Chapter 7
Are There Limits
To Cognition?
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[1] We have established
that the elements
for the explanation
of reality
are
to be found
in two spheres:
perceiving
and thinking.
It is due,
as we
have seen,
to our organization
that the full,
complete reality,
including our own selves
as subjects,
appears at first
as a duality.
Cognition
overcomes
this duality
by fusing
the two elements
of reality,
the percept
and the concept
gained
by thinking,
into the complete thing.
Let us
call the manner
in which
the world
presents itself to us,
before it
has taken on
its true nature
through cognition,
"the world
of appearance,"
in contrast
to the unified whole composed
of percept and concept.
We can then say:
The world
is given
to us
as a duality,
and
cognition transforms it
into a unity.
A philosophy
which starts from this
basic principle
may be called
a monistic philosophy,
or monism.
Opposed
to this
is
the two-world theory,
or dualism.
The latter
does not assume just
that there are
two sides
of a single reality
which
are kept
apart
merely by our organization,
but
that there are two worlds
absolutely distinct
from one another.
It
then tries
to find
in one
of these two worlds
the principles
for the explanation
of the other.
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[2] Dualism
rests
on a false conception
of what
we
call cognition.
It divides
the whole
of existence
into two spheres,
each
of which
has
its own laws,
and
it leaves
these two worlds standing
apart and opposed.
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[3] It is
from a dualism
such as this
that there arises
the distinction
between the perceptual object
and the thing-in-itself,
which
Kant introduced
into philosophy,
and which,
to the present day,
we have not succeeded
in eradicating.
According to
our line
of argument,
it is
due to the nature
of our mental organization
that a particular thing
can be given
to us
only
as a percept.
Thinking
then overcomes
this particularity
by assigning
to each percept
its rightful place
in the world
as a whole.
As long
as we designate
the separated
parts
of the world
as percepts,
we are simply following,
in this
separating out,
a law
of our subjectivity.
If,
however,
we regard the sum
of all percepts
as the one part,
and contrast
with this
a second part,
namely,
the things-in-themselves,
then we
are philosophizing into the blue.
We are merely playing
with concepts.
We construct
an artificial pair of
opposites,
but
we can gain
no content
for the second
of these
opposites,
since such content
for a particular thing
can be drawn only
from perception.
[4] Every kind
of existence
that is assumed
outside the realm
of percept and
concept
must be relegated
to the sphere
of unjustified hypotheses.
To this category
belongs the
"thing-in-itself".
It is quite natural
that a dualistic thinker
should be unable
to find
the connection
between the world principle
which
he hypothetically assumes
and
the things given
in experience.
A content
for the hypothetical world principle
can be arrived
at
only by
borrowing it
from the world
of experience
and then shutting one's eyes
to the fact
of the borrowing.
Otherwise
it remains an empty concept,
a non-concept
which has nothing
but the form
of a concept.
Here the dualistic thinker
usually asserts that
the content
of this concept
is inaccessible
to our cognition;
we can know only
that
such
a content exists,
but not
what it
is that exists.
In both cases
it is impossible
to overcome dualism.
Even though
one
were
to import
a few abstract elements
from the world
of experience
into the concept
of the thing-in-itself,
it would still remain impossible
to derive
the rich concrete life
of experience
from these
few qualities
which are,
after all,
themselves
taken
from perception.
DuBois-Reymond
considers
that the imperceptible atoms
of matter produce sensation
and feeling
by means
of their position
and motion,
and
then comes
to the conclusion
that
we can never find
a satisfactory explanation
of how matter and
motion produce sensation
and feeling,
for "it
is absolutely and
for ever incomprehensible
that it should be other
than indifferent
to a number
of atoms
of carbon,
hydrogen,
nitrogen,
and so on,
how they
lie and move,
how
they lay
and moved,
or
how
they will lie
and will move.
It is impossible
to see how
consciousness
could come
into existence
through their interaction."
This conclusion
is characteristic
of this whole trend
of thought.
