 Seeing Good Qualities
It is said that love makes us blind to the flaws of the loved one. But we can turn this around and say that love opens our eyes to the good qualities of the loved one. Many pass by without noticing these good qualities. One person sees them and, just because of this, love awakens within. What has this person done other than make a mental image/picture of something that hundreds of others have failed to see? Others do not love because they lack the mental image/picture.
[19] We can consider the subject from whatever point we like, yet it becomes ever clearer that an investigation into the origin of thought is required before questioning the nature of human action. So I will turn to this question now.
It is said that love makes us blind to the flaws of the loved one. But we can turn this around and say that love opens our eyes to the good qualities of the loved one. Many pass by without noticing these good qualities. One person sees them and, just because of this, love awakens within. What has this person done other than make a mental image/picture of something that hundreds of others have failed to see? Others do not love because they lack the mental image/picture.
[19] We can consider the subject from whatever point we like, yet it becomes ever clearer that an investigation into the origin of thought is required before questioning the nature of human action. So I will turn to this question now.
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note: "Seeing Good Qualities" seeing, eyes, relates to sensationalism. I don't mean to imply limitation of sensationalism.
[Sensational phenomena of the seeing mind?] [‘From whatever point we like’ has to be a subtle joke on those who do not believe we have the liberty to want as we like.] |
======== end of Chapter 1 =========
To get the green type to
To get the green type to show you need to click on the "input format" link at the bottom of the text box and then select "text editor" and then save it.
Greenhorn
I tried all the options I could see in a blur of late-nightis, Tom. Thanks for the tip, and for fixing the display formatting.
Important question, Mr. Ralph!
Of course, the text you added should be marked - but not just marked!
Any added text belongs in a footnote with an explanation by the editor why he thinks the addition is necessary and why he thinks Steiner omitted it.
[All mental pictures are now mental images.]
What does that mean?
Mean
In Tom's draft the term 'mental picture' was used.
In the draft above the term 'mental image' is used in place of 'mental picture' for the German word Vorstellung. This is why I noted it.
Why choose 'mental image'?
'Mental image' is in common usage and reflects what earlier translators tried to achieve with with the unfamiliar term 'mental picture' or 'mental representation', but is a more generally known term.
Whether this term accurately reflects what Steiner actually intended we can explore in a new thread if necessary. It has been considered a tricky area by previous translators. Is it right? Let's get it right!
Mind Vorstellung?
Thank you. Now I understand what you meant in that vague remark about both expressions >mental picture< and >mental image<. It is correct that if an expression is replaced by another this must be announced and brought to the attention of everyone concerned.
Isn't the German word Vorstellung and how Steiner uses it the real problem?
Does Vorstellung belong to those German words for which apparently the English language had no need to develop?
Isn't the history of the word Vorstellung and how its various meanings developed and how German scientific research - presumably in philosophy and psychology - in which this word appeared was received by English speaking science relevant?
Who introduced the word Vorstellung into the German language and why? In what context did this noun arise - was the verb already in existence and what did it mean? Was it a substitute for a Latin word used in philosophy and psychology? Was the Latin predecessor adapted from ancient Greek?
Agreement
I agree that the issue to be considered is what Steiner meant and then we can try to capture that in English.
Please feel free to start a new Journal on this issue, Beginner, to keep this thread from becoming too full.
I believe that Vorstellung is important as an aid to understanding the difference between thinking as an activity and our perception THROUGH thinking.
spiritual perception
You always have to be careful about importing Steiner's later works into POF. These are a consideration, but his later work was given to a different audience: theosophists. Steiner's post POF work was more focused on spiritual perception, and was the results of spiritual perception. This is different than his path to achieve spiritual perception.
perception
Are we on a crossed wire here, Tom? I carefully made no mention of anything outside PoF.
free thinker: intellectually free being
Opening sentence: Ist der Mensch in seinem Denken und Handeln ein geistig freies Wesen oder steht er unter dem Zwange einer rein naturgesetzlichen ehernen Notwendigkeit?
Is man, in his thinking and doing—an [geistig] ( intellectually) free being—or does he stand under the compulsion of an iron necessity of purely natural lawfulness.
Is the human being in thought and action a free thinker, or inescapably controlled by natural laws?
"Free thinker" replaces "intellectually free being" (geistig freies Wesen).
This version brings in "free thinker" vs. "control" by natural laws, which I think is the question for today.
Shift of meaning?
Does Tom's suggestion above shift Steiner's meaning too much?
