Chapter 9 The Idea Of Freedom
Chapter 9 The Idea
of Spiritual Activity
|
| |
[1] For our cognition,
the concept of the tree
is conditioned
by the percept
of the tree.
When faced
with a particular percept,
I can select only one
particular concept
from the general system
of concepts.
The connection
of concept and
percept
is determined
by thinking,
indirectly
and objectively,
at the level
of the percept.
This connection
of the percept
with its concept
is recognized
after the act
of perceiving;
but
that they
do belong
together lies
in the very nature
of things.
|
| |
[2] The process
looks different
when we
examine knowledge,
or rather the relation
of man
to the world
which arises within knowledge.
In the preceding chapters
the attempt
has been made to show
that
an unprejudiced observation
of this relationship
is
able to throw light
on its nature.
A proper understanding
of this observation
leads
to the insight
that thinking
can be directly discerned
as a self-contained entity.
Those
who find it necessary
for the explanation
of
thinking as such
to invoke
something else,
such as physical brain
processes
or unconscious spiritual processes
lying
behind the conscious thinking which
they observe,
fail to recognize
what an unprejudiced observation
of thinking yields.
When we
observe our thinking,
we live
during this observation
directly within a self-supporting,
spiritual web
of being.
Indeed,
we can even say that
if
we would grasp
the essential nature
of spirit
in the form
in which
it presents itself most immediately
to man,
we need
only
look
at the self-sustaining activity
of thinking.
|
| |
[3] When
we are contemplating thinking itself,
two things
coincide
which
otherwise must always appear apart,
namely,
concept and percept.
If we
fail to see this,
we shall be unable
to regard
the concepts
which we
have elaborated
with respect
to percepts
as anything
but shadowy copies
of these percepts,
and
we shall take
the percepts
as presenting
to us the true reality.
We shall,
further,
build up
for ourselves
a metaphysical world
after the pattern
of the perceived world;
we shall call this
a world
of atoms,
a world
of will,
a world
of unconscious spirit,
or whatever,
each
according to his own kind
of mental imagery.
And
we shall fail
to notice
that all the time
we have been doing nothing
but building
up a metaphysical world hypothetically,
after the pattern
of our own world
of percepts.
But
if
we recognize
what is
present
in thinking,
we shall realize
that
in the percept
we have only one part
of the reality
and that the other part
which belongs to it,
and
which
first allows
the full reality to appear,
is experienced
by us
in the permeation
of the percept
by thinking.
We shall see
in this element
that appears
in our consciousness
as thinking,
not a shadowy copy
of some reality,
but a self-sustaining spiritual essence.
And
of this
we shall be able
to say
that it
is brought
into consciousness
for us
through intuition.
Intuition
is
the conscious experience
-- in pure spirit --
of a purely spiritual content.
Only through an intuition
can the essence
of thinking
be grasped.
[4] Only if,
by means
of unprejudiced observation,
one has wrestled through
to the recognition
of this truth
of the intuitive essence
of thinking
will
one succeed
in clearing
the way
for an insight
into the psyche-physical organization
of man.
One will see
that this organization
can have no effect
on the essential nature
of thinking.
At first sight
this seems
to be contradicted
by patently obvious facts.
For ordinary experience,
human
thinking
makes its appearance
only in connection
with,
and by means of,
this organization.
This form of its appearance
comes so much
to the fore
that its real significance
cannot be grasped
unless
we recognize
that
in the essence
of thinking
this organization
plays
no part whatever.
Once
we appreciate this,
we can no longer
fail to notice
what
a peculiar kind
of relationship
there is
between the human organization
and the thinking itself.
For this organization
contributes nothing
to the essential nature
of thinking,
but recedes
whenever the activity
of thinking
makes
its appearance;
it suspends
its own activity,
it yields ground;
and
on the ground
thus left empty,
the thinking
appears.
The essence
which is active
in thinking
has
a twofold function:
first,
it represses
the activity
of the human organization;
secondly,
it steps
into its place.
For even the former,
the repression
of the physical organization,
is a consequence
of the activity
of thinking,
and more particularly
of that part
of this activity
which
prepares
the manifestation
of thinking.
From this one
can see
in what
sense
thinking
finds its counterpart
in the physical organization.
When
we see this,
we can no longer
misjudge
the significance
of this counterpart
of the activity
of thinking.