Position
and
motion
are abstracted
from the rich world
of percepts,
They
are
then transferred
to the notional world
of atoms.
And
then
astonishment arises
that real life
cannot be evolved
out of this self-made principle
borrowed
from the world
of percepts.
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[5]
That the dualist
can reach no explanation
of the world,
working
as he
does
with a completely empty concept
of the "in-itself"
of a thing,
follows at
once from the very
definition of his principle
given above.
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[6] In every
case
the dualist
finds himself
compelled
to set impassable barriers
to our capacity
for cognition.
The follower
of a monistic world conception
knows
that everything
he
needs for the explanation
of any given phenomenon
in the world
must lie
within this world
itself.
What prevents him
from reaching
it can be only
accidental limitations
in space
and time,
or defects
of his organization,
that is, not
of human organization
in general,
but
only of his own particular one.
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[7] It follows
from the concept
of cognizing,
as we
have defined it,
that one
cannot speak
of limits
to cognition.
Cognizing is not a concern
of the world
in general,
but an affair
which man
must settle
for himself.
Things
demand no explanation.
They exist
and act
on one another
according to
laws
which
can be discovered
through thinking,
They
exist
in indivisible unity
with these laws.
Our Egohood
confronts them,
grasping
at first only
that part of them
we have called percepts.
Within our Egohood,
however,
lies the power
to discover
the other part
of the reality
as well.
Only
when the Egohood
has taken
the two elements of reality
which
are indivisibly united
in the world and
has combined them also
for itself,
is cognitive satisfaction
attained
-- the I
has
then arrived
at the reality once more.
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[8] Thus the conditions necessary
for cognition
to take place
are there through the I
and
for the I. The I
sets itself
the problems
of cognition;
and
moreover
it
takes them
from an element
that is
absolutely
clear
and transparent
in itself:
the element of thinking.
If
we set ourselves
questions
which
we cannot answer,
it must be
because
the content of the questions
is not
in all respects
clear and distinct.
It is not the world
which sets us the questions,
but we ourselves.
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[9] I can imagine
that it
would be quite impossible
for me
to answer
a question
which
I happened
to find written down somewhere,
without knowing
the sphere
from
which
the content
of the question
was taken.
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[10] Our cognition
is concerned
with questions
which
arise
for us
through the fact
that a sphere
of percepts,
conditioned
by place,
time,
and our subjective organization,
is confronted
by a sphere
of concepts
pointing
to the totality
of the universe.
My task
consists
in reconciling
these two spheres,
with both
of which
I am well acquainted.
Here one
cannot speak
of a limit
to cognition.
It may be that,
at any particular moment,
this or that remains
unexplained
because,
through our place
in life,
we are prevented
from perceiving
the things involved.
What is not found today,
however,
may be found
tomorrow.
The limits
due to these causes
are only transitory,
and can be overcome
by the progress
of perception
and thinking.
[11] Dualism
makes the mistake
of transferring
the antithesis
of object
and subject,
which
has
meaning only
within the perceptual realm,
to purely notional entities
outside this realm.
But
since
the separate things
within the perceptual field
remain
separated only so long
as the perceiver
refrains
from thinking
(which
cancels all separation
and shows it
to be
due to purely subjective factors),
the dualist
is therefore transferring
to entities
behind the perceptible realm
determining
factors
which
even for this realm
have no absolute validity,
but only relative.
He
thus splits
up the two
factors
concerned
in the cognitive process,
namely percept
and concept,
into four:
(1) the object
in itself;
(2) the precept
which the subject
has of the object;
(3) the subject;
(4) the concept
which relates
the precept
to the object
in itself.
The relation
between subject
and object
is
a real one;
the subject
is really
(dynamically)
influenced by the object.
This real process
is said not
to appear in consciousness.
But it
is supposed to evoke
in the subject a response
to the stimulation
from the object.
The result of this response
is said
to be the percept.
Only at this stage
does it
enter our consciousness.
The object
is said
to have an objective
(independent
of the subject)
reality,
the percept
a subjective reality.
