Chapter 5
The Act Of Knowing The World
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[1]
From
the foregoing considerations it follows
that it
is impossible
to prove
by investigating
the content
of our observation
that our percepts
are mental
pictures.
Such proof
is supposed
to be established
by showing that,
if the process
of perceiving
takes place
in the way
in which â€"
on the basis
of naive-realistic assumptions
about our psychological
and physiological constitution â€"
we imagine
that it does,
then we
have to do,
not with things
in themselves,
but
only with our mental pictures
of things.
Now
if naïve realism,
when
consistently thought out,
leads to results
which
directly contradict its presuppositions,
then these presuppositions
must be discarded
as unsuitable
for the foundation
of a universal philosophy.
In any case,
it is not permissible
to reject
the presuppositions
and
yet accept the consequences,
as the critical idealist
does
when
he bases
his assertion
that the world
is my mental
picture
on the line
of argument
already described.
(Eduard von Hartmann gives
a full account
of this line
of argument
in his work,
Das Grundproblem der
Erkenntnistheorie.)
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[2] The truth
of critical
idealism is one thing,
the force
of its proof
another.
How
it stands
with the former
will appear later
on
in the course
of this book,
but
the force of its proof
is exactly nil.
If one builds
a house,
and
the ground floor
collapses
while
the first floor
is being built,
then
the first floor
collapses also.
Naïve
realism
and critical idealism is related
as ground floor
to the first floor
in this simile.
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[3] For someone
who
believes
that the whole perceived world
is only an imagined one,
a mental picture,
and is
in fact the effect
upon my soul
of things unknown
to me,
the real problem of knowledge
is naturally concerned not
with the mental pictures present only
in the soul
but with the things
which are independent
of us and
which
lie outside
our consciousness.
He asks:
How much
can
we learn
about these things indirectly,
seeing
that
we cannot observe them directly?
From this point of view,
he is concerned not
with the inner connection
of his conscious percepts
with one another
but
with their causes
which
transcend
his consciousness
and
exist independently
of him,
since the percepts,
in his opinion,
disappear as soon
as he turns
his senses
away from things.
Our consciousness,
on this view,
works like
a mirror
from which
the pictures of definite things
disappear
the moment its reflecting surface
is not turned toward them.
If,
now,
we do not see
the things themselves
but
only their reflections,
then
we must learn indirectly
about the nature
of things
by drawing conclusions
from the behavior
of the reflections.
Modern science
takes
this attitude
in that it uses percepts
only
as a last resort
in obtaining information
about the processes
of matter
which
lie
behind them,
and which alone
really "are."
If the philosopher,
as critical idealist,
admits real existence
at all,
then his search
for knowledge
through the medium
of mental pictures
is directed solely toward
this existence.
His interest
skips
over the subjective world
of mental pictures
and goes straight
for what
produces
these pictures.
[4]
The critical idealist can,
however,
go even further
and say:
I am confined
to the world
of my mental pictures
and
escape from it.
If
I think
of a thing
as being
behind my mental picture,
then thought
is again nothing
but a mental picture.
An idealist of this type
will
either
deny
the thing-in-itself entirely
or
at any rate
assert
that it
has no significance
for human beings,
in other words,
that it
is
as good as non-existent
since
we can know nothing
of it.
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[5] To this kind
of critical
idealist the whole world seems
a dream,
in the face
of which
all striving
for knowledge
is simply meaningless.
For him
there can be only
two sorts of men:
victims
of the illusion
that their own dream structures
are real things,
and the wise ones
who
see through the nothingness
of this dream
world and who
must therefore gradually lose all
desire
to trouble themselves further
about it.
From this point of view,
even
one's own personality
may become
a mere dream phantom.
Just
as during sleep
there appears
among my dream
images an image
of myself,
so in waking consciousness
the mental picture
of my own
I is added
to the mental picture
of the outer world.
