Chapter 1 Conscious Human Action
Chapter 1
Conscious Human
Action
[1] Is man
in his thinking
and acting
a spiritually free being,
or is
he compelled
by the iron necessity
of purely natural law?
There are
few questions
upon which
so much sagacity
has been brought to bear.
The idea
of the freedom
of the human
will
has found
enthusiastic supporters and stubborn opponents
in plenty.
There are those
who,
in their moral fervor,
label anyone
a man
of limited intelligence
who can deny so patent
a fact
as freedom.
Opposed
to them
are
others
who regard it
as the acme
of unscientific thinking
for anyone
to believe
that
the uniformity of natural law
is broken
in the sphere
of human action
and thinking.
One
and the same thing
is thus proclaimed,
now
as the most precious possession
of humanity,
now
as its most fatal illusion.
Infinite subtlety
has been employed
to explain how
human freedom
can be consistent
with the laws
working
in nature,
of which man,
after all,
is a part.
No less is the trouble
to which
others
have gone
to explain how
such
a delusion
as this could have arisen.
That
we are dealing here
with one
of the most important questions
for life,
religion,
conduct,
science,
must be felt
by anyone
who includes any degree
of thoroughness
at
all in his make-up.
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It is
one
of the sad signs
of the superficiality
of present-day
thought
that a book
which
attempts
to develop
a new faith
out of the results
of recent scientific research,
has nothing more
to say
on this question
than
these words:
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"With
the question
of the freedom
of the human
will
we are not concerned.
The alleged freedom
of indifferent
choice
has been recognized
as an empty illusion
by every philosophy worthy
of the name.
The moral valuation
of human action
and
character
remains
untouched
by this problem.."
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It is not
because
I
consider that the book
in which
it occurs
has
any special importance that
I
quote this passage,
but
because
it seems
to me
to express
the view
to which
the thinking
of most
of our contemporaries
manages
to rise
in this matter.
Everyone
who claims
to have grown
beyond the kindergarten stage
of science
appears
to know nowadays
that freedom
cannot consist
in choosing,
at one's pleasure,
one or other
of two possible courses
of action.
There is always,
so
we are told,
a perfectly definite reason
why,
out of several possible actions,
we carry
out just one
and no other.
[2] This
seems obvious.
Nevertheless,
down to the present day,
the main attacks
of the opponents
of freedom
are directed only
against freedom
of choice.
Even
Herbert Spencer,
whose doctrines
are gaining
ground daily,
says,
"That everyone
is
at liberty
to desire or not
to desire,
which
is the real proposition involved
in the dogma
of free will,
is negated
as much
by the analysis
of consciousness,
as
by the contents
of the preceding chapter.."
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Others, too,
start
from the same point of view
in combating
the concept of free will.
The germs of all
the relevant arguments
are
to be found
as early
as Spinoza.
All that
he brought
forward
in clear and
simple language
against the idea
of freedom
has
since
been repeated
times
without number,
but
as a rule enveloped
in the most hair-splitting
theoretical
doctrines,
so that it
is difficult
to recognize
the straightforward train of thought
which is all that matters.
Spinoza
writes
in a letter
of October
or November, 1674,
"I call
a thing free which exists
and acts
from the pure necessity
of its nature,
and
I call
that unfree,
of which
the being
and action are precisely
and
fixedly determined
by something else.
Thus,
for example,
God,
though necessary,
is free
because
he exists only through
the necessity
of his own nature.
Similarly,
God cognizes himself
and all else freely,
because
it follows solely
from the necessity
of his nature
that
he cognizes all.
You see,
therefore,
that
for me
freedom consists not
in free decision,
but
in free necessity..
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[3]
"But let us
come down
to created
things
which
are all determined
by external causes
to exist
and
to act
in a fixed
and definite manner.
To perceive
this more clearly,
let us
imagine a perfectly simple case.
A stone,
for example,
receives
from an external cause
acting
upon it
a certain quantity
of motion,
by reason
of which
it necessarily continues to move,
after the impact
of the external cause
has ceased.
The continued motion
of the stone
is due to compulsion,
not to the necessity
of its own nature,
because
it requires
to be defined
by the thrust
of an external cause.
What is
true here for the stone
is true
also for every other
particular thing,
however
complicated
and
many-sided it
may be,
namely,
that everything
is necessarily determined
by external causes
to exist
and
to act
in a fixed
and definite manner.
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[4]
"Now,
please,
suppose
that
this stone during its motion
thinks and knows
that it
is striving
to the best
of its ability
to continue in motion.
This stone,
which is conscious
only of its
striving and
is by no
means
indifferent,
will believe
that it
is
absolutely free,
and
that it
continues in motion for no
other
reason
than its own
will
to continue.
But this
is just
the human freedom that everybody
claims to possess
and
which
consists
in nothing
but this,
that men
are conscious
of their desires,
but ignorant
of the causes
by which
they are determined.
Thus
the child
believes that
he desires
milk
of his own free will,
the angry boy
regards his desire
for vengeance
as free,
and the coward
his desire
for flight.
Again,
the drunken man
believes
that he
says
of his own free
will what,
sober again,
he would
fain have left unsaid,
and
as this prejudice is innate
in all men,
it is difficult
to free oneself
from it.
For,
although
experience
teaches us often enough
that man least
of all can temper his desires,
and that,
moved
by conflicting passions,
he sees
the better
and pursues
the worse,
yet
he considers himself free
because there are some things
which
he desires less strongly,
and some desires
which
he can easily inhibit
through the recollection
of something
else which it
is often possible
to recall.
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[5] Because this view
is so clearly
and definitely expressed
it is easy
to detect
the fundamental error
that it contains.