This subjective reality
is referred
by the subject to the object.
This reference
is called
an ideal one.
With this
the dualist
therefore splits
up the cognitive process
into two parts.
The one part,
namely,
the production
of the perceptual object
out of the thing-in-itself,
he conceives of
as taking place
outside consciousness,
whereas the other,
the combination
of percept
with concept
and the reference
of the concept
to the object,
takes place,
according to him,
within consciousness.
With these presuppositions,
it is
clear
why
the dualist
believes
his concepts
to be merely
subjective representatives
of what
is there prior to
his consciousness.
The objectively real process
in the subject
by means
of which
the percept
comes about,
and still more
the objective relations
between things-in-themselves,
remain
for such a dualist inaccessible
to direct knowledge;
according to him,
man can obtain only
conceptual representatives
of the objectively real.
The bond of unity
which connects things
with one another
and
also
objectively with the individual mind
of each
of us (as thing-in-itself) lies
beyond our consciousness
in a being-in-itself
of whom,
once more,
we can have
in our consciousness merely
a conceptual representative.
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[12] The dualist
believes
that
he would dissolve away
the whole world
into a mere abstract. scheme
of concepts,
did
he not insist
on real connections
between the objects
besides
the conceptual ones.
In other words,
the ideal principles
which
thinking
discovers seem too airy
for the dualist,
and
he seeks,
in addition,
real principles
with which
to support them.
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[13] Let us examine
these real principles
a little more closely.
The naive man
(naive realist)
regards the objects
of external experience
as realities.
The fact that his hands
can grasp these objects,
and
his eyes
see them,
is for him
sufficient proof
of their reality.
"Nothing
exists
that cannot be perceived"
is,
in fact,
the first axiom
of the naïve man;
and
it is held
to be equally
valid
in its converse:
"Everything
which can be perceived exists."
The best evidence
for this assertion
is
the naïve man's belief
in immortality
and ghosts.
He thinks
of the soul
as refined material
substance
which may,
in special circumstances,
become visible
even to the ordinary man
(naive belief
in ghosts).
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[14] In contrast
with this
real world
of his,
the naïve realist
regards everything else,
especially
the world
of ideas,
as unreal
or
"merely ideal".
What
we add
to objects
by thinking
is
nothing
more than thoughts
about the things.
Thought adds nothing real
to the percept.
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[15] But it is not only
with reference
to the existence
of things
that the naïve man
regards
sense
perception as the sole proof
of reality,
but
also with
reference
to events.
A thing,
according to him,
can act
on another
only
when a force
actually present to sense
perception issues
from the one and
seizes
upon the other.
In the older physics
it was thought
that very fine substances emanate
from the objects
and penetrate
through the sense organs
into the soul.
The actual
seeing
of these substances
is impossible
only
because
of the coarseness
of our sense organs relative
to the fineness
of these substances.
In principle,
the reason
for attributing reality
to these substances
was the same
as for attributing it
to the objects
of the sense-perceptible world,
namely
because
of their mode
of existence,
which
was thought
to be
analogous
to
that
of sense-perceptible reality.
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[16] The self-contained nature of what
can be experienced
through ideas
is not regarded
by the naïve mind
as being real
in the same way
that sense experience is.
An object grasped
in
"mere idea"
is regarded
as a chimera
until
conviction of its reality
can be given
through sense perception.
In short,
the naïve man
demands
the real evidence
of his senses
in addition
to the ideal evidence
of his thinking.
In this need
of the naïve man
lies the original ground
for primitive forms
of the belief
in revelation.
The God
who is given
through thinking
remains
to the naïve mind
always a merely "notional" God.
The naïve mind
demands
a manifestation
that is accessible
to sense perception.
God must appear
in the flesh,
and
little value
is attached
to the testimony
of thinking,
but
only to proof
of divinity
such as changing
water
into wine
in a way
that can be testified
by the senses.
[17] Even cognition
itself
is pictured
by the naïve man
as a process analogous
to sense perception.
