ChapterTen
Monism And The Philosophy Of
Spiritual Activity
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[1] The naive man,
who acknowledges
as real only
what
he can see
with his eyes and
grasp
with his hands,
requires
for his moral life,
also,
a basis
for action
that shall be perceptible
to the senses.
He requires
someone
or
something
to impart
the basis
for his action
to him
in a way
that his senses can understand.
He is ready
to allow
this basis
for action
to be dictated
to him
as commandments
by any man
whom
he considers
wiser or more powerful
than himself,
or whom he
acknowledges for some other
reason
to be a power over
him.
In this way
there arise,
as moral principles,
the authority
of family,
state,
society,
church and God,
as previously described.
A man
who is very
narrow minded
still puts
his faith
in some one person;
the more advanced man
allows his moral conduct
to be dictated
by a majority
(state, society).
It is always
on perceptible
powers
that he builds.
The man
who awakens
at last
to the conviction
that basically
these powers
are human beings
as weak
as himself,
seeks guidance
from a higher power,
from a Divine Being,
whom
he endows,
however,
with sense
perceptible features.
He conceives
this Being
as communicating
to him the conceptual content
of his moral life,
again in a perceptible way
-- whether
it be,
for example,
that God
appears
in the burning bush,
or
that He moves about
among men
in manifest human shape,
and
that their ears
can hear Him
telling them
what to do and
what not
to do.
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[2]
The highest stage
of development
of naive realism
in the sphere
of morality
is
that
where
the moral commandment (moral idea)
is separated
from every
being other
than oneself and
is thought of,
hypothetically,
as being
an absolute power
in one's own inner life.
What man
first took
to be
the external voice
of God,
he now takes
as an independent power
within him,
and speaks
of this inner voice
in such
a way
as
to identify
it
with conscience.
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[3] But in doing
this
he has already gone
beyond the stage
of naive consciousness
into the sphere
where the moral laws
have become independently existing standards.
There
they are
no longer carried
by real bearers,
but have become
metaphysical entities
existing
in their own right.
They are analogous
to the invisible
"visible forces"
of metaphysical realism,
which does not seek reality
through the part
of it
that man
has
in his thinking,
but hypothetically adds
it on
to actual experience.
These extra-human moral standards
always occur
as accompanying features
of metaphysical realism.
For metaphysical realism
is bound
to seek
the origin
of morality
in the sphere
of extra-human reality.
Here
there are
several possibilities.
If
the hypothetically assumed entity
is conceived
as in itself unthinking,
acting according to purely
mechanical laws,
as materialism
would have it,
then it
must also produce
out of itself,
by purely mechanical necessity,
the human individual
with all
his characteristic features.
The consciousness
of freedom
can
then be nothing
more than an illusion.
For
though
I consider myself the author
of my action,
it is the matter
of which
I am composed
and the movements
going on in it
that are working in me.
I believe myself free;
but
in fact
all my actions
are nothing
but the result
of the material processes
which
underlie
my physical
and mental organization.
It is said
that we
have the feeling
of freedom
only
because we
do not know
the motives compelling us.
"We must emphasize
that the feeling of freedom
is
due to the absence
of external compelling motives,,
motives,,...
Our action
is necessitated
as is our thinking."
[4] Another possibility
is
that a man may picture
the extra-human Absolute that lies
behind the world
of appearances
as a spiritual being.
In this case
he will also seek
the impulse
for his actions
in a corresponding spiritual force.
He will see
the moral principles
to be found
in his own reason
as the expression
of this
being itself,
which
has
its own special intentions
with regard to
man.
To this kind
of dualist
the moral laws
appear
to be dictated
by the Absolute,
and all
that man
has
to do
is
to use
his intelligence
to find out
the decisions
of the absolute
being
and
then
carry them out.
The moral world order
appears
to the dualist
as the perceptible reflection
of a higher order
standing
behind it.
Earthly morality
is the manifestation
of the extra-human world order.
It is not man
that matters
in this moral order,
but the being itself,
that is,
the extra-human entity.
Man shall do
as this
being wills.
Eduard von Hartmann,
who imagines
this being itself
as a Godhead
whose very existence
is a life
of suffering,
believes
that this Divine Being
has created
the world
in order
thereby
to gain
release
from His infinite
suffering,
Hence this philosopher
regards
the moral evolution
of humanity
as a process
which
is there
for the redemption
of God.
Only through
the building up
of a moral world order
by intelligent self-conscious individuals
can
the world
process
be led towards its goal...,
True existence
is the incarnation
of the Godhead;
the world process
is the Passion
of the incarnated Godhead
and
at the same
time the way of redemption
for Him
who was crucified
in the flesh;
morality,
however,
is the collaboration
in the shortening
of this path
of suffering
and redemption.
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Here man
does not act
because he wants to,
but
he shall act,
because it
is God's
will
to be redeemed.
