Chapter 7 Are There Limits To Cognition?
Chapter 7
Are There Limits
To Cognition?
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[1] We have established
that the elements
for the explanation
of reality
are
to be found
in two spheres:
perceiving
and thinking.
It is due,
as we
have seen,
to our organization
that the full,
complete reality,
including our own selves
as subjects,
appears at first
as a duality.
Cognition
overcomes
this duality
by fusing
the two elements
of reality,
the percept
and the concept
gained
by thinking,
into the complete thing.
Let us
call the manner
in which
the world
presents itself to us,
before it
has taken on
its true nature
through cognition,
"the world
of appearance,"
in contrast
to the unified whole composed
of percept and concept.
We can then say:
The world
is given
to us
as a duality,
and
cognition transforms it
into a unity.
A philosophy
which starts from this
basic principle
may be called
a monistic philosophy,
or monism.
Opposed
to this
is
the two-world theory,
or dualism.
The latter
does not assume just
that there are
two sides
of a single reality
which
are kept
apart
merely by our organization,
but
that there are two worlds
absolutely distinct
from one another.
It
then tries
to find
in one
of these two worlds
the principles
for the explanation
of the other.
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[2] Dualism
rests
on a false conception
of what
we
call cognition.
It divides
the whole
of existence
into two spheres,
each
of which
has
its own laws,
and
it leaves
these two worlds standing
apart and opposed.
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[3] It is
from a dualism
such as this
that there arises
the distinction
between the perceptual object
and the thing-in-itself,
which
Kant introduced
into philosophy,
and which,
to the present day,
we have not succeeded
in eradicating.
According to
our line
of argument,
it is
due to the nature
of our mental organization
that a particular thing
can be given
to us
only
as a percept.
Thinking
then overcomes
this particularity
by assigning
to each percept
its rightful place
in the world
as a whole.
As long
as we designate
the separated
parts
of the world
as percepts,
we are simply following,
in this
separating out,
a law
of our subjectivity.
If,
however,
we regard the sum
of all percepts
as the one part,
and contrast
with this
a second part,
namely,
the things-in-themselves,
then we
are philosophizing into the blue.
We are merely playing
with concepts.
We construct
an artificial pair of
opposites,
but
we can gain
no content
for the second
of these
opposites,
since such content
for a particular thing
can be drawn only
from perception.
[4] Every kind
of existence
that is assumed
outside the realm
of percept and
concept
must be relegated
to the sphere
of unjustified hypotheses.
To this category
belongs the
"thing-in-itself".
It is quite natural
that a dualistic thinker
should be unable
to find
the connection
between the world principle
which
he hypothetically assumes
and
the things given
in experience.
A content
for the hypothetical world principle
can be arrived
at
only by
borrowing it
from the world
of experience
and then shutting one's eyes
to the fact
of the borrowing.
Otherwise
it remains an empty concept,
a non-concept
which has nothing
but the form
of a concept.
Here the dualistic thinker
usually asserts that
the content
of this concept
is inaccessible
to our cognition;
we can know only
that
such
a content exists,
but not
what it
is that exists.
In both cases
it is impossible
to overcome dualism.
Even though
one
were
to import
a few abstract elements
from the world
of experience
into the concept
of the thing-in-itself,
it would still remain impossible
to derive
the rich concrete life
of experience
from these
few qualities
which are,
after all,
themselves
taken
from perception.
DuBois-Reymond
considers
that the imperceptible atoms
of matter produce sensation
and feeling
by means
of their position
and motion,
and
then comes
to the conclusion
that
we can never find
a satisfactory explanation
of how matter and
motion produce sensation
and feeling,
for "it
is absolutely and
for ever incomprehensible
that it should be other
than indifferent
to a number
of atoms
of carbon,
hydrogen,
nitrogen,
and so on,
how they
lie and move,
how
they lay
and moved,
or
how
they will lie
and will move.
It is impossible
to see how
consciousness
could come
into existence
through their interaction."
This conclusion
is characteristic
of this whole trend
of thought.