Things,
it is thought,
make an impression
on the soul,
or send
out images
which
enter through our senses,
and so on.
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[18] What the naïve man
can perceive
with his senses
he regards as real,
and
what
he cannot thus
perceive
(God,
soul,
cognition, etc.)
he regards
as analogous
to what he
does perceive.
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[19] A science
based
on naïve
realism
would have
to be nothing
but an exact description
of the content
of perception.
For naïve realism,
concepts
are only
the means
to an end.
They exist
to provide
ideal counterparts
of percepts,
and have no significance
for the things themselves.
For the naïve realist,
only the individual tulips
which
he sees (or could see) are real;
the single idea
of the tulip
is to him an abstraction,
the unreal thought-picture which
the soul
has put together
out of the characteristics common
to all tulips.
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[20] Naive realism,
with its fundamental principle
of the reality
of all perceived things,
is contradicted
by experience,
which
teaches us
that the content of percepts
is of a transitory nature.
The tulip I see
is real today;
in a year
it will have vanished
into nothingness.
What persists
is
the species tulip.
For the naïve realist,
however,
this species
is "only"
an idea,
not a reality.
Thus
this theory
of the world
find itself
in the position
of seeing
its realities
arise and perish,
while
what
it regards
as unreal,
in contrast
with the real,
persists.
Hence naïve realism
is compelled
to acknowledge,
in addition
to percepts,
the existence
of something ideal.
It must admit
entities
which
cannot be perceived
by the senses.
In doing so,
it justifies itself
by conceiving
their existence
as being analogous
to
that
of sense-perceptible
objects.
Just
such hypothetical realities
are
the invisible forces
by means
of which
the sense-perceptible objects
act
on one another.
Another
such thing
is heredity,
which
works on
beyond the individual
and is the reason
why a new
being
which
develops
from the individual
is similar
to it,
thereby serving
to maintain the species.
Such
a thing
again is
the life-principle
permeating
the organic body,
the soul
for which the naïve mind
always finds
a concept formed
in analogy
with sense realities,
and finally
the naïve man's Divine Being.
This Divine Being
is thought of
as acting
in a manner
exactly corresponding
to the way
in which man himself
is seen to act;
that is,
anthropomorphically.
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[21] Modern physics
traces
sensations
back
to processes
of the smallest particles
of bodies
and of
an infinitely fine substance,
called ether,
or
to other such things.
For example,
what
we experience
as warmth is,
within the space occupied
by the warmth-giving body,
the movement
of its parts.
Here
again
something imperceptible
is conceived
in analogy
with what
is perceptible.
In this sense,
the perceptual analogue
to the concept "body"
would be,
shall
we say,
the interior
of a totally enclosed space,
in which elastic
spheres
are moving
in all directions,
impinging one
on another,
bouncing
on and off the walls,
and so on.
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[22] Without such assumptions the world
would fall apart
for the naïve realist
into an incoherent aggregate
of percepts
without mutual relationships
and with no
tendency
to unite.
It is clear,
however,
that naïve realism
can make
these assumptions
only by an inconsistency.
If
it would remain true
to its fundamental principle
that only
what is perceived
is real,
then
it ought not
to assume
a reality
where
it perceives nothing.
The imperceptible forces
which
proceed
from the perceptible things
are
in fact
unjustified hypotheses
from the standpoint
of naïve realism.
And
because
naïve realism knows
no other realities,
it invests
its hypothetical forces
with perceptual content.
It thus
ascribes
a form
of existence
(perceptible existence)
to a sphere
where the only means
of making any assertion
about such existence,
namely,
sense perception,
is lacking.
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[23] This self-contradictory theory
leads
to metaphysical realism.
This constructs,
in addition
to the perceptible reality,
an imperceptible reality
which
it conceives
on the analogy
of the perceptible one.
Therefore
metaphysical realism is
of necessity dualistic.
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[24] Wherever the metaphysical realist observes
a relationship
between perceptible things
(such as when
two things
move towards each other,
or
when
something objective
enters
consciousness),
there
he sees a reality.