When we
walk over soft ground,
our feet
leave impressions
in the soil.
We shall not be tempted
to say
that
these footprints
have been formed from below
by the forces
of the ground.
We shall not attribute
to these forces any share
in the production
of the footprints.
Just as little,
if
we observe
the essential nature
of thinking
without prejudice,
shall
we attribute any share
in that nature
to the traces
in the physical organism
which arise through the fact
that the thinking prepares
its manifestation
by means
of the body.
|
| |
[5] An important question,
however,
emerges here.
If the human organization
has no part
in the essential nature
of thinking,
what is the significance
of this organization
within the whole nature
of man?
Now,
what happens
in this organization
through the thinking
has indeed
nothing to do
with the essence
of thinking,
but it
has a great deal
to do
with the arising
of the ego-consciousness
out of this thinking.
Thinking,
in its own essential nature,
certainly contains
the real
I or ego,
but it
does not contain
the ego-consciousness.
To see
this
we have
but to observe
thinking
with an open mind.
The "I"
is to be found
within the thinking;
the "ego-consciousness"
arises
through the traces
which the activity
of thinking
engraves
upon our general consciousness,
in the sense
explained above.
(The ego-consciousness thus
arises
through the bodily organization.
However,
this must not be taken
to imply
that the ego-consciousness,
once
it has arisen,
remains dependent
on the bodily organization.
Once arisen,
it is taken up
into thinking and
shares henceforth
in thinking's spiritual being.)
|
| |
[6] The "ego-consciousness"
is built
upon the human organization.
Out of the latter flow
our acts of will.
Following the lines
of the preceding argument,
we can gain insight
into the connections
between thinking,
conscious I,
and act
of will,
only by
observing first how an act
of will
issues
from the human organization.
|
| |
[7] In any particular act
of will
we must take into account
the motive
and the driving force.
The motive
is a factor
with the character
of a concept
or a mental picture;
the driving force
is the will-factor belonging
to the human organization
and directly conditioned
by it.
The conceptual factor,
or motive,
is the momentary determining factor
of the will;
the driving force
is the permanent determining factor
of the individual.
A motive for the will
may be a pure concept,
or else
a concept
with a particular reference
to a percept,
that is,
a mental picture.
Both general concepts
and individual ones
(mental pictures)
become motives
of will
by affecting
the human individual
and determining him
to action
in a particular direction.
But one
and the same concept,
or one
and the same mental picture,
affects
different individuals differently.
They stimulate different men
to different actions.
An act
of will
is therefore
not merely the outcome
of the concept
or the mental picture
but
also of the individual make-up
of the person.
Here
we may well follow
the example
of Eduard von Hartmann
and call
this individual make-up
the characterological disposition.
The manner
in which concept
and mental
picture
affects
the characterological disposition
of a man
gives
to his life
a definite moral
or ethical stamp.
|
| |
[8] The characterological disposition
is formed
by the more
or less permanent content
of our subjective life,
that is,
by the content
of our mental pictures
and feelings.
Whether
a mental picture
which
enters
my mind
at this moment
stimulates me
to an act
of will or not,
depends
on how
it relates itself
to the content
of all my other mental pictures
and also to my idiosyncrasies
of feeling.
But after all,
the general content
of my mental pictures
is itself conditioned
by the sum total
of those concepts
which have,
in the course
of my individual life,
come
into contact
with percepts,
that is,
have become mental pictures.
This sum,
again,
depends
on my greater
or lesser capacity
for intuition
and on the range
of my observations,
that is,
on the subjective
and objective
factors
of experience,
on my inner nature
and situation
in life.
My characterological disposition
is determined especially
by my life of feeling.
Whether
I shall make
a particular mental
picture
or concept
into a motive
of action or not,
will depend
on whether
it gives me
joy or pain.
These are the elements
which we
have to consider
in an act of will.
The immediately present mental picture
or concept,
which becomes the motive,
determines
the aim or the purpose
of my will;
my characterological disposition
determines me
to direct my activity
towards this aim.
The mental picture
of taking
a walk
in the next half-hour
determines the aim
of my action.
But this mental picture
is raised to the
[9] We must therefore distinguish
(1) the possible subjective dispositions
which are capable
of turning
certain mental pictures
and concepts
into motives,
and
(2) the possible mental pictures
and concepts
which
are
in a position to influence
my characterological disposition
so that an act
of will results.