Position
and
motion
are abstracted
from the rich world
of percepts,
They
are
then transferred
to the notional world
of atoms.
And
then
astonishment arises
that real life
cannot be evolved
out of this self-made principle
borrowed
from the world
of percepts.
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[5]
That the dualist
can reach no explanation
of the world,
working
as he
does
with a completely empty concept
of the "in-itself"
of a thing,
follows at
once from the very
definition of his principle
given above.
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[6] In every
case
the dualist
finds himself
compelled
to set impassable barriers
to our capacity
for cognition.
The follower
of a monistic world conception
knows
that everything
he
needs for the explanation
of any given phenomenon
in the world
must lie
within this world
itself.
What prevents him
from reaching
it can be only
accidental limitations
in space
and time,
or defects
of his organization,
that is, not
of human organization
in general,
but
only of his own particular one.
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[7] It follows
from the concept
of cognizing,
as we
have defined it,
that one
cannot speak
of limits
to cognition.
Cognizing is not a concern
of the world
in general,
but an affair
which man
must settle
for himself.
Things
demand no explanation.
They exist
and act
on one another
according to
laws
which
can be discovered
through thinking,
They
exist
in indivisible unity
with these laws.
Our Egohood
confronts them,
grasping
at first only
that part of them
we have called percepts.
Within our Egohood,
however,
lies the power
to discover
the other part
of the reality
as well.
Only
when the Egohood
has taken
the two elements of reality
which
are indivisibly united
in the world and
has combined them also
for itself,
is cognitive satisfaction
attained
-- the I
has
then arrived
at the reality once more.
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[8] Thus the conditions necessary
for cognition
to take place
are there through the I
and
for the I. The I
sets itself
the problems
of cognition;
and
moreover
it
takes them
from an element
that is
absolutely
clear
and transparent
in itself:
the element of thinking.
If
we set ourselves
questions
which
we cannot answer,
it must be
because
the content of the questions
is not
in all respects
clear and distinct.
It is not the world
which sets us the questions,
but we ourselves.
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[9] I can imagine
that it
would be quite impossible
for me
to answer
a question
which
I happened
to find written down somewhere,
without knowing
the sphere
from
which
the content
of the question
was taken.
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[10] Our cognition
is concerned
with questions
which
arise
for us
through the fact
that a sphere
of percepts,
conditioned
by place,
time,
and our subjective organization,
is confronted
by a sphere
of concepts
pointing
to the totality
of the universe.
My task
consists
in reconciling
these two spheres,
with both
of which
I am well acquainted.
Here one
cannot speak
of a limit
to cognition.
It may be that,
at any particular moment,
this or that remains
unexplained
because,
through our place
in life,
we are prevented
from perceiving
the things involved.
What is not found today,
however,
may be found
tomorrow.
The limits
due to these causes
are only transitory,
and can be overcome
by the progress
of perception
and thinking.
[11] Dualism
makes the mistake
of transferring
the antithesis
of object
and subject,
which
has
meaning only
within the perceptual realm,
to purely notional entities
outside this realm.
But
since
the separate things
within the perceptual field
remain
separated only so long
as the perceiver
refrains
from thinking
(which
cancels all separation
and shows it
to be
due to purely subjective factors),
the dualist
is therefore transferring
to entities
behind the perceptible realm
determining
factors
which
even for this realm
have no absolute validity,
but only relative.
He
thus splits
up the two
factors
concerned
in the cognitive process,
namely percept
and concept,
into four:
(1) the object
in itself;
(2) the precept
which the subject
has of the object;
(3) the subject;
(4) the concept
which relates
the precept
to the object
in itself.
The relation
between subject
and object
is
a real one;
the subject
is really
(dynamically)
influenced by the object.
This real process
is said not
to appear in consciousness.
But it
is supposed to evoke
in the subject a response
to the stimulation
from the object.
The result of this response
is said
to be the percept.
Only at this stage
does it
enter our consciousness.
The object
is said
to have an objective
(independent
of the subject)
reality,
the percept
a subjective reality.
This subjective reality
is referred
by the subject to the object.