However,
the relationship
which
he notices
can only be expressed
by means
of thinking;
it cannot be perceived.
The purely ideal relationship
is
then arbitrarily made
into something similar
to a perceptible one.
Thus,
according to this theory,
the real world
is composed
of the objects
of perception
which are in ceaseless flux,
arising and disappearing,
and
of imperceptible forces
which
produce the objects
of perception,
and are
the things that endure.
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[25] Metaphysical realism
is a contradictory mixture
of naïve realism
and idealism.
Its hypothetical forces
are
imperceptible entities
endowed
with the qualities
of percepts.
The metaphysical realist
has made
up his mind to acknowledge,
in addition
to the sphere
which he
is able
to know
through perception,
another sphere
for which
this means
of knowledge
fails him
and
which
can be known only
by means of thinking.
But
he cannot make
up his mind
at the same time
to acknowledge
that the mode
of existence
which
thinking reveals,
namely,
the concept (idea),
is just
as important
a factor
as the percept.
If we
are
to avoid
the contradiction
of imperceptible percepts,
we must admit that
the relationships
which
thinking
establishes
between the percepts
can have
no other mode
of existence
for us
than
that
of concepts.
If
we reject the untenable part
of metaphysical realism,
the world
presents itself
to us
as the sum
of percepts
and their conceptual (ideal) relationships.
Metaphysical realism
would
then
merge
into a view of the world
which
requires
the principle
of perceivability
for percepts and
that
of conceivability
for the relationships
between the percepts.
This view of the world
can admit no third sphere
-- in addition
to the world
of percepts
and the world
of concepts --
in which
both
the so-called "real"
and
"ideal" principles are simultaneously valid.
[26] When the metaphysical realist
asserts that,
besides
the ideal relationship
between the percept
of the object
and the percept
of the subject,
there must also exist
a real relationship
between the "thing-in-itself"
of the percept
and the "thing-in-itself"
of the perceptible subject
(that is,
of the so-called individual spirit),
he is basing his assertion
on the false assumption
of a real process,
analogous
to the processes
in the sense world
but imperceptible.
Further,
when the metaphysical realist
asserts
that
we
enter
into a conscious ideal
relationship
to our world
of percepts,
but
that
to the real world
we can have only
a dynamic (force) relationship,
he repeats the mistake
we have already criticized.
One can talk
of a dynamic relationship
only within the world
of percepts
(in the sphere
of the sense
of touch),
but
not outside that world.
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[27] Let us call the view
which we
have characterized above,
into which metaphysical realism
merges
when
it discards its contradictory elements,
monism,
because
it combines
one-sided realism
with idealism
into a higher unity.
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[28] For naïve realism,
the real world
is
an aggregate
of perceived
objects (percepts);
for metaphysical realism,
not only
percepts
but also imperceptible forces
are real;
monism
replaces
forces
by ideal connections
which
are gained
through thinking.
The laws of nature
are just such connections.
A law of nature
is
in fact nothing
but the conceptual expression
of the connection
between certain percepts.
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[29] Monism
never finds it necessary
to ask
for any principles
of explanation
for reality other
than percepts
and concepts.
It knows
that
in the whole field
of reality
there is
no
occasion
for this question.
In the perceptual world,
as it presents itself directly
to perception,
it sees one half
of the reality;
in the union
of this world
with the world
of concepts
it finds the full reality.
The metaphysical realist
may object
to the adherent
of monism:
It may be
that
for your organization,
your cognition
is
complete
in itself,
with no
part lacking;
but you
do not know how
the world
is
mirrored in an intelligence
organized differently
from your own.
To this
the monist
will reply:
If there are intelligences other
than human,
and
if
their percepts
are different
from ours,
all that concerns me
is
what reaches me
from them
through perception
and concept.
Through my perceiving,
that is,
through this
specifically human mode
of perceiving,
I,
as subject,
am confronted
with the object.
The connection of things
is thereby interrupted.
The subject
restores this connection
by means of thinking.