We have
then given
to us
in consciousness,
not our real I,
but
only
our mental picture
of our I. Whoever
denies that things exist,
or at least
that
we can know anything
of them,
must also deny
the existence,
or at least
the knowledge,
of one's own personality.
The critical idealist
then comes
to the conclusion
that
"All reality
resolves itself
into a wonderful dream,
without a life
which is dreamed about,
and
without a spirit
which is having the dream;
into a dream
which
hangs together in a dream
of itself."
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[6] For the person
who believes
that
he recognizes
our immediate life
to be
a dream,
it is immaterial
whether
he postulates nothing more
behind this dream
or
whether
he relates
his mental pictures
to actual things.
In both cases
life must lose all
academic interest
for him.
But
whereas
all learning
must be meaningless
for those
who
believe
that the whole
of the accessible universe
is exhausted in dreams,
yet for others
who feel
entitled
to argue
from mental pictures
to things,
learning
will consist
in the investigation
of these
"things-in-themselves."
The first of these theories
may be called
absolute illusionism,
the second
is called
transcendental realism
by its most rigorously
logical exponent,
Eduard von Hartmann.
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[7]
Both these points
of views
have
this
in common
with naïve realism,
that
they seek
to gain
a footing
in the world
by means
of an investigation
of perceptions.
Within this sphere,
however,
they are unable
to find
a firm foundation.
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[8]
One
of the most important questions
for an adherent
of transcendental
realism
would have to be:
How does
the Ego
produce
the world
of mental pictures
out of itself?
A world of mental pictures
which was given to us,
and
which
disappeared
as soon
as we shut
our senses
to the external world,
might kindle
as earnest desire
for knowledge,
in so far
as it
was a means
of investigating indirectly
the world
of the I-in-itself.
If
the things of our experience
were
"mental
pictures",
then
our everyday life
would be like
a dream,
and
the discovery
of the true state of affairs
would be like
waking.
Now our dream images
interest us as long
as we
dream
and consequently do not detect
their dream character.
But
as soon
as we wake,
we no longer look
for the inner connections
of our dream
images
among themselves,
but rather
for the physical,
physiological and psychological processes
which underlie them.
In the same way,
a philosopher
who holds
the world
to be
his mental picture
cannot be interested
in the mutual relations
of the details
within the picture.
If
he allows
for the existence
of a real Ego
at all,
then
his question
will be,
not how
one of his mental pictures
is linked with another,
but
what takes place
in the independently existing soul
while
a certain train
of mental pictures
passes
through his consciousness.
If
I dream
that
I am drinking wine
which makes my throat dry,
and
then
wake up with a cough,
I cease,
the moment
I wake,
to be interested
in progress
of the dream
for its own sake.
My attention
is now concerned only
with the physiological
and psychological processes
by means
of which
the irritation
which
causes me
to cough
comes
to be symbolically expressed
in the dream picture.
Similarly,
once
the philosopher is convinced
that the given world consists
of nothing
but mental
pictures,
his interest
is bound
to switch at
once from this world
to the real soul
which lies behind.
The matter
is more serious,
however,
for the adherent
of illusionism
who denies altogether
the existence
of an Ego-in-itself
behind the mental pictures,
or at least
holds
this Ego
to be unknowable.
We might very easily be led
to such
a view
by the observation
that,
in contrast
to dreaming,
there is indeed
the waking
state
in which
we have
the opportunity
of seeing
through our dreams
and referring them
to the real relations
of things,
but
that there is no
state
of the self which
is related similarly
to our waking conscious life.
Whoever
takes this view fails
to see
that there is,
in fact,
something
which
is related
to mere perceiving
in the way
that our waking experience
is related
to our dreaming.
This something
is thinking.
[9] The naïve man
cannot be charged
with the lack
of insight
referred
to here.
He accepts life
as it is,
and regards things
as real
just
as they
present themselves to him
in experience.
The first step,
however,
which
we take
beyond this standpoint
can be only this,
that
we ask
how thinking
is related
to perception.
