Chapter 13 The Value Of Life Part 1
Chapter
Thirteen The Value
of Life
(Optimism
and Pessimism)
[1] One view
says
that this world
is the best
that could conceivably exist,
and
that
to live
and
to act in it
is a blessing
of untold value.
Everything that exists
displays
harmonious and purposeful co-operation
and is worthy
of admiration.
Even
what is apparently bad
and
evil may,
from a higher point of view,
be seen
to be good,
for it
represents
an agreeable contrast
with the good;
we are the more able
to appreciate
the good
when it
is clearly contrasted with evil.
Moreover,
evil is not genuinely real;
what
we feel
as evil
is only
a lesser degree
of good.
Evil is the absence
of good;
it has no significance
in itself.
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[2] The other
view
maintains
that life
is
full of misery
and want;
everywhere
pain
outweighs pleasure,
sorrow outweighs joy.
Existence
is
a burden,
and non-existence
would
in all
circumstances
be preferable
to existence.
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[3] The chief representatives
of the former view,
optimism,
are Shaftesbury
and Leibnitz;
those
of the latter,
pessimism,
are Schopenhauer
and Eduard von Hartmann.
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[4] Leibnitz
believes
the world
is the best
of all possible worlds.
A better one
is impossible.
For God
is good and wise.
A good God
wants
to create the best possible world;
a wise God
knows
which is the best possible
-- He is able
to distinguish
the best
from all other possible worse ones.
Only
an evil
or an unwise God
would be able
to create
a world worse
than the best possible.
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[5] Whoever
starts
from this point of view
will find it easy
to lay down
the direction
that human action must follow
in order to
make
its contribution to the greatest good
of the world.
All
that man
need
do is
to find out
the counsels
of God
and to behave in accordance
with them.
If
he knows
what
God's intentions
are concerning the world
and mankind,
he will be able
to do
what is right.
And
he will be happy
in the feeling
that he
is adding his share
to the other good
in the world.
From this
optimistic standpoint,
then,
life
is worth living.
It must stimulate us
to co-operative participation.
[6] Schopenhauer
pictures things
quite differently.
He thinks
of the foundation
of the world not
as an all-wise
and all-beneficent being,
but as blind urge
or will.
Eternal striving,
ceaseless craving for satisfaction
which is ever beyond reach,
this is
the fundamental characteristic
of all active will.
For no sooner
is
one goal attained,
than a fresh need springs up,
and so on.
Satisfaction,
when
it occurs,
lasts only
for an infinitesimal time.
The entire remaining content
of our life
is unsatisfied craving,
that is, dissatisfaction
and suffering.
If at last blind craving
is dulled,
then all content
is gone
from our lives;
an infinite boredom
pervades
our existence.
Hence
the best
we can do
is
to stifle
all wishes and
needs within us
and exterminate
the will.
Schopenhauer's pessimism
leads
to complete inactivity;
his moral
aim
is
universal idleness.
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[7] From
the observation
of life
he hopes
to discover
whether pleasure
or pain
outweighs
the other
in the world.
He parades
whatever
appears
to men
as blessing
and fortune
before the tribunal
of reason,
in order to show
that all alleged
satisfaction
turns out
on closer inspection
to be illusion.
It is illusion
when
we believe that in health,
youth,
freedom,
sufficient income,
love
(sexual satisfaction),
pity,
friendship
and family life,
self-respect,
honor,
fame,
power,
religious edification,
pursuit
of science
and of art,
hope of a life
hereafter,
participation
in the progress
of civilization
-- that in all
these
we have sources
of happiness
and satisfaction.
Soberly considered,
every enjoyment
brings much more evil
and misery
into the world
than pleasure.
The disagreeableness
of the hangover
is always greater than
the agreeableness
of getting drunk.
Pain far
outweighs pleasure
in the world.
No man,
even though
relatively the happiest,
would,
if asked,
wish
to live through
this miserable life
a second time.
The pain
of created
beings is,
however,
nothing
but God's pain itself,
for the life
of the world
as a whole
is identical
with the life
of God.
An all-wise Being can,
however,
see his goal
only in
release
from suffering,
and,
since
all existence is suffering,
in release
from existence.