In doing so
it puts itself
back
into the context
of the world
as a whole.
Since it
is only through
the subject that the whole
appears
cut
in two
at the place
between our percept
and our concept,
the uniting
of those two
gives us
true cognition.
For beings
with a different perceptual world
(for example,
if they
had twice our number
of sense organs),
the continuum
would appear
broken
in another place,
and the reconstruction
would accordingly have
to take
a form specific
for such beings.
The question
concerning
the limits
to cognition
exists only
for naïve
and metaphysical realism,
both
of which
see
in the contents
of the soul
only an ideal representation
of the real world.
For these theories,
what exists
outside the subject
is
something absolute,
founded
in itself,
and
what is contained
within the subject
is a picture
of this absolute,
but
quite external
to it.
The completeness
of the cognition
depends
on the greater
or lesser degree
of resemblance
between the picture
and the absolute object.
A being
with fewer senses
than man
will perceive less
of the world,
one with more senses
will perceive more.
The former
will accordingly have
a less complete knowledge
than the latter.
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[30] For monism,
the situation
is different.
The manner
in which
the world continuum
appears
to be rent asunder
into subject
and object
depends
on the organization
of the perceiving being.
The object
is not absolute,
but merely relative,
with reference
to this particular subject.
Bridging
over the antithesis,
therefore,
can again take place only
in the quite specific way
that is characteristic
of the particular human
subject.
As soon
as the I,
which
is separated
from the world
in the act
of perceiving,
fits itself
back
into the world continuum through
thoughtful contemplation,
all further questioning
ceases,
having been
but a consequence
of the separation.
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[31] A differently constituted
being
would have
a differently constituted cognition.
Our own cognition
suffices
to answer
the questions
put
by our own nature.
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[32] Metaphysical realism
has to ask:
By
what means
are our percepts given?
What is it
that affects the subject?
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| |
[33] Monism
holds
that percepts
are determined through the subject.
But
at the same time,
the subject
has
in thinking
the means
for canceling
this self-produced determination.
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[34] The metaphysical realist
is faced
by a further difficulty
when
he seeks to explain
the similarity between the world
pictures
of different human individuals.
He has
to ask himself:
How is it
that the picture
of the world
which
I build up
out of my subjectively determined
percepts
and my concepts
turns out
to be
the same
as the one
which
another individual
is also building up
out of the same
two subjective factors?
How can I,
in any case,
draw conclusions
from my own
subjective picture
of the world
about
that
of another human being?
The fact that people
can understand
and get on
with one another
in practical life
leads
the metaphysical realist to conclude
that their subjective world pictures
must be similar.
From the similarity
of these world pictures
he
then further concludes
that the
"individual spirits"
behind the single human subjects
as percepts,
or the "I-in-itself"
behind the subjects,
must also be like
one another.
[35] This
is an inference
from a sum
of effects
to the character
of the underlying causes.
We believe that
we can understand
the situation well enough
from a sufficiently large number
of instances
to know how
the inferred
causes
will behave
in other instances.
Such an inference
is called an inductive inference.
We shall be obliged
to modify
its results
if further observation
yields some unexpected element,
because
the character
of our conclusion is,
after all,
determined only
by the particular form
of our actual observations.
The metaphysical realist
asserts
that this knowledge
of causes,
though conditional,
is nevertheless quite sufficient
for practical life.
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[36] Inductive inference
is
the method underlying
modern metaphysical
realism.
At one time
it was thought that
we could evolve
something
out of concepts
that is
no longer
a concept.
It was thought
that the metaphysical realities,
which metaphysical realism
after all requires,
could be known
by means
of concepts.
This kind
of philosophizing
is now out of date.
Instead
it
is thought
that one can infer
from a sufficiently large number
of perceptual facts
the character
of the thing-in-itself which
underlies these facts.
Whereas formerly
it was from concepts,
now
it is from percepts
that people
seek to evolve
the metaphysical.
Since
one has concepts
before oneself
in transparent clearness,
it was thought
that one
might be able
to deduce
the metaphysical
from them
with absolute certainty.