It makes
no difference
whether
or
no the percept,
in the shape given
to me,
exists continuously
before and after my forming
a mental picture;
if
I want
to assert
anything
whatever
about it,
I can do so only
with the help
of thinking.
If
I assert
that the world
is my mental picture,
I have enunciated
the result
of an act
of thinking. and
if my thinking
is not applicable
to the world,
then
this result is false.
Between a percept
and every kind
of assertion
about it
there intervenes
thinking.
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[10] The reason
why
we generally overlook
thinking
in our consideration
of things
has already been given.
It lies
in the fact
that our attention
is concentrated only
on the object
we are thinking about,
but
not at the same time
on the thinking itself.
The naïve consciousness,
therefore,
treats
thinking
as something
which has nothing
to do with things,
but stands altogether aloof
from them
and contemplates
them.
The picture
which the thinker
makes
of the phenomena
of the world
is regarded not
as something
belonging
to the things
but as existing only
in the human head.
The world
is complete
in itself
without this picture.
It is finished
and complete
with all its substances
and forces,
and
of this
ready-made world man
makes
a picture.
Whoever
thinks thus need
only be asked one question.
What right
have you
to declare
the world to be
complete
without thinking?
Does not
the world
produce
thinking
in the heads
of men
with the same necessity
as it produces
the blossom
on a plant?
Plant a seed
in the earth.
It puts
forth root
and stem,
it unfolds
into leaves and blossoms.
Set the plant
before yourself.
It connects itself,
in your mind,
with a definite concept.
Why should
this concept
belong any less
to the whole plant
than
leaf and blossom?
You say
the leaves
and blossoms
exist quite
apart from a perceiving
subject,
but the concept
appears only
when a human being
confronts the plant.
Quite so.
But leaves
and blossoms
also appear
on the plant
only
if there is
soil
in which
the seed
can be planted,
and light
and air
in which the leaves
and blossoms
can unfold.
Just so
the concept of a plant
arises
when a thinking consciousness
approaches the plant.
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[11] It is quite arbitrary
to regard
the sum
of what
we experience
of a thing
through bare perception
as a totality,
as the whole thing,
while
that
which
reveals itself
through thoughtful contemplation
(thinking consideration)
is regarded
as a mere accretion
which has nothing
to do
with the thing
itself.
If
I am given
a rosebud today,
the picture that offers
itself
to my perception
is complete only
for the moment.
If
I put
the bud
into water,
I shall
tomorrow
get a very different picture
of my object.
If
I watch the rosebud
without interruption,
I shall see
today's state change continuously
into tomorrow's
through an infinite number
of intermediate stages.
The picture
which
presents itself
to me
at any one
moment
is only a chance cross-section
of an object
which
is
in a continual process
of development.
If
I do not put the bud
into water,
a whole series
of states
which
lay
as possibilities
within the bud
will not develop.
Similarly I
may be prevented
tomorrow from observing
the blossom further,
and will thereby have
an incomplete picture
of it.
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[12] It would be
a quite unobjective
and fortuitous kind
of opinion
that declared
of the purely momentary appearance
of a thing:
this is
the thing.
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[13] Just
as little is it legitimate
to regard
the sum
of perceptual characteristics
as the thing.
It might be quite possible
for a spirit
to receive
the concept
at the same time as,
and united with,
the percept.
It would never occur
to such
a spirit
that the concept
did not belong
to the thing.
It would have
to ascribe to the concept
an existence indivisibly bound up
with the thing.
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[14] I will make myself clearer
by an example.
If
I throw a stone
horizontally through the air,
I perceive it
in different places
one
after the other.
I connect
these places so
as to form a line.
Mathematics
teaches me
to know
various kinds
of lines,
one
of which
is
the parabola.
I know the parabola
to be a line
which
is produced
when
a point
moves
according to
a particular law.
