Chapter 9 The Idea of Freedom Part 2
[30] If
we seek out the rules
(conceptual principles)
underlying the actions
of individuals,
peoples,
and epochs,
we obtain
a system
of ethics
which is not so much
a science
of moral laws
as a natural history
of morality.
It is only
the laws
obtained
in this way
that are related
to human action
as the laws
of nature
are related
to a particular phenomenon.
These laws,
however,
are
by no
means identical
with the impulses
on which
we base our actions.
If
we want
to understand how
a man's action
arises
from his moral will,
we must first study
the relation of this
will
to the action.
Above all,
we must keep
our eye
on those actions
in which
this relation
is the determining factor.
If I,
or someone else,
reflect
upon such an action afterwards,
we can discover
what
moral principles come
into question
with regard to it.
While I
am performing
the action
I am influenced
by a moral maxim
in so far
as it can live
in me intuitively;
it is bound up
with my love
for the objective
that
I want
to realize
through my action.
I ask no man
and
no rule,
"Shall I
perform this action?"
-- but carry it out
as soon as I
have grasped the idea
of it.
This alone
makes it
my action.
If
a man
acts only
because
he accepts certain moral standards,
his action
is the outcome
of the principles
which
compose his moral code.
He merely carries out orders.
He is a superior automaton.
Inject some stimulus
to action
into his mind,
and at once
the clockwork
of his moral principles
will set itself
in motion
and run its
prescribed course,
so
as to result in
an action
which is Christian,
or humane,
or seemingly unselfish,
or calculated
to promote
the progress
of civilization.
Only
when I
follow
my love
for my objective
is
it I myself
who act.
I act,
at this level
of morality,
not
because
I
acknowledge a lord over
me,
or an external authority,
or a so-called inner voice;
I acknowledge no external principle
for my action,
because
I have found in myself
the ground
for my action,
namely,
my love
of the action.
I do not work out mentally
whether
my action
is
good or bad;
I carry it out
because I love it.
My action
will be "good"
if my intuition,
steeped in love,
finds its right place
within the intuitively
experienceable world continuum;
it will be
"bad"
if this
is not the case.
Again,
I do not ask myself,
"How would
another man
act
in my position?"
-- but
I act
as I,
this particular individuality,
find
I have
occasion
to do.
No general usage,
no common custom,
no maxim applying
to all men,
no moral standard
is
my immediate guide,
but my love
for the deed.
I feel no compulsion,
neither
the compulsion of nature
which
guides me
by my instincts,
nor the compulsion
of the moral commandments,
but
I want simply
to carry
out what lies
within me.
[31] Those
who
defend
general moral standards might reply
to these arguments
that
if
everyone strives
to live
his own life
and do
what
he pleases,
there can be no distinction
between a good deed
and a crime;
every corrupt impulse
that lies within me
has as good
a claim
to express itself
as has
the intention
of serving
the general good.
What determines me
as a moral
being
cannot be
the mere fact
of my having conceived
the idea
of an action,
but
whether
I judge
it to be
good or evil.
Only in the former case
should
I carry it
out.
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[32] My reply
to this
very obvious objection,
which
is nevertheless based
on a misapprehension
of my argument,
is this:
If
we want
to understand
the nature
of the human will,
we must distinguish
between the path
which
leads this will
to a certain degree
of development
and the unique character
which
the will
assumes as it approaches
this goal.
On the path
towards this goal
the standards
play their rightful part.
The goal
consists
of the realization
of moral
aims
grasped
by pure intuition.
Man attains
such aims
to the extent
that he
is able
to raise himself
at
all to the intuitive world
of ideas.
In any particular act
of will
such moral
aims
will generally have
other elements
mixed in with them,
either as driving
force or
as motive.
Nevertheless
intuition
may still be wholly
or partly
the determining factor
in the human will.
What
one should do,
that one does;
one provides
the stage upon which obligation
becomes deed;
one's own action
is
what
one brings forth from oneself.
Here the impulse
can only be wholly individual.
And,
in truth,
only an act
of will
that springs
from intuition
can be
an individual one.
To regard evil,
the deed
of a criminal,
as an expression
of the human individuality
in the same sense
as one regards
the embodiment of pure intuition
is only possible
if
blind instincts
are reckoned
as part
of the human individuality.
But the blind instinct
that drives
a man to crime
does not spring from intuition,
and does not belong
to what
is individual
in him,
but rather
to what
is most general
in him,
to
what is equally
present
in all individuals
and
out of which a man
works
his way
by means
of what
is individual
in him.
What is individual
in me
is not my organism
with its instincts
and its feelings
but
rather the unified world
of ideas
which
lights up
within this organism.
My instincts,
urges
and passions establish no
more than
that
I belong
to the general species man;
it is the fact that
something of the idea world
comes
to expression
in a particular way
within these urges,
passions
and feelings
that establishes my individuality.
Through my instincts
and cravings,
I am the sort
of man
of whom there are twelve
to the dozen;
through the particular form
of the idea
by means
of which
I designate myself
within the dozen
as "I",
I am an individual.
Only a being other
than
myself
could distinguish me
from others
by the difference
in my animal nature;
through my thinking,
that is,
by actively grasping
what expresses itself
in my organism
as idea,
I distinguish myself from others.
Therefore
one cannot say
of the action
of a criminal
that it proceeds
from the idea
within him.
Indeed,
the characteristic feature
of criminal actions
is precisely
that
they spring
from the non-ideal elements
in man.
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[33] An action
is felt
to be
free
in so far
as the reasons
for it
spring
from the ideal part
of my individual being;
every other part
of an action,
irrespective
of whether
it is carried out
under the compulsion
of nature
or under the obligation
of a moral standard,
is felt
to be unfree.