It appears to me that Tom conflates the activity of thinking with the German concept of geistig. Is this justifiable? Is it the real question that motivates the author to write PoF?
How about:
Does the human being have any capacity for freedom in thinking and action, or are we inescapably controlled by entirely natural laws?
I will add these to the list of suggestions.
adjective versus noun
The German sentence contains the opposition between an adjective frei (free) and a noun Zwang (compulsion).
However, the sentence does not have the structure of a simple decision question (positive or negative judgment), rather has a complicated structure of two questions, each containing one partner of this opposition.
response to John's comments
I accepted your 11/10/2009 suggests except for this few issues.
the innate necessity of our character/our characterological disposition;
innate: not established by conditioning or learning
In chapter 1 we are looking at our inborn desires (child desire for milk) given by nature and our conditioned desires from society (mental pictures formed). Our characterological disposition is composed of mental pictures we form. So using "innate necessity" with character blurs that distinction.
Characterological disposition is an important POF term explained in detail in chapter 9 and a real term in science so it can't be dismissed. I don't see much confusion since the reader sees character and disposition in the term which explains it really. The reader should understand the word "necessity" by now. The most we could do is call it character and charaterological disposition : .....but rather according to the necessity of our character (characterological disposition).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
John: 1.7 This thought has been very clearly expressed in sharply outlined words [This is a meaningless phrase in English.]
in scharf-umrissenen Worten gekennzeichnet
denoted in sharply outlined words
scharf: sharp, keen
umrissenen: define, outline
Worten:
gekennzeichnet: denote, characterize
I think Steiner is saying that Hamerling's wording was clearly defined and precise but not so in the English translation because of the want/will problem. That is why I didn't use words like "clear" because I consider it possibly the most unclear section in the book. I went with a more vague "sharply outlined".
But I have a translators perspective. The reader will assume the section is clearly defined. I like sharply defined because of the sharp concentration required to read it. It is painful to read, ---"sharp".
sharp: keenly and painfully felt; as if caused by a sharp edge or point
What about: This thought has been outlined in sharply defined words by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>.
Doch genug der Beispiele, welche beweisen, daß viele gegen die Freiheit kämpfen, ohne zu wissen, was Freiheit überhaupt ist.
[16] Enough now of examples proving that many who fight against freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
The German word means "fight" though the translators have used fight, argue, and oppose.
I like fight because this is not just philosophy to "argue" about. You have to fight for inner and outer freedom every day. Others are using everything they have to take it away from you. This book is about a fight for freedom.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that cannot be analysed away into / should not be reduced to cold concepts of the understanding.
Should not be reduced to concepts looks like an attack upon conceptual thinking, the path of this book. Pure thinking requires reducing everything to concepts. But feelings can be dismissed by "analyzing them away" as a cold intellectual which is something different.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
mental image/picture
My hunch is if we think it through we will find "representation", which is the philosophy meaning of Vorstellung, to be the only word that can encompass the vast meaning of mental picture. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 try to explain what a mental picture is and give many meanings. In chapter 4 we will need to know what word to use.
All of these various meanings are ways we represent things. You can find major flaws in the other terms. But "representation" reads very poorly for a new reader.
Hoernle is the only translator that tried to use different words for Vorstellung depending on the context. I am gaining respect for Hoernle. He is the only English translator up until now that actually applied thinking to his translation. The others were anthroposophical society dogmatists who liked to define a word according to "Steinerism" and then just plop it in mindlessly. Hoernle, from what I can find, was very intelligent and accomplished in German, English, philosophy and actually thought through the philosophy issues in the book and wrote about them on his own outside the fixed thinking found in anthroposophy. I haven't found any evidence he was an anthroposophist. I think he was chosen to translate because of his qualifications rather than his loyalty to Steinerism. He wrote to the world as Steiner did in POF rather than to a narrow-minded group of follwers which the other barely qualified translators wrote for. (this is not to diminish their contribution but only to put it in perspective)
We can try using various words for Vorstellung but may have to settle for one. In chapter 1 Hoernle used "idea" in 1.4 when the Vorstellung came from the outside and "thought" later when we formed it since chapter 1 was about recognizing how "thought" was behind everything. It was a great try but doesn't seem to fit quit right.
Few lines to settle on in chp. 1
We still have these to resolve in chapter 1:
1. This thought has been outlined in sharply defined words by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will:
2. [16] Enough now of examples proving that many who fight against freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
3. Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that cannot be analysed away into cold concepts of the understanding.