If
I examine
the conditions
under which
the stone
thrown
by me moves,
I find
the path traversed is identical
with the line
I
know as a parabola.
That the stone moves
just
in a parabola
is a result
of the given
conditions and follows necessarily
from them.
The form of the parabola
belongs
to the whole phenomenon
as much as
any other feature
of it does.
The spirit
described above
who has no need
of the detour
of thinking
would find itself
presented not only a sequence
of visual percepts
at different points
but,
as part
and parcel
of these phenomena,
also with the parabolic form
of the path
which
we add
to the phenomenon
only by thinking.
[15] It is not
due to the objects
that they
are given us
at
first without the corresponding concepts,
but
to our mental organization.
Our whole
being
functions
in such
a way
that
from every real thing
the relevant elements
come
to us
from two sides,
from perceiving
and from thinking.
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[16] The way
I am organized for apprehending
the things
has nothing
to do
with the nature
of the things themselves.
The gap
between perceiving
and thinking
exists only
from the moment
that
I as spectator
confront the things.
Which elements do,
and which
do not,
belong
to the things
cannot depend
at
all on the manner
in which
I obtain my knowledge
of these elements.
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[17] Man is a limited being.
First of all,
he is a being
among other beings.
His existence
belongs
to space and time.
Thus,
only
a limited part
of the total universe
that
can be given him
at any one time.
This limited part,
however,
is linked up
with other parts
in all directions both
in time
and in space.
If
our existence
were so
linked up
with the things
that
every occurrence in the world
were at the same
time also an occurrence
in us,
the distinction
between ourselves
and
the things would not exist.
But
then there would be
no separate things
at
all for us.
All occurrences would pass continuously
one
into the other.
The cosmos
would be
a unity
and a whole,
complete
in itself.
The stream of events
would nowhere be interrupted.
It is owing
to our limitations
that a thing appears
to us
as single
and separate
when
in truth
it is not
a separate thing
at all.
Nowhere,
for example,
is the single quality "red"
to be found
by itself
in isolation.
It is surrounded
on all sides
by other qualities
to which
it belongs,
and
without which
it could not subsist.
For us,
however,
it is necessary
to isolate
certain sections
of the world
and
to consider them
by themselves.
Our eye
can grasp
only single colors one
after another
out of a manifold totality
of color,
and our understanding,
can grasp
only single concepts
out of a connected
conceptual system.
This separating
off is a subjective act,
which
is
due to the fact
that we
are not identical
with the world process,
but are a single
being
among other beings.
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[18] The all important thing
now is
to determine how
the being
that we ourselves are
is related
to the other entities.
This determination
must be distinguished
from merely becoming conscious
of ourselves.
For
this latter self-awareness
we depend
on perceiving just
as we
do
for our awareness of any other thing.
The perception of myself
reveals
to me a number
of qualities
which
I combine
into my personality as a whole,
just as I
combine the qualities yellow,
metallic,
hard, etc.,
in the unity "gold."
The perception of myself
does not take me
beyond the sphere
of what
belongs
to me.
This
perceiving
of myself
must be distinguished
from determining myself
by means of thinking.
Just as,
by means
of thinking,
I fit any single external percept
into the whole world context,
so by means
of thinking
I
integrate into the world
process
the percepts
I
have made of myself.
My self-perception
confines me
within certain limits,
but my thinking
is not concerned
with these limits.
In this sense
I am a two-sided
being.
I am enclosed
within the sphere
which
I perceive
as that of my personality,
but
I am also the bearer
of an activity
which,
from a higher sphere,
defines
my limited existence.
Our thinking
is not individual like
our sensing
and feeling;
it is universal.
It receives
an individual stamp
in each separate human being
only
because
it comes
to be related
to his individual feelings
and sensations.
By means
of these
particular colorings
of the universal thinking,
individual men
differentiate themselves
from one another.
There is only
one single concept
of "triangle".
It is quite immaterial
for the content
of this concept
whether it
is grasped
in A's consciousness
or in B's.