The same necessity
by which
a stone makes
a definite movement
as the result
of an impact,
is said to compel
a man to carry
out an action
when impelled thereto
by any reason.
It is only
because man
is conscious
of his action
that he
thinks himself
to be its originator.
But
in doing so
he overlooks the fact
that he
is driven by a cause
which
he cannot help obeying.
The error
in this train
of thought
is soon discovered.
Spinoza,
and
all
who think like
him,
overlook the fact
that man
not only is conscious
of his action,
but also may become conscious
of the causes
which guide him.
Nobody
will deny
that the child is unfree
when
he desires milk,
or the drunken man
when
he says things
which
he later regrets.
Neither knows anything
of the causes,
working
in the depths
of their organisms,
which exercise irresistible
control over them.
But is it justifiable
to lump
together actions
of this kind
with those
in which
a man
is conscious
not
only of his actions
but also of the reasons
which cause him to act?
Are the actions
of men really all of one
kind?
Should the act
of a soldier
on the field of battle,
of the scientific researcher
in his laboratory,
of the statesman
in the most complicated
diplomatic negotiations,
be placed scientifically
on the same level
with
that of the child
when
it desires milk:
It is
no doubt true
that it
is
best
to seek
the solution
of a problem
where the conditions
are simplest.
But inability to discriminate
has
before now caused
endless confusion.
There is,
after all,
a profound difference
between knowing
why
I am acting
and not knowing
it.
At first sight
this seems
a self-evident truth.
And yet
the opponents of freedom
never ask themselves
whether a motive
of action
which
I recognize and
see through,
is to be regarded
as compulsory
for me
in the same sense
as the organic process
which causes
the child
to cry for milk.
[6]
Eduard von Hartmann asserts
that the human will
depends
on two chief factors,
the motives
and the character.
If one regards men
as all alike,
or at any
rate the differences between them
as negligible,
then
their will appears
as determined from without,
that is to say,
by the circumstances
which
come
to meet them.
But
if
one bears in mind
that a man
adopts an idea,
or mental picture,
as the motive
of his action
only
if
his character
is
such that
this mental picture arouses
a desire in him,
then
he appears
as determined from
within and
not from
without.
Now because,
in accordance
with his character,
he must first adopt
as a motive
a mental picture given
to him from
without,
a man
believes
he is free,
that is, independent
of external impulses.
The truth,
however,
according to Eduard von Hartmann,
is that,
"even though
we ourselves first
adopt a mental picture
as a motive,
we do
so not arbitrarily,
but
according to
the necessity
of our characterological disposition,
that is,
we are anything
but free."
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Here
again the difference
between motives
which
I allow
to influence me only
after I
have permeated them
with my consciousness,
and those
which
I follow
without any clear knowledge
of them,
is absolutely ignored.
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[7] This
leads us straight
to the standpoint
from which
the subject
will be considered here.
Have
we any right
to consider
the question
of the freedom
of the will
by itself
at all?
And if not,
with what
other
question
must
it necessarily be connected?
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[8] If there is a difference
between a conscious motive
of action
and an unconscious urge,
then the conscious motive
will result in an action
which
must be judged differently
from one
that springs
from blind impulse.
Hence our first question
will concern this difference,
and
on the result
of this enquiry
will depend
what
attitude
we shall have
to take towards
the question
of freedom proper.
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[9] What
does
it mean
to have
knowledge
of the reasons
for one's action?
Too little attention
has been paid
to this question
because,
unfortunately,
we have torn
into two
what is really
an inseparable whole:
Man.
We have distinguished
between the knower
and the doer and
have left
out of account precisely
the one
who matters most
of all
-- the knowing doer.
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[10] It is said
that man
is free
when he
is controlled only
by his reason
and not by his animal passions.
Or again,
that to be
free means
to be
able
to determine one's life
and action
by purposes
and deliberate decisions.
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[11] Nothing
is gained
by assertions
of this sort.
For the question
is just
whether reason,
purposes,
and decisions
exercise the same kind
of compulsion
over a man
as his animal passions.
If without my co-operation,
a rational decision
emerges
in me
with the same necessity
with which
hunger and thirst arise,
then
I must needs obey it,
and my freedom
is an illusion.
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[12] Another form of expression runs:
to be free
does not mean
to be
able
to want as one
wills,
but
to be
able
to do as one
wills.
This thought
has been expressed
with great clearness
by the poet-philosopher
Robert Hamerling.
"Man can certainly do
as he wills,
but he
cannot want as he wills,
because
his wanting
is determined by motives.
He cannot want
as he wills?
Let us
consider these phrases more closely.
Have
they any intelligible meaning:
Freedom
of will would
then mean
being able
to want
without ground,
without motive.
But
what does wanting mean
if not
to have grounds
for doing,
or trying to do,
this
rather than that:
To want something
without ground
or motive
would be to want
something
without wanting
it.
The concept
of wanting
cannot be divorced
from the concept
of motive.
Without a determining motive
the will
is an empty faculty;
only through the motive
does it become active
and real.
It is,
therefore,
quite true
that the human
will is not "free"
inasmuch as
its direction
is always determined
by the strongest motive.
But
on the other hand
it must be admitted
that it
is absurd,
in contrast
with this "unfreedom",
to speak
of a conceivable freedom
of the will
which
would consist
in being able
to want
what
one does not want.
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[13] Here again,
only motives
in general
are mentioned,
without taking
into account
the difference
between unconscious and conscious motives.
If
a motive
affects me,
and
I am compelled to act
on it
because
it proves to be
the "strongest"
of its kind,
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