Few lines 1
Tom raised a number of points above that I will respond to individually.
Vorstellung will become a separate journal and I will paste in the comments so far.
This thought has been outlined in sharply defined words by poet and philosopher Robert Hamerling in his Atomistics of the Will:
I suggest:
This thought has been very pointedly expressed by poet...
or:
This thought has been expressed in sharply pointed words by poet...
clearly outlined
"Words" isn't essential here and these words have changed in English. I think the section does clearly outline the thought. "Expressed" is an added word.:
This thought has been clearly outlined by poet...
OK
OK, but I thought that sharply outlined would be better. Never mind.
Congratulations to us
I don't want to discourage the reader with "clearly" so I would prefer "sharply outlined".
With that we have come to an agreement with a draft of chapter 1. I think we can easily agree the sum is greater than the addition of the parts (the contributors), and that group intuitive thinking is possible on the web. Now all we have to do is endure until the end.
This thought has been sharply outlined by poet...
[16] Enough now of examples proving that many who fight against freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom is.
Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces that do not let themselves be reduced to cold rational concepts.
It is said that this is where heart-felt sensibility prevails.
Enduring
Tom wrote: Now all we have to do is endure until the end.
Much better is : Now all we have to do is endure and develop our technique until the end.
Otherwise agree to your assessment.
Few lines 2
Doch genug der Beispiele, welche beweisen, daß viele gegen die Freiheit kämpfen, ohne zu wissen, was Freiheit überhaupt ist.
[16] Enough now of examples proving that many who* fight *against freedom know absolutely nothing of what freedom really is.
Tom wrote: The German word means "fight" though the translators have used fight, argue, and oppose. I like fight because this is not just philosophy to argue about. You have to fight for inner and outer freedom every day. Others are using everything they have to take it away from you. This book is about a fight for freedom.
I hear you Tom, but these folk know absolutely nothing of what freedom is so these are not the folk who are trying to take it away from you. They are only battling in ignorance against an idea that they do not recognise. So they dismiss it. (DISMISS: Bar from attention or consideration; cease to consider; put out of judicial consideration; declare void) I am fully aware that the word dismiss is not a translation of kämpfen but it precisely describes what is going on here. You rightly said that You have to fight for inner and outer freedom every day, but this only possible once you have recognised what freedom really is. In this one sentence paragraph (unique in the chapter) Steiner dismisses the guys who are shooting blanks wildly.
The word kämpfen can be translated in many ways that remain within the context of philosophical dispute. If you want a fight then a fight it is.
English gentleman?
We took "moral fervor" and reduced it to "high moral tone".
Now we should take "fight against freedom"" and reduce it to "argue against freedom"?
In chapter 1 we are dealing with people driven by animal instincts and conditioned behavior. What are you, an English gentleman?
Argue?
Many thanks for the backhanded complement, Tom, but I doubt that I deserve it.
The argue comes from an earlier comment (I think it may have been one of yours) that I pasted in. I have since shifted my position after considering yesterday's realisation of the overall gesture of paragraph 16.
I did not post another revision yesterday as I wanted to resolve all 3 lines first. Yesterday I was going to let you win your fight and revise to fight. Now I am rooting for dismiss or dispute. Today I am thinking that I will insert the dismiss/dispute options as well as fight unless we can reach a gentleman's agreement and shake hands on this matter... What say you, sir?
Few lines 3
Liebe, Mitleid, Patriotismus sind Triebfedern des Handelns, die sich nicht in kalte Verstandesbegriffe auflösen lassen.
Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that cannot be analysed away into / should not be reduced to cold concepts of the understanding.
Love, compassion, and patriotism are more than mere concepts. The German word is auflösen, meaning dissolve or disintegrate, so Tom’s suggestion of analysed away holds up. However it is not an easy read, so I had suggested reduced. The word analyse also means: consider in detail and subject to an analysis in order to discover essential features or meaning. This ambiguity is not helpful to the reader.
So, remembering that Tom gave a good argument against cannot in an earlier post, I suggest:
Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces for actions that should not be broken down into cold concepts of the understanding.
1-10 Dynamism
Love, compassion, and patriotism are driving forces that do not let themselves be reduced to cold rational concepts.
Referring to the outlook of this section, Dynamism, helped clear this up. Dynamism says forces are dominant everywhere, the force dominates the situation. This force (love, compassion, and patriotism) does not let itself be reduced to cold rational concepts.
It is said that this is where heart-felt sensibility prevails. (holds sway)
Rechte: right, law, justice; title, privilege, advantage, prerogative, something to which a person is entitled
Hmmm....