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[34] Man is free
in so far
as he
is able
to obey himself
in every moment
of his life.
A moral deed
is my deed
only
if
it can be called
a free one
in this sense.
We have here considered
what conditions
are required
for an intentional action
to be felt
as a free one;
how this
purely ethically understood
idea of freedom
comes
to realization
in the being
of man
will be shown
in what follows.
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[35] Acting
out of freedom does not exclude
the moral laws;
it includes them,
but shows itself
to be
on a higher level
than those actions
which
are merely dictated
by such laws.
Why should
my action
be
of less service
to the public good
when
I have done it
out of love than
when
I have done it
only
because
I consider
serving
the public good
to be my duty?
The mere concept of duty
excludes
freedom
because it
does not acknowledge
the individual element
but demands
that this be subject to
a general standard.
Freedom of action
is conceivable
only from the standpoint
of ethical individualism.
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[36] But how is
a social life possible
for man
if each one
is only striving to assert
his own individuality?
This objection
is characteristic
of a false understanding
of moralism.
Such
a moralist
believes
that a social community
is possible only
if all men
are united
by a communally fixed moral order.
What this kind
of moralist
does not understand
is just the unity
of the world
of ideas.
He does not see that
the world
of ideas
working in me
is
no other
than
the one
working
in my fellow man.
Admittedly,
this unity
is
but an outcome
of practical experience.
But
in fact
it cannot be anything else.
For if
it could be known
in any other way
than
by observation,
then
in its own sphere
universal standards
rather than individual
experience
would be
the rule.
Individuality
is possible only
if every individual
being
knows
of others
through individual observation
alone.
I differ
from my fellow man,
not at all
because we
are living
in two entirely
different spiritual
worlds,
but
because
from the world
of ideas
common to us
both we
receive different intuitions.
He wants
to live
out his intuitions,
I mine.
If we both
really conceive
out of the idea,
and
do not obey
any external impulses
(physical or spiritual),
then
we cannot
but meet one
another
in like striving,
in common intent.
A moral
misunderstanding,
a clash,
is impossible
between men
who are morally free.
Only
the morally unfree
who
follow
their natural instincts
or the accepted
commands
of duty
come
into conflict
with their neighbors
if these
do not obey
the same instincts
and the same commands
as themselves.
To live
in love
towards our actions,
and
to let
live
in the understanding
of the other person's will,
is the fundamental maxim
of free men.
They know
no other obligation
than w
[37] Were the ability
to get on
with one another
not a basic part
of human nature,
no external laws
would be able
to implant
it
in us.
It is only
because
human individuals
are one in spirit
that
they can live
out their lives side by side.
The free man
lives
in confidence
that
he and any other free man
belong
to one spiritual world,
and
that their intentions will harmonize.
The free man
does not demand agreement
from his fellow man,
but expects
to find
it
because it
is inherent
in human nature.
I am not here referring
to the necessity
for
this or that
external institution,
but
to the disposition,
the attitude
of soul,
through which a man,
aware
of himself
among his fellows,
most clearly expresses
the ideal
of human dignity.
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[38] There
are
many
who
will say that the concept
of the free man
which
I have here developed
is a chimera nowhere
to be found in practice;
we have
to do
with actual human beings,
from
whom
we can only hope
for morality
if they
obey some moral law,
that is,
if
they regard
their moral task
as a duty
and do not freely follow
their inclinations
and loves.
I do not doubt this
at all.
Only a blind man
could do so.
But
if this
is to be
the final conclusion,
then
away with all
this hypocrisy
about morality!
Let us
then simply say
that human nature
must be driven
to its actions
as long
as it is not free.
Whether
his unfreedom
is forced
on him
by physical means
or by moral laws,
whether man
is unfree
because
he follows
his unlimited sexual desire
or
because he
is bound
by the fetters
of conventional morality,
is quite immaterial
from a certain point of view.
Only let us
not assert
that such
a man
can rightly call
his actions his own,
seeing
that he
is driven
to them
by a force other
than himself.
But
in the midst
of all
this framework
of compulsion
there arise men
who establish themselves
as free spirits
in all
the welter
of customs,
legal codes,
religious observances,
and so forth.
They are
free
in so far
as they
obey only themselves,
unfree
in so far
as they
submit to control.
Which
of us
can say
that he
is
really
free
in all his actions?
Yet in each
of us
there dwells a deeper
being
in which the free man
finds expression.
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[39] Our life
is made up
of free and unfree actions.
We cannot,
however,
think
out the concept
of man
completely without
coming upon
the free spirit
as the purest expression
of human nature.
Indeed,
we are men
in the true
sense only in so far
as we are free.
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[40] This
is
an ideal,
many will say.
Doubtless;
but it is an ideal
which is
a real element
in us
working
its way
to the surface
of our nature.
It is no ideal
just thought
up or dreamed,
but
one which has life,
and
which
announces itself clearly
even in the least perfect form
of its existence.
If man
were merely
a natural creature,
there would be
no such thing
as the search
for ideals,
that is,
for ideas
which
for the moment
are not effective
but
whose realization
is required.
With the things
of the outer world,
the idea
is determined
by the percept;
we have done our share
when we
have recognized the connection
between idea
and percept.
But
with the human being
it is not so.
The sum total
of his existence
is not fully determined
without his own self;
his true concept
as a moral
being
(free spirit)
is not objectively united
from the start
with the percept-picture "man"
needing only
to be confirmed
by knowledge afterwards.
Man must unite
his concept
with the percept
of man
by his own activity.
Concept
and percept
coincide in this case only
if man
himself
makes them coincide.
This
he can do only
if he
has found the concept
of the free spirit,
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