To transform
existence
into the far better state
of non-existence
is the purpose
of all creation.
The course of the world
is
a continuous battle
against God's pain,
which
ends
at last
with the annihilation
of all existence.
The moral life
of men,
therefore,
will consist
in taking part in
the annihilation
of existence.
God has created
the world
so that
through it He
may free Himself
from His infinite pain.
The world
is
"to be regarded,
more or less,
as an itching eruption
upon the Absolute,"
by means
of which
the unconscious healing power
of the Absolute
rids itself
of an inward disease,
"or
even as
a painful poultice
which
the All-One
applies
to himself
in order first
to divert
the inner pain outwards,
and
then
to get rid of it altogether."
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[8] Man has
to permeate
his whole
being
with the recognition
that the pursuit
of individual satisfaction
(egoism) is a folly,
and
that
he ought to be guided solely
by the task
of dedicating himself
to the redemption
of God
by unselfish devotion (service)
to the progress
of the world.
Thus,
in contrast
to Schopenhauer's,
von Hartmann's pessimism leads us
to activity
devoted
to a sublime task.
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[9] But is
it really based on experience?
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[10] To strive
for satisfaction
means
that our activity reaches out
beyond the actual content
of our lives.
A creature
is hungry,
that is,
it
strives
for repletion,
when its organic functions,
if they
are
to continue,
demand the supply
of fresh means
of life
in the form
of nourishment.
The striving
for honor
means
that a man only regards
what
he personally does or leaves
undone as valuable
when his activity
is approved by others.
The striving for knowledge
arises
when a man
finds that something is missing
from the world
that
he sees,
hears,
and so on,
as long
as he
has not understood it.
The fulfillment
of the striving
creates pleasure
in the striving individual,
failure creates pain.
It is important here
to observe that pleasure
and pain
are dependent
only upon the fulfillment
or non-fulfillment
of my striving.
The striving itself
can by no
means
be counted as pain.
Hence,
if
it happens
that
in the very moment
in which
a striving
is fulfilled
a new striving
at once arises,
this is
no ground
for saying that,
because
in every case
enjoyment
gives
rise
to a desire
for its repetition
or for a fresh pleasure,
my pleasure
has given birth
to pain.
I can speak
of pain
only
when desire
runs up
against the impossibility
of fulfillment.
Even
when
an enjoyment that
I have had
creates
in me the desire
for the experience
of greater
or more refined pleasure,
I cannot speak
of this desire
as a pain created
by the previous pleasure
until
the means
of experiencing
the greater
or more refined pleasure
fail me.
Only
when pain
appears
as a natural consequence
of pleasure,
as for instance
when
a woman's sexual pleasure
is followed
by the suffering
of childbirth
and the cares
of a family,
can
I find
in the enjoyment
the originator
of the pain.
If striving
by itself
called
forth pain,
then each reduction
of striving
would have
to be accompanied by pleasure.
But the opposite
is the case.
To have
no
striving
in one's life
creates boredom,
and
this is connected with displeasure.
Now,
since
it may be
a long time
before
striving
meets
with fulfillment,
and since,
in the interval,
it is content
with the hope
of fulfillment,
we must acknowledge
that the pain has nothing
whatever
to do
with the striving
as such,
but depends solely
on the non-fulfillment
of the striving.
Schopenhauer,
then,
is in any case wrong
to take
desiring
or striving (will)
as being
in itself
the source
of pain.
[11] In fact,
just
the opposite
is correct.
Striving (desiring) in itself
gives pleasure.
Who
does not know
the enjoyment given
by the hope
of a remote
but intensely desired
goal?
This joy
is the companion
of all labor
that gives us
its fruits
only in the future.
It is a pleasure
quite independent
of the attainment
of the goal.
For when
the goal
has been reached,
the pleasure of fulfillment
is added
as something new
to the pleasure
of striving.
If anyone
were to argue
that the pain caused
by an unsatisfied
aim
is increased
by the pain
of disappointed hope,
and that thus,
in the end,
the pain
of non-fulfillment
will eventually outweigh
the possible pleasure
of fulfillment,
we shall have to reply
that the reverse
may be the case,
and
that the recollection
of
past enjoyment
at a time
of unfulfilled
desire
will just
as often mitigate the pain
of non-fulfillment.
