Chapter
Thirteen The Value
of Life
(Optimism
and Pessimism)
[1] One view
says
that this world
is the best
that could conceivably exist,
and
that
to live
and
to act in it
is a blessing
of untold value.
Everything that exists
displays
harmonious and purposeful co-operation
and is worthy
of admiration.
Even
what is apparently bad
and
evil may,
from a higher point of view,
be seen
to be good,
for it
represents
an agreeable contrast
with the good;
we are the more able
to appreciate
the good
when it
is clearly contrasted with evil.
Moreover,
evil is not genuinely real;
what
we feel
as evil
is only
a lesser degree
of good.
Evil is the absence
of good;
it has no significance
in itself.
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[2] The other
view
maintains
that life
is
full of misery
and want;
everywhere
pain
outweighs pleasure,
sorrow outweighs joy.
Existence
is
a burden,
and non-existence
would
in all
circumstances
be preferable
to existence.
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[3] The chief representatives
of the former view,
optimism,
are Shaftesbury
and Leibnitz;
those
of the latter,
pessimism,
are Schopenhauer
and Eduard von Hartmann.
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[4] Leibnitz
believes
the world
is the best
of all possible worlds.
A better one
is impossible.
For God
is good and wise.
A good God
wants
to create the best possible world;
a wise God
knows
which is the best possible
-- He is able
to distinguish
the best
from all other possible worse ones.
Only
an evil
or an unwise God
would be able
to create
a world worse
than the best possible.
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[5] Whoever
starts
from this point of view
will find it easy
to lay down
the direction
that human action must follow
in order to
make
its contribution to the greatest good
of the world.
All
that man
need
do is
to find out
the counsels
of God
and to behave in accordance
with them.
If
he knows
what
God's intentions
are concerning the world
and mankind,
he will be able
to do
what is right.
And
he will be happy
in the feeling
that he
is adding his share
to the other good
in the world.
From this
optimistic standpoint,
then,
life
is worth living.
It must stimulate us
to co-operative participation.
[6] Schopenhauer
pictures things
quite differently.
He thinks
of the foundation
of the world not
as an all-wise
and all-beneficent being,
but as blind urge
or will.
Eternal striving,
ceaseless craving for satisfaction
which is ever beyond reach,
this is
the fundamental characteristic
of all active will.
For no sooner
is
one goal attained,
than a fresh need springs up,
and so on.
Satisfaction,
when
it occurs,
lasts only
for an infinitesimal time.
The entire remaining content
of our life
is unsatisfied craving,
that is, dissatisfaction
and suffering.
If at last blind craving
is dulled,
then all content
is gone
from our lives;
an infinite boredom
pervades
our existence.
Hence
the best
we can do
is
to stifle
all wishes and
needs within us
and exterminate
the will.
Schopenhauer's pessimism
leads
to complete inactivity;
his moral
aim
is
universal idleness.
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[7] From
the observation
of life
he hopes
to discover
whether pleasure
or pain
outweighs
the other
in the world.
He parades
whatever
appears
to men
as blessing
and fortune
before the tribunal
of reason,
in order to show
that all alleged
satisfaction
turns out
on closer inspection
to be illusion.
It is illusion
when
we believe that in health,
youth,
freedom,
sufficient income,
love
(sexual satisfaction),
pity,
friendship
and family life,
self-respect,
honor,
fame,
power,
religious edification,
pursuit
of science
and of art,
hope of a life
hereafter,
participation
in the progress
of civilization
-- that in all
these
we have sources
of happiness
and satisfaction.
Soberly considered,
every enjoyment
brings much more evil
and misery
into the world
than pleasure.
The disagreeableness
of the hangover
is always greater than
the agreeableness
of getting drunk.
Pain far
outweighs pleasure
in the world.
No man,
even though
relatively the happiest,
would,
if asked,
wish
to live through
this miserable life
a second time.
The pain
of created
beings is,
however,
nothing
but God's pain itself,
for the life
of the world
as a whole
is identical
with the life
of God.
An all-wise Being can,
however,
see his goal
only in
release
from suffering,
and,
since
all existence is suffering,
in release
from existence.
To transform
existence
into the far better state
of non-existence
is the purpose
of all creation.
The course of the world
is
a continuous battle
against God's pain,
which
ends
at last
with the annihilation
of all existence.
The moral life
of men,
therefore,
will consist
in taking part in
the annihilation
of existence.
God has created
the world
so that
through it He
may free Himself
from His infinite pain.