For our moral life
the former
represent the driving force,
and the latter,
its aims.
|
| |
[10] The driving force
in the moral life
can be discovered
by finding out
the elements
of which
individual life
is composed.
|
| |
[11] The
first level of individual life
is
that
of perceiving,
more particularly perceiving
through the senses.
This is the region
of our individual life
in which
perceiving
translates itself directly
into willing,
without the intervention
of either
a feeling
or a concept.
The driving force here involved
is simply called instinct.
The satisfaction
of our lower,
purely animal
needs
(hunger,
sexual intercourse, etc.)
comes about in this way.
The main characteristic
of instinctive life
is the immediacy
with which
the single percept
releases
the act of will.
This kind
of determination
of the will,
which
belongs originally
only to the life
of the lower senses,
may
however
become
extended also
to the percepts
of the higher senses.
We may react to the percept
of a certain event
in the external world
without reflecting
on what
we do,
without any special
feeling connecting itself
with the percept,
as in fact
happens
in our conventional social behaviour.
The driving force
of such action
is called tact
or moral good taste.
The more often
such immediate reactions
to a percept occur,
the more the person concerned
will prove himself able
to act purely under
the guidance
of tact;
that is,
tact
becomes
his characterological disposition.
|
| |
[12] The second level
of human life
is feeling.
Definite feelings
accompany the percepts
of the external world.
These feelings
may become
the driving force
of an action.
When
I see
a starving man,
my pity
for him
may become
the driving force
of my action.
Such feelings,
for example,
are shame,
pride,
sense of honour,
humility,
remorse,
pity,
revenge,
gratitude,
piety,
loyalty,
love,
and duty.
|
| |
[13] The third level
of life amounts
to thinking
and forming mental
pictures.
A mental picture
or a concept
may become
the motive
of an action through
mere reflection.
Mental
pictures
become motives
because,
in the course
of life,
we regularly connect certain aims
of our will
with percepts
which
recur again and again
in more or
less modified form.
Hence with people
not wholly devoid
of experience
it happens
that
the occurrence of certain percepts
is always accompanied
by the appearance
in consciousness
of mental pictures
of actions
that
they themselves have carried out
in a similar case
or have seen
others
carry out.
These mental pictures
float
before their minds
as patterns
which
determine all subsequent decisions;
they become
parts
of their characterological disposition.
The driving force
in the will,
in this case,
we can call practical experience.
Practical experience
merges gradually
into purely tactful behaviour.
This happens
when
definite typical pictures
of actions
have become
so firmly connected
in our minds
with mental pictures
of certain situations
in life that,
in any given instance,
we skip over all
deliberation based
on experience
and go straight
from the percept
to the act of will.
|
| |
[14] The highest level
of individual life
is
that
of conceptual thinking
without
regard
to any definite perceptual content.
We determine
the content
of a concept through
pure intuition
from
out of the ideal sphere.
Such
a concept contains,
at first,
no reference
to any definite percepts.
If
we enter
upon an act
of will
under the influence
of a concept
which refers to a percept,
that is,
under the influence
of a mental picture,
then it
is this percept
which determines
our action
indirectly by way
of the conceptual thinking.
But
if
we act under the influence
of intuitions,
the driving force
of our action
is pure thinking.
As it
is the custom
in philosophy
to call
the faculty
of pure thinking
"reason",
we may well be justified
in giving
the name
of practical
reason
to the moral
driving
force characteristic
of this level
of life.
The dearest account
of this driving force
in the will
has been given by Kreyenbühl.
In my opinion
his article on this subject
is one
of the most important contributions
to present-day philosophy,
more especially to Ethics.
Kreyenbühl
calls
the driving force
we are here discussing,
the practical a priori,
that is,
an impulse
to action
issuing directly
from my intuition.
|
| |
[15] It is clear
that such
an impulse
can
no longer
be counted
in the strictest sense
as belonging
to the characterological disposition.
For
what is here effective
as the driving force
is no longer something
merely individual
in me,
but the ideal and
hence universal content
of my intuition.
As soon
as I see
the justification
for taking
this content
as the basis
and starting
point
of an action,
I enter
upon the act
&nbs | | | |