Whoever
exclaims
in the face
of shattered hopes,
"I have done my part,"
is a proof
of this assertion.
The blissful feeling
of having tried one's best
is overlooked
by those
who say of every
unsatisfied
desire
that not only is the joy
of fulfillment absent
but
the enjoyment
of the desiring itself
has been destroyed.
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[12] The fulfillment of a desire
brings pleasure
and
its nonfulfillment
brings pain.
But
from this
we
must not conclude
that pleasure is the satisfaction
of a desire,
and pain
its non-satisfaction.
Both pleasure
and pain
can be experienced
without being
the consequence
of desire.
Illness
is
pain not preceded
by desire.
If
anyone were to maintain
that illness
is unsatisfied
desire
for health,
he would be making the mistake
of regarding
the unconscious
wish not
to fall ill,
which
we all take for granted,
as a positive desire.
When
someone receives
a legacy
from a rich relative
of whose existence
he had not
the faintest idea,
this fills him
with pleasure
without any preceding desire.
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[13] Hence,
if
we set out to enquire
whether
the balance
is
on the side
of pleasure or of pain,
we must take into account
the pleasure
of desiring,
the pleasure
at the fulfillment
of a desire,
and the pleasure
which
comes
to us
without any striving.
On the other side
of the account
we shall have
to enter
the displeasure
of boredom,
the pain
of unfulfilled striving,
and lastly the pain
which
comes
to us
without any desiring
on our part.
Under this last
heading
we shall have
to put also
the displeasure
caused by work,
not chosen
by ourselves,
that has been forced
upon us.
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[14] This leads
to the question:
What
is
the right method
for striking the balance
between these credit
and debit columns?
Eduard von Hartmann believes
that it
is reason
that holds the scales.
It is true
that
he says,
"Pain and pleasure
exist only in so far
as they are actually felt."
It follows
that there can be no yardstick
for pleasure other
than the subjective one
of feeling.
I must feel
whether the sum
of my disagreeable feelings
together
with my agreeable feelings
leaves me
with a balance
of pleasure
or of pain.
But for all that,
von Hartmann
maintains that,
"though the value
of the life
of every person
can be set
down only according to his own
subjective measure,
yet
it by no means
follows
that every person is able
to arrive
at the correct algebraic sum
from all
the collected emotions
in his life
-- or,
in other words,
that his total estimate
of his own life,
with regard to
his subjective experiences,
would be
correct."
With this,
the rational estimation
of feeling
is once more made
the evaluator.
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[15] Anyone
who follows fairly closely
the line
of thought
of such thinkers
as Eduard von
Hartmann
may believe it necessity,
in order to arrive
at a correct valuation
of life,
to clear
out of the way those factors
which
falsify
our judgment
about the balance
of pleasure and pain.
He can try
to do
this in two ways.
Firstly,
by showing
that our desire
(instinct, will)
interferes
with our sober estimation
of feeling values
in a disturbing way.
Whereas,
for instance,
we ought to say
to ourselves
that sexual enjoyment
is a source
of evil,
we are misled
by the fact
that the sexual instinct
is very strong
in us
into conjuring up
the prospect of a pleasure
which
just is not there
in that degree
at all.
We want
to enjoy ourselves;
hence
we do not admit
to ourselves
that we
suffer under the enjoyment.
Secondly,
he can do it
by subjecting feelings
to a critical examination
and
attempting
to prove
that the objects
to which
our feelings
attach themselves
are revealed
as illusions
by the light
of reason,
and
that they
are destroyed from the moment
that our ever growing intelligence
sees through the illusions.
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[16] He can think
of the matter
in the following way.
If an ambitious man
wants
to determine clearly
whether,
up to the moment
of his enquiry,
there has been a surplus
of pleasure or
of pain
in his life,
then he
has
to free himself
from two sources
of error
that may affect his judgment.
Being ambitious,
this fundamental feature
of his character
will make him
see the joys
due to
the recognition of his achievements
through a magnifying glass,
and the humiliations
due to his rebuffs
through a diminishing glass.
At the time
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