Ok Tom, I can go with the do not let themselves be reduced solution, although it jars me slightly as a reader. I may want to find something better later, but I can't indentify anything right now.
I am not a fan of the slightly archaic word, prevails (holds sway is absolutely intolerable) but I can appreciate that the meaning here has the quality of being the strongest so perhaps it makes a connection to paragraph 13: strongest of its kind. That phrase smacks of Dynamism in my mind. For me the phrase comes into its own makes more sense here than prevails.
But as you want to push so dynamically here I allow you to prevail.
A Couple of Suggestions:
Hi Tom and John,
This is reading really nicely, here are a couple of thoughts:
One and the same thing is proclaimed to be humanity's most precious possession as often as it is called its worst illusion. [I think greatest delusion would read better than worst illusion]
Endless subtle distinctions have been used to...
How about "Endless subtlety has been used"
Instead of characterological disposition (I agree this is a strange phrase and probably unnecessary) could we use something like "predisposition of [our] character"?
Surely the original text of Spencer did not use the word "negatived"? Perhaps you mean "negated"?
Regards,
Tim
Thanks for reviewing the
Thanks for reviewing the chapter Tim.
I just lost a lengthy post as to why but I will summarize. To change illusion to delusion means delusion appears twice with no illusion. Occultism, mood of chapter, refers to hidden from perception and cognition. Illusion (hidden from perception) delusion (hidden from cognition) so both need to be in section.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Endless subtle distinctions have been used to explain....
I think you identified a poor translation with Endless suble distinctions.. which others translate as endless subtlety.
From the Leo translator forum: In fact the other LEO definitions for Spitzfindigkeit: refinement, sophistry and subtleness do not really match either. "nitpickiness, finickiness or petty-minded discrimination" would be closer to the German meaning.
Spitzfindigkeit: academic hairsplitting
strictness, hairsplitting, making unnecessarily fine distinctions in reasoning,
sophistry: a deliberately invalid argument displaying ingenuity in reasoning in the hope of deceiving someone,
hairsplitting: unreasonably fine distinctions.
nitpick: To be concerned with or find fault with insignificant details.
There is likely nothing wrong with subtlety or making subtle distinctions unless they are insignificant and just used to make a bad case by ignoring the major influences.
Endless subtle distinctionsEndless insignificant distinctions? have been used to explain how human freedom can be compatible with determinism in nature, because the human being is so clearly a part of nature. No less effort has been put into explaining how this delusion has arisen.>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
characterological disposition has more to do with the meaning of "characterological" than disposition. (see 9-3) "predisposition of [our] character" could refer to inborn temperament which is a minor part of characterological (study of character). While chapter 1 isn't expected to know character in depth the connection to chapter 9 can't be deleted. And its use in chapter 9 is a complex study of character.
Tim’s view/Tom’s view
Illusion/delusion – taking on board Tom’s view, Tim’s suggestion puts more of an edge on the precious/worst divide. If that is a useful sharpening then I would suggest switching the words illusion and delusion in the text.
The German superlative is ärgste, which derives from the adjective arg meaning malicious, harmful or evil. Maybe worst is too gentlemanly here as even Google translates it as most fatal. How about most harmful?
Subtle distinctions could become insignificant distinctions as Tom suggests, or just perplexities.
Tom is in love with the term characterological because of what will come later. However the author, von Hartmann, was unaware of what Steiner would make of this term when he wrote it. I feel that we should try to translate von Hartmann in Chapter 1 and a simpler term is more meaningful to the reader at this point. I am waiting until we come to this term in Chapter 9 before pushing for a final decision here.
Yes, Spencer really did write negatived. Poppelbaum includes the original text if you do not want to find the freely available facsimile via Google. It comes quite close to the end of the book.
Lets make the change to
Lets make the change to insignificant distinctions unless Tim has a better suggestion.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>..
The German says illusion and delusion so we would need a strong case to change it which I don't see we have.
German - English
Illusion - illusion
Wahnidee - delusional idea
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>.