The world
is
"to be regarded,
more or less,
as an itching eruption
upon the Absolute,"
by means
of which
the unconscious healing power
of the Absolute
rids itself
of an inward disease,
"or
even as
a painful poultice
which
the All-One
applies
to himself
in order first
to divert
the inner pain outwards,
and
then
to get rid of it altogether."
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[8] Man has
to permeate
his whole
being
with the recognition
that the pursuit
of individual satisfaction
(egoism) is a folly,
and
that
he ought to be guided solely
by the task
of dedicating himself
to the redemption
of God
by unselfish devotion (service)
to the progress
of the world.
Thus,
in contrast
to Schopenhauer's,
von Hartmann's pessimism leads us
to activity
devoted
to a sublime task.
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[9] But is
it really based on experience?
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[10] To strive
for satisfaction
means
that our activity reaches out
beyond the actual content
of our lives.
A creature
is hungry,
that is,
it
strives
for repletion,
when its organic functions,
if they
are
to continue,
demand the supply
of fresh means
of life
in the form
of nourishment.
The striving
for honor
means
that a man only regards
what
he personally does or leaves
undone as valuable
when his activity
is approved by others.
The striving for knowledge
arises
when a man
finds that something is missing
from the world
that
he sees,
hears,
and so on,
as long
as he
has not understood it.
The fulfillment
of the striving
creates pleasure
in the striving individual,
failure creates pain.
It is important here
to observe that pleasure
and pain
are dependent
only upon the fulfillment
or non-fulfillment
of my striving.
The striving itself
can by no
means
be counted as pain.
Hence,
if
it happens
that
in the very moment
in which
a striving
is fulfilled
a new striving
at once arises,
this is
no ground
for saying that,
because
in every case
enjoyment
gives
rise
to a desire
for its repetition
or for a fresh pleasure,
my pleasure
has given birth
to pain.
I can speak
of pain
only
when desire
runs up
against the impossibility
of fulfillment.
Even
when
an enjoyment that
I have had
creates
in me the desire
for the experience
of greater
or more refined pleasure,
I cannot speak
of this desire
as a pain created
by the previous pleasure
until
the means
of experiencing
the greater
or more refined pleasure
fail me.
Only
when pain
appears
as a natural consequence
of pleasure,
as for instance
when
a woman's sexual pleasure
is followed
by the suffering
of childbirth
and the cares
of a family,
can
I find
in the enjoyment
the originator
of the pain.
If striving
by itself
called
forth pain,
then each reduction
of striving
would have
to be accompanied by pleasure.
But the opposite
is the case.
To have
no
striving
in one's life
creates boredom,
and
this is connected with displeasure.
Now,
since
it may be
a long time
before
striving
meets
with fulfillment,
and since,
in the interval,
it is content
with the hope
of fulfillment,
we must acknowledge
that the pain has nothing
whatever
to do
with the striving
as such,
but depends solely
on the non-fulfillment
of the striving.
Schopenhauer,
then,
is in any case wrong
to take
desiring
or striving (will)
as being
in itself
the source
of pain.
[11] In fact,
just
the opposite
is correct.
Striving (desiring) in itself
gives pleasure.
Who
does not know
the enjoyment given
by the hope
of a remote
but intensely desired
goal?
This joy
is the companion
of all labor
that gives us
its fruits
only in the future.
It is a pleasure
quite independent
of the attainment
of the goal.
For when
the goal
has been reached,
the pleasure of fulfillment
is added
as something new
to the pleasure
of striving.
If anyone
were to argue
that the pain caused
by an unsatisfied
aim
is increased
by the pain
of disappointed hope,
and that thus,
in the end,
the pain
of non-fulfillment
will eventually outweigh
the possible pleasure
of fulfillment,
we shall have to reply
that the reverse
may be the case,
and
that the recollection
of
past enjoyment
at a time
of unfulfilled
desire
will just
as often mitigate the pain
of non-fulfillment.
Whoever
exclaims
in the face
of shattered hopes,
"I have done my part,"
is a proof
of this assertion.
The blissful feeling
of having tried one's best
is overlooked
by those
who say of every
unsatisfied
desire
that not only is the joy
of fulfillment absent
but
the enjoyment
of the desiring itself
has been destroyed.
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[12] The fulfillment of a desire
brings pleasure
and
its nonfulfillment
brings pain.
But
from this
we
must not conclude
that pleasure is the satisfaction
of a desire,
and pain
its non-satisfaction.
