Chapter 14 Individuality And Genus
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[1] The view
that man
is destined
to become a complete,
self-contained,
free individuality
seems to be contested
by the fact
that
he makes
his appearance
as a member
of a naturally given totality
(race,
people,
nation,
family,
male
or female sex)
and also works
within a totality
(state,
church,
and so on).
He bears
the general characteristics
of the group
to which
he belongs,
and
he gives to his actions
a content
that is determined
by the position
he occupies among many others.
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[2] This
being so,
is individuality possible
at all?
Can
we regard man
as a totality
in himself,
seeing
that
he grows
out of one totality
and
integrates himself
into another?
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[3] Each member of a totality
is determined,
as regards
its characteristics
and functions,
by the whole totality.
A racial group
is a totality and
all the people belonging
to it bear
the characteristic
features
that are inherent
in the nature
of the group.
How
the single member is constituted,
and
how
he will behave,
are determined
by the character
of the racial group.
Therefore the physiognomy
and
conduct
of the individual
have
something generic
about them.
If
we ask
why
some particular thing
about a man
is like
this
or like that,
we are referred
back
from the individual
to the genus.
The genus
explains
why
something in the individual appears
in the form we observe.
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[4] Man,
however,
makes himself
free
from what is generic.
For the generic features
of the human race,
when rightly understood,
do not restrict
man's freedom,
and should not
artificially be made
to do so.
A man
develops qualities
and activities
of his own,
and the basis
for these
we can seek only
in the man himself.
What is generic
in him
serves only
as a medium
in which
to express
his own individual being.
He uses
as a foundation
the characteristics that nature
has given him,
and
to these
he gives a form
appropriate
to his own being.
If we
seek
in the generic laws the reasons
for an expression
of this being,
we seek in vain.
We are concerned
with something
purely individual
which
can be explained only
in terms
of itself.
If
a man
has achieved
this emancipation
from all that is generic,
and
we are nevertheless determined
to explain
everything
about him
in generic terms,
then we
have
no sense
for what is individual.
[5] It is impossible
to understand
a human being completely
if one takes
the concept
of genus
as the basis
of one's judgment.
The tendency
to judge according to
the genus
is
at its most stubborn
where
we are concerned
with differences
of sex.
Almost invariably man
sees in woman,
and woman in man,
too much
of the general character
of the other sex
and too little
of what is individual.
In practical life
this does less harm
to men than
to women.
The social position
of women
is
for the most part
such an unworthy one
because
in so many respects
it
is determined not
as it should be
by the particular characteristics
of the individual woman,
but
by the general picture
one has
of woman's natural tasks
and needs.
A man's activity in life
is governed
by his individual capacities
and inclinations,
whereas
a woman's is supposed
to be determined solely
by the mere fact
that she is a woman.
She
is supposed to be
a slave
to what
is generic,
to womanhood
in general.
As long
as men continue to debate
whether
a woman
is suited
to this or that profession
"according to
her natural disposition",
the so-called woman's question
cannot advance
beyond its most elementary stage.
What a woman,
within her natural limitations,
wants
to become
had better
be left
to the woman herself
to decide.
If it
is true
that women
are suited only
to that profession
which is theirs
at present,
then
they will hardly have it
in them
to attain any other.
But
they must be allowed
to decide
for themselves
what is
in accordance
with their nature.
To all
who
fear
an upheaval
of our social structure
through accepting women
as individuals
and not
as females,
we must reply that
a social structure
in which
the status
of one half
of humanity
is unworthy
of a human being
is itself
in great need
of improvement.
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[6] Anyone
who judges people
according to
generic characters
gets only
as far
as the frontier
where people
begin to be
beings whose activity
is based on free self-determination.
Whatever lies short
of this frontier
may naturally become
matter
for academic study.
The characteristics
of race,
people,
nation
and
sex are
the subject matter
of special branches
of study.
Only men
who wish
to live
as nothing
more than examples
of the genus
could possibly conform
to a general picture
such as arises
from academic study
of this kind.
But none of
these branches
of study
are able
to advance as far
as the unique content
of the single individual.
Determining the individual
according to
the laws
of his genus
ceases
where the sphere
of freedom
(in thinking and acting)
begins.
The conceptual content which man
has to connect
with the percept
by an act
of thinking
in order to have
the full reality
cannot be fixed
once and for all
and bequeathed ready-made
to mankind.
The individual
must get his concepts
through his own intuition.
How
the individual has
to think
cannot possibly be deduced
from any kind
of generic concept.
It depends simply
and
solely on the individual.
Just
as little is it possible
to determine
from the general characteristics
of man
what concrete
aims
the individual
may choose
to set himself.
If
we would understand
the single individual
we must find
our way
into his own particular
being
and not stop short
at those characteristics
that are typical.
In this sense
every single human being
is a separate problem.
And every kind
of study
that deals
with abstract
thoughts
and
generic concepts
is
but
a preparation
for the knowledge
we get
when
a human individuality tells us
his way
of viewing the world,
and
on the other hand
for the knowledge
we get
from the content
of his acts of will.
Whenever
we feel
that we
are dealing
with that element
in a man
which
is
free
from stereotyped thinking
and instinctive willing,
then,
if
we would understand him
in his essence,
we must cease
to call
to our aid any concepts
at all of
our own making.
The act
of knowing
consists
in combining
the concept
with the percept
by means of thinking.
With all other
objects
the observer must get
his concepts
through his intuition;
but
if we
are
to understand
a free individuality
we must take over
into our own
spirit those concepts
by which
he determines himself,
in their pure form
(without mixing
our own
conceptual content
with them).
Those
who immediately mix
their own concepts
into every judgment
about another person,
can never arrive
at the understanding
of an individuality.
Just
as the free
individuality
emancipates himself
from the characteristics
of the genus,
so must
the act
of knowing
emancipate itself
from the way
in which
we understand
what is generic.
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[7]
Only
to the extent
that a man
has emancipated himself
in this way
from all that is generic,
does
he count
as a free spirit
within a human community.
No man
is all genus,
none
is
all individuality;
but
every man gradually emancipates
a greater or lesser sphere
of his being,
both
from the generic characteristics
of animal life
and from domination
by the decrees
of human authorities.
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[8] As regards
that part
of his nature
where
a man
is not able
to achieve
this freedom
for himself,
he constitutes
a part
of the whole organism
of nature and spirit.
In this respect
he lives
by copying others
or
by obeying
their commands.
But
only that part
of his conduct
that springs
from his intuitions
can have ethical value
in the true sense.
And those moral instincts
that
he possesses
through the inheritance
of social instincts
acquire ethical value
through being taken up
into his intuitions.
It is
from individual ethical intuitions
and
their acceptance
by human communities
that all
moral activity of mankind originates.
In other words,
the moral life
of mankind
is the sum total
of the products
of the moral imagination
of free human individuals.
This is
the conclusion
reached by monism.
Footnotes:
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[1] Immediately
upon the publication
of this book (1894),
critics
objected
to the above arguments
that,
even now,
within the generic character
of her sex,
a woman
is able
to shape her life individually,
just
as she pleases,
and far more freely
than
a man
who is already
de-individualized,
first by the school,
and later
by war
and profession.
I am aware
that this objection
will be urged today (1918),
even more strongly.
None the less,
I feel
bound
to let
my sentences stand,
in the hope
that there are readers
who appreciate how violently
such
an objection
runs
counter
to the concept
of freedom
advocated
in this book,
and
who will judge
my sentences
above by a standard other
than
the de-individualizing
of man
through school
and profession. |
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