Percepts
are not given
with the same transparent clearness.
Each subsequent one
is a little different
from others
of the same kind which
preceded it.
Basically,
therefore,
anything
inferred from
past percepts
will be somewhat modified
by each subsequent percept.
The character
of the metaphysical thus
obtained can,
therefore,
be only relatively true,
since it
is subject to correction
by further instances.
Eduard von Hartmann's metaphysics has
a character determined
by this basic method,
as expressed
in the motto
on the title page
of his first important book:
"Speculative
results
following
the inductive method
of Natural Science."
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[37] The form
which the metaphysical realist
nowadays gives to his things-in-themselves
is obtained
by inductive inferences.
Through considerations
of the process
of cognition
he is convinced
of the existence
of an objectively
real world continuum,
over
and above
the "subjective" world continuum
which is cognizable
through percepts
and concepts.
The nature
of this reality
he thinks
he can determine
by inductive inferences
from his percepts.
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Author's addition,
1918
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[1] For
the unprejudiced observation
of what
is experienced
through percept
and concept,
as we
have tried
to describe
it
in the foregoing pages,
certain ideas
which
originate
in the field
of natural science
are repeatedly found
to be disturbing.
Thus it
is said
that
in the spectrum
of light
the eye
perceives
colors
from red
to violet.
But
in the space
beyond the violet
there are
forces
of radiation
for which
there is
no corresponding color-perception
in the eye,
but instead
there is a definite chemical
effect;
in the same way,
beyond the limit
of the red
there are radiations
having only
an effect
of warmth.
By studying
these and other similar phenomena,
one is led
to the view
that
the range
of man's perceptual world
is determined
by the range
of his senses,
and
that
he would be confronted
by a very different world
if he
had additional,
or altogether different,
senses.
Anyone who
chooses
to indulge
in the extravagant flights
of fancy
for which
the brilliant discoveries
of recent scientific research offer
such tempting opportunities,
may well arrive
at the conclusion
that nothing
enters man's field
of observation except
what can affect
the senses
which
his bodily organization
has evolved.
He has no
right to regard
what is perceived,
limited
as it
is
by his organization,
as in any way
setting
a standard
for reality.
Every new sense
would confront him
with a different picture
of reality.
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[2] Within its
proper limits this view
is entirely justified.
But
if
anyone allows
this view
to confuse him
in his unprejudiced observation
of the relationship
of percept
and concept
as set out
in these chapters,
then
he will bar
his own way
to any realistic knowledge
of man
and of the world.
To experience
the essential nature
of thinking,
that is,
to work
one's way
into the world
of concepts
through one's own activity,
is an entirely different thing
from experiencing something perceptible
through the senses.
Whatever senses man
might possibly have,
not
one would give him
reality
if his thinking
did not permeate with concepts
whatever
he perceived
by means
of it.
And every sense,
however constructed,
would,
if thus permeated,
enable him
to live within reality.
This question
of
how
he stands
in the world
of reality
is untouched by any speculations
he may have
as to
how
the perceptual world might appear
to him
if he had different senses.
We must clearly understand
that every perceptual picture
of the world
owes its form
to the organization
of the perceiving being,
but
also that the perceptual picture
which
has been thoroughly permeated
by the experience
of thinking
leads us
into reality.
What causes us
to enquire into our relationship
to the world
is not
the fanciful pictures
of how different
the world
would appear
to other
than human
senses,
but
the realization
that every percept
gives us only
a part
of the reality concealed
within it,
in other words,
that it
directs us away
from its inherent reality.
Added to this
is
the further realization that thinking
leads us
into that part
of the reality
which the percept
conceals within itself.
[3] Another difficulty
in the way
of the unprejudiced observation
of the relationship
between the percept
and
the concept
wrought
by thinking,
as here described,
arises when,
for example,
in the field
of experimental physics
it becomes necessary
to speak not
of immediately perceptible elements,
but
of non-perceptible quantities
as in the case
of lines
of electric or magnetic force.