Both pleasure
and pain
can be experienced
without being
the consequence
of desire.
Illness
is
pain not preceded
by desire.
If
anyone were to maintain
that illness
is unsatisfied
desire
for health,
he would be making the mistake
of regarding
the unconscious
wish not
to fall ill,
which
we all take for granted,
as a positive desire.
When
someone receives
a legacy
from a rich relative
of whose existence
he had not
the faintest idea,
this fills him
with pleasure
without any preceding desire.
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[13] Hence,
if
we set out to enquire
whether
the balance
is
on the side
of pleasure or of pain,
we must take into account
the pleasure
of desiring,
the pleasure
at the fulfillment
of a desire,
and the pleasure
which
comes
to us
without any striving.
On the other side
of the account
we shall have
to enter
the displeasure
of boredom,
the pain
of unfulfilled striving,
and lastly the pain
which
comes
to us
without any desiring
on our part.
Under this last
heading
we shall have
to put also
the displeasure
caused by work,
not chosen
by ourselves,
that has been forced
upon us.
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[14] This leads
to the question:
What
is
the right method
for striking the balance
between these credit
and debit columns?
Eduard von Hartmann believes
that it
is reason
that holds the scales.
It is true
that
he says,
"Pain and pleasure
exist only in so far
as they are actually felt."
It follows
that there can be no yardstick
for pleasure other
than the subjective one
of feeling.
I must feel
whether the sum
of my disagreeable feelings
together
with my agreeable feelings
leaves me
with a balance
of pleasure
or of pain.
But for all that,
von Hartmann
maintains that,
"though the value
of the life
of every person
can be set
down only according to his own
subjective measure,
yet
it by no means
follows
that every person is able
to arrive
at the correct algebraic sum
from all
the collected emotions
in his life
-- or,
in other words,
that his total estimate
of his own life,
with regard to
his subjective experiences,
would be
correct."
With this,
the rational estimation
of feeling
is once more made
the evaluator.
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[15] Anyone
who follows fairly closely
the line
of thought
of such thinkers
as Eduard von
Hartmann
may believe it necessity,
in order to arrive
at a correct valuation
of life,
to clear
out of the way those factors
which
falsify
our judgment
about the balance
of pleasure and pain.
He can try
to do
this in two ways.
Firstly,
by showing
that our desire
(instinct, will)
interferes
with our sober estimation
of feeling values
in a disturbing way.
Whereas,
for instance,
we ought to say
to ourselves
that sexual enjoyment
is a source
of evil,
we are misled
by the fact
that the sexual instinct
is very strong
in us
into conjuring up
the prospect of a pleasure
which
just is not there
in that degree
at all.
We want
to enjoy ourselves;
hence
we do not admit
to ourselves
that we
suffer under the enjoyment.
Secondly,
he can do it
by subjecting feelings
to a critical examination
and
attempting
to prove
that the objects
to which
our feelings
attach themselves
are revealed
as illusions
by the light
of reason,
and
that they
are destroyed from the moment
that our ever growing intelligence
sees through the illusions.
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[16] He can think
of the matter
in the following way.
If an ambitious man
wants
to determine clearly
whether,
up to the moment
of his enquiry,
there has been a surplus
of pleasure or
of pain
in his life,
then he
has
to free himself
from two sources
of error
that may affect his judgment.
Being ambitious,
this fundamental feature
of his character
will make him
see the joys
due to
the recognition of his achievements
through a magnifying glass,
and the humiliations
due to his rebuffs
through a diminishing glass.
At the time
when
he suffered the rebuffs
he felt
the humiliations
just
because he
was ambitious;
in recollection
they appear
to him
in a milder light,
whereas the joys
of recognition
to which
he is so susceptible
leave a far deeper impression.
Now,
for an ambitious man
it is
an undeniable blessing
that it should be so.
The deception
diminishes his pain
in the moment
of self-analysis.
None the less,
his judgment
is wrong.
The sufferings over which
a veil is now drawn
were actually experienced
by him
in all their intensity,
and
hence
he enters them
at a wrong valuation
in his life's account book.
In order to
arrive
at a correct estimate,
an ambitious man
would have
to lay
aside his ambition
for the time
of his enquiry.
He would have
to review
his past life
without any distorting glasses
before his mind's eye.
Otherwise
he would resemble
a merchant who,
in making
up his books,
enters
among the items
on the credit
side his own zeal
in business.
[17] But
the holder of this view
can go
even further.
He can say:
The ambitious man
will even make
clear
to himself
that
the recognition he pursues
is a worthless thing.