This reference
is called
an ideal one.
With this
the dualist
therefore splits
up the cognitive process
into two parts.
The one part,
namely,
the production
of the perceptual object
out of the thing-in-itself,
he conceives of
as taking place
outside consciousness,
whereas the other,
the combination
of percept
with concept
and the reference
of the concept
to the object,
takes place,
according to him,
within consciousness.
With these presuppositions,
it is
clear
why
the dualist
believes
his concepts
to be merely
subjective representatives
of what
is there prior to
his consciousness.
The objectively real process
in the subject
by means
of which
the percept
comes about,
and still more
the objective relations
between things-in-themselves,
remain
for such a dualist inaccessible
to direct knowledge;
according to him,
man can obtain only
conceptual representatives
of the objectively real.
The bond of unity
which connects things
with one another
and
also
objectively with the individual mind
of each
of us (as thing-in-itself) lies
beyond our consciousness
in a being-in-itself
of whom,
once more,
we can have
in our consciousness merely
a conceptual representative.
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[12] The dualist
believes
that
he would dissolve away
the whole world
into a mere abstract. scheme
of concepts,
did
he not insist
on real connections
between the objects
besides
the conceptual ones.
In other words,
the ideal principles
which
thinking
discovers seem too airy
for the dualist,
and
he seeks,
in addition,
real principles
with which
to support them.
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[13] Let us examine
these real principles
a little more closely.
The naive man
(naive realist)
regards the objects
of external experience
as realities.
The fact that his hands
can grasp these objects,
and
his eyes
see them,
is for him
sufficient proof
of their reality.
"Nothing
exists
that cannot be perceived"
is,
in fact,
the first axiom
of the naïve man;
and
it is held
to be equally
valid
in its converse:
"Everything
which can be perceived exists."
The best evidence
for this assertion
is
the naïve man's belief
in immortality
and ghosts.
He thinks
of the soul
as refined material
substance
which may,
in special circumstances,
become visible
even to the ordinary man
(naive belief
in ghosts).
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[14] In contrast
with this
real world
of his,
the naïve realist
regards everything else,
especially
the world
of ideas,
as unreal
or
"merely ideal".
What
we add
to objects
by thinking
is
nothing
more than thoughts
about the things.
Thought adds nothing real
to the percept.
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[15] But it is not only
with reference
to the existence
of things
that the naïve man
regards
sense
perception as the sole proof
of reality,
but
also with
reference
to events.
A thing,
according to him,
can act
on another
only
when a force
actually present to sense
perception issues
from the one and
seizes
upon the other.
In the older physics
it was thought
that very fine substances emanate
from the objects
and penetrate
through the sense organs
into the soul.
The actual
seeing
of these substances
is impossible
only
because
of the coarseness
of our sense organs relative
to the fineness
of these substances.
In principle,
the reason
for attributing reality
to these substances
was the same
as for attributing it
to the objects
of the sense-perceptible world,
namely
because
of their mode
of existence,
which
was thought
to be
analogous
to
that
of sense-perceptible reality.
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[16] The self-contained nature of what
can be experienced
through ideas
is not regarded
by the naïve mind
as being real
in the same way
that sense experience is.
An object grasped
in
"mere idea"
is regarded
as a chimera
until
conviction of its reality
can be given
through sense perception.
In short,
the naïve man
demands
the real evidence
of his senses
in addition
to the ideal evidence
of his thinking.
In this need
of the naïve man
lies the original ground
for primitive forms
of the belief
in revelation.
The God
who is given
through thinking
remains
to the naïve mind
always a merely "notional" God.
The naïve mind
demands
a manifestation
that is accessible
to sense perception.
God must appear
in the flesh,
and
little value
is attached
to the testimony
of thinking,
but
only to proof
of divinity
such as changing
water
into wine
in a way
that can be testified
by the senses.
[17] Even cognition
itself
is pictured
by the naïve man
as a process analogous
to sense perception.
Things,
it is thought,
make an impression
on the soul,
or send
out images
which
enter through our senses,
and so on.
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[18] What the naïve man
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