It may seem
as if the elements
of reality
of which
physicists
speak
had
no
connection either
with what
is perceptible
or
with the concepts
which active thinking
has wrought.
Yet
such
a view
would be based
on self-deception.
The main point
is that all
the results
of physical research,
apart from unjustifiable hypotheses
which ought to be excluded,
have been obtained
through percept
and concept.
Elements
which are seemingly non-perceptible
are placed
by the physicist's sound instinct
for knowledge
into the field
where
percepts lie,
and
they are thought of
in terms
of concepts
commonly used
in this field.
The strengths
of electric or magnetic fields
and such like
are arrived at,
in the very nature
of things,
by no
other
process
of knowledge
than the one
which
occurs
between percept
and concept.
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[4] An increase
or a modification
of human senses
would yield
a different perceptual picture,
an enrichment or a modification
of human experience.
But
even with this experience
one could arrive
at real knowledge
only through the interplay
of concept and percept.
The deepening
of knowledge
depends
on the powers
of intuition
which
express themselves
in thinking
(see Chapter 5).
In the living
experience
which
develops
within thinking,
this intuition
may dive down
to greater
or to lesser depths
of reality.
An extension
of the perceptual picture
may provide
stimulation
for this
diving down
of intuition,
and thus
indirectly promote it.
But
under no
circumstances should this diving
into the depths
to reach
reality
be confused
with being confronted
by a perceptual picture
of greater or lesser breadth,
which
in any case
can only contain half
the reality,
as determined
by the organization
of the cognizing being.
If
one does not lose oneself
in abstractions,
one will realize
that
for a knowledge
of human nature
it is
a relevant fact
that in physics
one has to infer
the existence
of elements
in the perceptual field
for which
no sense organ is tuned
as it
is
for color or sound.
Man's being,
quite concretely,
is determined not
only by what
his organization presents
to him
as immediate percept,
but
also by the fact
that
from this immediate
perception other things
are excluded.
Just
as it
is necessary
for life
that
in addition
to the conscious waking state
there should be
an unconscious sleeping state,
so for man's experience
of himself
it is necessary
that
in addition
to the sphere
of his sense
perception
there should be another sphere
-- in fact
a far larger one --
of elements not perceptible
to the senses
but belonging
to the same field
from which
the sense
percepts come.
All this was already implied
in the original presentation
of this work.
The author
adds these extensions
to the argument
because he
has found by experience
that many a reader
has not read accurately enough.
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[5] It is
to be remembered, too,
that
the idea of percept
developed
in this book
is not
to be confused
with the idea
of external sense
percept
which
is
but a special instance
of it.
The reader
will gather
from what
has gone before,
but even more
from what
will follow,
that "percept"
is
here taken to be
everything that approaches man
through the senses
or through the spirit,
before it
has been grasped
by the actively elaborated concept.
"Senses",
as
we ordinarily understand the term,
are not necessary
in order to have percepts
in soul-
or spirit-experience.
It might be said
that this
extension of our ordinary usage
is not permissible.
But
such extension
is absolutely necessary
if we
are not
to be prevented
by the current sense
of a word
from enlarging
our knowledge
in certain fields.
Anyone
who uses "perception"
to mean
only
"sense perception"
will never arrive
at a concept fit
for the purposes
of knowledge
-- even knowledge
of this same sense perception.
One must sometimes enlarge
a concept
in order that
it may get
its appropriate meaning
in a narrower field.
Sometimes
one must also add
to the original content
of a concept
in order that
the original concept
may be justified
or,
perhaps,
readjusted.
Thus
we find it
said here
in this book
(see Chapter 6):
"The mental picture
is
an individualized concept."
It has been objected
that this
is an unusual use
of words.
But
this use
is necessary
if we
are
to find out
what
a mental picture
really is.
How can
we expect any progress
in knowledge
if
everyone who finds himself
compelled
to readjust
concepts
is to be met
by the objection,
"This
is an unusual use
of words"? |
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