Either
by himself,
or through the influence
of others,
he will come
to see
that for an intelligent man
recognition by others
counts for very little,
seeing that
"in all such matters,
other than
those
that are
questions
of sheer
existence or that
are already finally settled
by science,"
one can be quite sure
"that the majority is wrong
and the minority right....
Whoever
makes
ambition
the lode-star
of his life
puts
his life's happiness
at the mercy
of such a judgment."
If the ambitious man
admits all this to himself,
then
he must regard
as illusion
what his ambition
had pictured as reality,
and thus
also
the feelings attached
to these illusions
of his ambition.
On this basis
it could
then be said
that such feelings
of pleasure
as are produced
by illusion
must also be struck
out of the balance sheet
of life's values;
what
then remains
represents the sum total
of life's pleasures
stripped
of all illusion,
and
this is so small
compared
with the sum total
of pain
that life
is no joy
and non-existence preferable
to existence.
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[18] But
while it
is immediately evident
that the deception produced
by the instinct
of ambition
leads
to a false result
when striking
the balance
of pleasure,
we must none
the less
challenge
what has been said
about the recognition
of the illusory character
of the objects
of pleasure.
The elimination
from the credit side
of life
of all pleasurable feelings
which accompany actual
or supposed
illusions
would positively falsify
the balance
of pleasure and pain.
For an ambitious man
has genuinely enjoyed
the acclamations
of the multitude,
irrespective of
whether subsequently
he himself,
or some other person,
recognizes
that this acclamation
is an illusion.
The pleasant sensation
he has had
is not
in the least diminished
by this recognition.
The elimination
of all such "illusory" feelings
from life's balance
does not make
our judgment
about our feelings more correct,
but
rather obliterates
from life
feelings
which
were
actually there.
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[19] And
why should
these feelings
be eliminated?
For
whoever has them,
they are certainly pleasure-giving;
for
whoever has conquered them,
a purely mental but none
the less significant pleasure arises
through the experience
of self-conquest
(not through the vain emotion:
What a noble fellow
I am!
but
through the objective sources
of pleasure
which
lie
in the self-conquest).
If
we strike
out feelings
from the pleasure side
of the balance
on the ground
that they
are attached to objects
which
turn out
to have been
illusory,
we make
the value
of life dependent
not on the quantity
but on the quality
of pleasure,
and this,
in turn,
on the value
of the objects
which
cause the pleasure.
But
if
I want
to determine
the value
of life
in the first place
by the quantity
of pleasure
or pain
which
it brings,
I may
nor presuppose
something else which
already determines the positive
or negative
value
of the pleasure.
If
I say
I want to compare
the quantity
of pleasure
with the quantity
of pain
in order to
see which is greater,
I am bound
to bring
into my account all pleasures
and pains
in their actual intensities,
whether they
are based
on illusions
or not.
Whoever
ascribes
a lesser value
for life
to a pleasure
which
is based
on an illusion
than
to one
which
can justify itself
before the tribunal
of reason,
makes the value
of life dependent
on factors other
than pleasure.
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[20] Whoever
puts down pleasure
as less valuable
when it
is attached
to a worthless object,
resembles
a merchant
who enters
the considerable profits
of a toy
factory
in his account
at a quarter
of their actual amount
on the ground
that the factory produces nothing
but playthings
for children.
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[21] If the point
is simply
to weigh
quantity
of pleasure
against quantity
of pain,
then
the illusory character
of the objects
causing
certain feelings of pleasure
must be left
right
out of the question.
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[22] The method
recommended
by von Hartmann,
that is,
rational consideration
of the quantities
of pleasure
and pain
produced
by life,
has thus
led us
to the point
where
we know how
we are to set
out our accounts,
what we
are
to put down
on the one side
of our book and
what
on the other.
But
how is the calculation now
to be made?
Is reason
actually capable
of striking the balance?
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[23] A merchant
has made a mistake
in his reckoning
if
his calculated
profit
does not agree
with the demonstrable results
or expectations
of his business.
Similarly,
the philosopher
will undoubtedly have made
a mistake
in his estimate
if
he cannot demonstrate in actual
feeling
the surplus
of pleasure,
or pain,
that he
has somehow extracted
from his accounts.
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[24] For the present
I shall not look
into the calculations
of those pessimists
whose opinion of the world
is measured
by reason;
but
if
one is to decide
whether
to carry
on the business
of life or not,
one will first demand
to be shown
where the alleged surplus
of pain
is
to be found.