Whereas
the materialistic dualist
makes man
an automaton whose actions
are only the result
of a purely mechanical system,
the spiritualistic dualist
(that is,
one
who sees the Absolute,
the Being-in-itself,
as something spiritual
in which man
has
no share
in his conscious experience)
makes him a slave
to the will
of the Absolute.
As in materialism,
so also
in one-sided spiritualism,
in fact
in any kind
of metaphysical realism
inferring
but not experiencing something
extra-human
as the true reality,
freedom
is
out of the question.
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[5] Metaphysical as well as naive realism,
consistently followed out,
must deny freedom
for one
and the same reason:
they both see man
as doing no
more than putting
into effect,
or carrying out,
principles forced (imposed)
upon him
by necessity.
Naive realism
destroys freedom
by subjecting man
to the authority
of a perceptible
being or
of one
conceived
on the analogy
of a perceptible being,
or eventually to the authority
of the abstract inner voice
which
it interprets as "conscience";
the metaphysician,
who merely infers
the extra-human reality,
cannot acknowledge freedom
because
he sees man
as being determined,
mechanically
or morally,
by a
"Being-in-itself".
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[6] Monism
will have
to recognize
that naive realism
is partially justified
because
it recognizes
the justification
of the world
of percepts.
Whoever is incapable
of producing moral ideas
through intuition
must accept them
from others.
In so far
as a man receives
his moral principles
from without,
he is
in fact unfree.
But
monism
attaches
as much significance
to the idea
as to the percept.
The idea,
however,
can come
to manifestation
in the human individual.
In so far
as man follows
the impulses
coming
from this side,
he feels himself
to be free.
But
monism denies all justification
to metaphysics,
which merely draws inferences,
and consequently
also to the impulses
of action
which are derived from so-called
"Beings-in-themselves".
According to
the monistic view,
man may act
unfreely-when
he obeys
some perceptible external compulsion;
he can act freely,
when
he obeys none
but himself.
Monism
cannot recognize
any unconscious compulsion
hidden
behind percept
and concept.
If anyone
asserts that the action
of a fellow man
is done unfreely,
then
he must identify
the thing or the person
or the institution
within the perceptible world,
that has caused the person
to act;
and
if
he bases
his assertion
upon causes
of action
lying
outside the world
that is real
to the senses
and the spirit,
then
monism can take no
notice of it.
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[7] According to
the monistic view,
then,
man's action
is partly unfree,
partly free.
He finds himself
to be
unfree
in the world
of percepts,
and
he realizes within himself
the free spirit.
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[8] The moral laws
which the metaphysician
who works
by mere inference
must regard
as issuing
from a higher power,
are,
for the adherent
of monism,
thoughts of men;
for him
the moral world
order
is
neither
the imprint
of a purely mechanical natural
order,
nor
that
of an extra-human world order,
but
through and
through the free creation
of men.
It is not
the will
of some
being
outside him
in the world
that man
has
to carry out,
but his own;
he puts into effect
his own
resolves
and intentions,
not
those
of another being.
Monism does not see,
behind man's actions,
the purposes
of a supreme directorate,
foreign
to him
and determining him according to
its will,
but rather sees
that men,
in so far
as they
realize their intuitive ideas,
pursue only their own human ends.
Moreover,
each individual
pursues his own particular ends.
For the world
of ideas
comes
to expression,
not in a community
of men,
but
only in human individuals.
What appears
as the common goal
of a whole group
of people
is only
the result of the separate
acts
of will
of its individual members,
and in fact,
usually of
a few outstanding ones
who,
as their authorities,
are followed
by the others.
Each one
of us
has it
in him to be
a free spirit,
just
as every rose
bud
has in it a rose.
[9] Monism,
then,
in the sphere
of true moral action,
is a freedom philosophy.
Since it
is a philosophy
of reality,
it rejects
the metaphysical,
unreal restrictions
of the free
spirit
as completely
as it accepts
the physical
and historical
(naively real) restrictions
of the naive man.
Since it
does not consider man
as a finished product,
disclosing his full nature
in every moment
of his life,
it regards
the dispute
as to
whether man
as such
is free or not,
to be
of no consequence.
It sees
in man a developing being,
and asks whether,
in the course
of this development,
the stage
of the free
spirit can be reached.
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[10] Monism
knows
that Nature
does not send man
forth
from her arms ready made
as a free spirit,
but
that
she leads him
up to a certain stage,
from
which
he continues
to develop still
as an unfree being,
until
he comes
to the point
where
he finds
his own self.
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[11] Monism
is
quite
clear
that a being acting
under physical or
moral compulsion cannot be
a truly moral
being.
It regards
the phases
of automatic behavior
(following natural
urges
and instincts)
and
of obedient behavior
(following moral standards)
as necessary preparatory stages
of morality,
but
it also sees
that both
these transitory stages
can be overcome
by the free spirit.