Let's do this:
One and the same thing is proclaimed to be humanity's most precious possession as often as it is called its most harmful illusion.
other translators:
most prized possesion - worst illusion
most precious possesion - worst illusion
most precious possesion - greatest illusion
most precious possesion - most fatal illusion
kostbarste: most precious, the choicest, treasure
ärgste: worst
arg: bad terrible
characterological disposition
I am of the view that it is not always necessary or beneficial to make certain terms simpler or more natural in POF. In my experience, for the thinking at this part of the book the term characterological disposition provides a "ponder point". That is to say, the fact that it demands of us some independent thinking to grasp its meaning in context is in fact its purpose. It is a technical term not a descriptive term so to reduce it to a descriptive term loses its value for the "technique" of thinking at this point of the book...what we gain in meaning we lose in the actual exercise of our thinking. That at least is how characterological dispostion has always and still seems to me. I am a lover of it for its ability to exercise the thinking outwith the flow of the argument at this part of the book and to test one's ability to re-enter the flow of the argument.
New google translation principle
Whenever I have trouble with a phrases in POF I usually look up words in the dictionary or google them. The dictionary provides as much as you need to know about "characterological disposition" in chapter 1. By making up new terms we disconnect from the world.
Dictionary
characterological:
based on character or the study of character including its development and its differences in different individuals
disposition:
1 a person’s inherent qualities of character.
2 an inclination or tendency.
New translation principle
I think we should look for words and phrases to use in POF whose meaning is widely available in dictionaries and google searches when possible.
"characterological disposition": google 7830
"innate necessity of our character" google: 0
"determinism in nature" google: 202,000
Chapter 1 revision
I propose we go back to "uniformity of natural law" in 1-0 because its meaning is widely available while "uniform continuity of natural law" is a puzzle that is not researchable.
Others who oppose them consider that it is the peak of unscientific thinking for anyone to believe that the uniformity of natural law is broken in the field of human action and thought.
"uniformity of natural law": google 481,000
"uniform continuity of natural law": google 0
Restatement of my principles of involvement
Dear Tom,
Just so that you remember, I am still not going to accept dictionaries or computers on this project as arbiters. So NO to all the above purely on the principle that trying to solve creative and qualitative issues with quantitative data is a false premise.
Posted
Amended - awaiting further improvements...
purely 1894 German
I am going over chapter 1 to check the original German with the 1918 revised German. I notice that Hoernle didn't make many of the small German revisions. But were these scattered word revisions really Steiner revisions or was someone else editing the German?
Here is one example where "drive" was added.
1894 If there is a difference between conscious and unconscious motives of actions,....
1918 If there is a difference between a conscious motive of action and an unconscious drive,...
I would expect Steiner revised this. The addition of "drive" more clearly distinguishes this section 1-5 which is decribing the difference between the doer and the knower. The knower has a conscious motive but no drive while the doer has drive.
How can we not include the addition of "drive" if it serves the reader in making the soul observation? I don't see how we can translate with academic purity (strictly 1894 original version). But rather need to decide in each case.
But as so often is the case, the original works better within the context. Blind urge is pointed out later in the sentence.
1-5 [8] If there is a difference between a conscious and an unconscious motive of action, then the conscious motive will result in an action that must be judged differently than one done out of blind urge. Our first question will consider this difference. The results of this inquiry will then determine the approach we need to take toward the question of freedom itself.
Moral Principle
Tom, I have noticed this from marking up the original text. I have thought about it quite often in the busy interlude since last working on the translation.
My view sways from (1) lets make it easy and stick to the original towards (2) lets apply PoF principles to each and every instance of a revision.
Option (1) is best for philosophical academics, who would probably throw up their hands in despair at option (2).
Option (2) - if we can make it work - could preserve Steiner's clarifications in the text and set aside the additional responses to von Hartmann's margin notes. However, producing a hybrid text (posthumous third edition?) would possibly compromise the author's integrity.
I believe we could make option 2 work as an original translation of the first edition with reference to texual corrections in the second edition. After working with our local study group, using Hoernle, I am less in love with that version. I would be prepared to abandon the 'Hoernle revision' brief in favour of a new translation that lights up the soul of the reader who gives everything to its study.
Whatever way we go, I look for a stable and moral principle, based on real discernment, that we can apply rigorously. The integrity of the author is paramount, whatever one's view of his later spiritual research.
For now I look, listen and think... and think again.
I am motivated to edit a
I am motivated to edit a Tom Last version specifically for the website study course. The published version would need to take into consideration the wants of the public, which you (John) may be better able to assess than myself.
Carl Unger's "Principles of Spiritual Science"
Any one else read it? I am just working with it. It is a gem. I think it is a must-read add-on to POF.
Poor old Mr Unger got shot as he was about to deliver a lecture about 1928 or 9. I would like to know more about him. I know he wasn't popular with the rank and file. Bless him. He writes a mean sentence.
Love
Bryn