[25] Here
we touch
the point
where
reason
is not
in a position
to determine
by itself
the surplus
of pleasure or of pain,
but
where
it must demonstrate
this surplus
as a percept
in life.
For man
reaches reality
not through concepts alone
but
through the interpenetration
of concepts
and percepts
(and feelings
are percepts)
which
thinking
brings about
(see page 67 ff.).
A merchant,
after all,
will give
up his business
only
when
the losses calculated
by his accountant
are confirmed
by the facts.
If this
does not happen,
he gets
his accountant
to make
the calculation
over again.
That is exactly
what
a man
will do
in the business
of life.
If a philosopher
wants to prove to him
that the pain is
far greater than the pleasure,
but
he himself does not feel
it to be so,
then
he will reply,
"You have gone astray
in your reckoning;
think it
all out again."
But should there come
a time
in a business
when
the losses
are really so great
that the firm's credit no longer
suffices
to satisfy the creditors,
then
bankruptcy
will result
if the merchant
fails
to keep himself
informed
about the state
of his affairs
by careful accounting.
Similarly,
if the quantity
of pain
in a man's life
became
at any time so great
that no hope
of future pleasure
(credit)
could help him
to get over the pain,
then
the bankruptcy of life's business
would inevitably follow.
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[26] Now
the number
of those
who kill themselves
is relatively unimportant
when compared
with the multitude
of those
who live bravely on.
Only very few men
give
up the business
of life
because
of the pain involved.
What follows
from this?
Either
that it
is untrue
to say
that
the quantity
of pain
is greater than the quantity
of pleasure,
or
that we
do not
at all make
the continuation
of life dependent
on the quantity
of pleasure
or pain
that is felt.
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[27] In a very curious way,
Eduard von Hartmann's pessimism comes
to the conclusion
that life
is valueless
because
it contains
a surplus
of pain
and yet affirms
the necessity
of going on
with it.
This necessity
lies
in the fact
that the world purpose
mentioned above
(page 177)
can be achieved only
by the ceaseless,
devoted
labour
of human beings.
But
as long
as men
still pursue
their egotistical cravings
they are unfit
for such selfless labour.
Not until
they have convinced themselves
through experience
and reason
that
the pleasures of life
pursued
by egoism
cannot be attained,
do they
devote themselves
to their proper tasks.
In this way
the pessimistic conviction
is supposed
to be
the source
of unselfishness.
An education
based
on pessimism
should exterminate egoism
by making it
see the hopelessness
of its case.
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[28] According to this view,
then,
the striving
for pleasure
is inherent
in human nature
from the outset.
Only
when fulfillment
is seen
to be impossible
does
this striving
retire
in favour
of higher tasks
for mankind.
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[29] It cannot be said
that egoism
is overcome
in the true sense
of the word
by an ethical world conception
that expects
a devotion
to unselfish aims
in life
through the acceptance
of pessimism.
The moral ideals
are said not
to be
strong enough
to dominate
the will until man
has learnt
that
selfish striving after pleasure
cannot lead to any satisfaction.
Man,
whose selfishness
desires
the grapes
of pleasure,
finds them
sour
because
he cannot reach them,
and so
he turns
his back
on them and
devotes himself
to an unselfish way of life.
Moral ideals,
then,
according to
the opinion
of pessimists,
are not strong enough
to overcome egoism;
but
they establish
their dominion
on the ground
previously cleared
for them
by the recognition
of the hopelessness
of egoism.
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[30] If men
by nature
were
to strive
after pleasure
but were unable
to reach it,
then annihilation
of existence,
and salvation
through non-existence,
would be
the only rational goal.
And
if one holds
the view that
the real bearer
of the pain
of the world
is God,
then
man's task
would consist
in bringing
about the salvation
of God.
Through the suicide of
the individual,
the realization of this aim
is not advanced,
but hindered.
Rationally,
God can only have created
men
in order to
bring about his salvation
through their actions.
Otherwise
creation would be purposeless.
And
it is extra-human purposes
that
such a world conception
has in mind.
Each one of us
has
to perform
his own particular task
in the general work
of salvation.
If
he withdraws
from the task
by suicide,
then the work
which was intended for him
must be done
by another.
Somebody else
must bear the torment
of existence
in his stead.
And
since
within every
being
it is
God
who
actually bears all pain,
the suicide does not
in the least
diminish
the quantity of God's pain,
but
rather imposes
upon God
the additional difficulty
of providing a substitute. |
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