Monism frees
the truly moral world
conception both from the mundane
fetters
of naive moral maxims
and
from the transcendental moral maxims
of the speculative metaphysician.
Monism
can
no more eliminate
the former
from the world
than
it can eliminate percepts;
it rejects
the latter
because
it seeks all
the principles
for the elucidation
of the world phenomena
within that world,
and none outside it.
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Just
as monism
refuses even
to think
of principles
of knowledge other
than
those that apply to men
(see Chapter 7),
so
it emphatically rejects even
the thought
of moral maxims other
than
those that apply to men.
Human morality,
like human knowledge,
is conditioned
by human nature.
And
just
as beings
of a different order
will understand
knowledge
to mean
something very different
from what
it means to us,
so will other beings
have a different morality
from ours.
Morality
is
for the monist
a specifically human quality,
and spiritual freedom
the human way
of being moral.
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Author's additions,
1918
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[1] In forming
a judgment
about the argument
of the two preceding chapters,
a difficulty
can arise
in that one
appears
to be faced
with a contradiction.
On the one hand
we have spoken
of the experience
of thinking,
which
is felt to have
universal significance,
equally valid
for every human consciousness;
on the other hand
we
have shown that the ideas
which
come
to realization
in the moral life,
and are
of the same kind
as those elaborated
in thinking,
come
to expression
in each
human consciousness
in a quite individual way.
If
we cannot get
beyond regarding
this antithesis
as a
"contradiction",
and
if we
do not see that
in the living recognition
of this
actually existing antithesis
a piece
of man's essential nature
reveals itself,
then
we shall be unable
to see
either the idea
of knowledge
or the idea
of freedom
in a true light.
For
those
who
think of their concepts
as merely abstracted
from the sense
perceptible world
and who
do not allow
intuition its rightful place,
this thought,
here
claimed
as a reality,
must remain a
"mere contradiction".
If
we really understand how ideas
are intuitively experienced
in their self-sustaining essence,
it becomes
clear
that
in the act
of knowing,
man,
on the edge
of the world
of ideas,
lives his way
into something
which is the same
for all men,
but that when,
from this world
of ideas,
he derives
the intuitions
for his acts
of will,
he individualizes a part
of this world
by the same activity
that
he practices
as a universal human one
in the spiritual ideal process
of knowing.
What appears
as a logical contradiction
between the universal nature
of cognitive ideas
and
the individual nature
of moral
ideas
is
the very thing that,
when seen
in its reality,
becomes
a living concept.
It is
a characteristic feature
of the essential nature
of man
that
what can be intuitively grasped
swings
to and fro
within man,
like a living pendulum,
between universally valid knowledge
and the individual experience
of it.
For
those
who cannot see
the one half
of the swing
in its reality,
thinking
remains
only a subjective human activity;
for those
who cannot grasp
the other half,
man's activity
in thinking
will seem
to lose all individual life.
For the first kind
of thinker,
it is the act
of knowing
that is
an unintelligible fact;
for the second kind,
it is
the moral life.
Both
will put forward
all sorts
of imagined ways
of explaining
the one
or the other,
all equally unfounded,
either
because
they
entirely fail to grasp
that thinking
can be actually experienced,
or
because
they misunderstand it
as a merely abstracting activity.
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* * * * *
[2] On page 147
I have spoken of materialism.
I am well aware
that there are thinkers â€"
such as Ziehen,
mentioned above â€"
who do not call
themselves materialists
at all,
but
who must nevertheless be described
as such
from the point of view
put forward
in this book.
The point
is not
whether
someone says
that for him
the world
is not restricted to merely
material
existence
and
that
therefore he
is no materialist;
but
the point
is
whether
he develops concepts
which are applicable
only to material existence.
Anyone
who says,
“Our action
is necessitated
as is our thinkingâ€,
has implied
a concept
which is applicable
only to material
processes,
but
not to action or
to being;
and
if he
were
to think
his concept
through to the end,
he could not help
but think materialistically.
He avoids
doing
this
only by the same inconsistency
that so often results
from not thinking
one's thoughts through
to the end.
[3] It is often said nowadays
that
the materialism of the nineteenth century
is outmoded
in knowledgeable circles.
But
in fact
this is not
at all true.
It is only
that nowadays
people
so often fail
to notice
that they
have no other ideas but those
with which
one can approach
only material things.
Thus recent materialism
is veiled,
whereas
in the second half
of the nineteenth century it
showed itself openly.
The veiled materialism
of the present
is no less intolerant
of an outlook that grasps
the world spiritually
than
was the self-confessed materialism
of the last century.
But
it deceives many
who think
they have
a right
to reject
a view
of the world
which takes spirit
into account
on the ground
that the scientific view
"has
long ago abandoned materialism". |
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