It will,
however,
be grasped
by each
of the two
in his own individual way.
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[19] This
thought
is opposed
by a common prejudice very hard
to overcome.
This prejudice
prevents one
from seeing
that the concept
of a triangle
that my head grasps
is the same
as the concept
that my neighbor's head grasps.
The naïve man
believes himself
to be
the creator
of his concepts.
Hence
he believes
that each person
has his own concepts.
It is
a fundamental requirement
of philosophic thinking
that it
should overcome this prejudice.
The one uniform concept
of "triangle"
does not become
a multiplicity
because it
is thought by many persons.
For
the thinking
of the many
is itself
a unity.
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[20] In thinking,
we have
that element
given us which welds
our separate individuality
into one whole
with the cosmos.
In so far
as we sense
and feel
(and also perceive),
we are single beings;
in so far
as we think,
we are the all-one
being
that pervades
everything.
This is
the deeper meaning
of our two-sided nature:
We see
coming
into being
in us a force complete
and absolute
in itself,
a force
which is universal
but
which
we learn to know,
not
as it issues
from the center
of the world,
but rather
at a point
in the periphery.
Were
we to know
it
at its source,
we should understand
the whole riddle
of the universe
the moment
we became conscious.
But
since
we stand
at a point
in the periphery,
and find that our own
existence is bounded
by definite limits,
we must explore the region
which
lies outside
our own
being
with the help
of thinking,
which
projects
into us
from the universal world existence.
[21] Through the fact
that the thinking,
in us,
reaches out
beyond our separate existence
and
relates itself
to the universal world existence,
gives
rise
to the fundamental desire
for knowledge
in us.
Beings
without thinking
do not have this desire.
When they
are faced with other things,
no questions
arise for them.
These other things remain external
to such beings.
But
in thinking beings
the concept
rises
up
when they
confront the external thing.
It is that part
of the thing
which
we receive not
from
outside but from
within.
To match up,
to unite
the two elements,
inner and outer,
is the task
of knowledge.
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[22] The percept
is thus
not
something finished and self-contained,
but one side
of the total reality.
The other side
is
the concept.
The act
of knowing
is the synthesis
of percept and concept.
Only percept
and concept
together constitute
the whole thing.
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[23] The foregoing arguments show
that it
is senseless
to look
for any common element
in the separate entities
of the world other
than
the ideal content that thinking
offers us.
All attempts
to find
a unity
in the world other
than
this internally coherent ideal content,
which
we gain
by a thoughtful contemplation
of our percepts,
are bound
to fail.
Neither
a humanly personal God,
nor force,
nor matter,
nor
the blind will,
can be valid
for us
as a universal world unity.
All these entities
belong only
to limited spheres
of our observation.
Humanly limited
personality
we
perceive only in ourselves;
force and matter
in external things.
As far
as the will is concerned,
it can be regarded only
as the expression
of the activity
of our finite personality.
Schopenhauer
wants
to avoid
making "abstract"
thinking the bearer
of unity
in the world,
and seeks instead
something
which
presents itself
to him immediately
as real.
This philosopher
believes
that
we can never approach
the world so long
as we
regard it
as "external" world.
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"In point
of fact,
the sought
for meaning
of the world
which
confronts me
is
nothing more than mental picture,
or the passage
from the world
as mere mental picture
of the knowing subject to
whatever it
may be besides this,
could never be found
at all
if
the investigator himself
were nothing
more than
the purely knowing
subject
(a winged cherub
without a body).
But he himself
is rooted in that world:
he finds himself
in it
as an individual,
that is to say,
his knowledge,
which
is the determining factor
supporting
the whole world
as mental picture,
is thus
always given
through the medium
of a body,
whose affections are,
for the intellect,
the starting
point
for the contemplation
of that world,
as we
have shown.
For the purely knowing
subject as such,
this body
is
a mental picture like any other,
an object
among objects;
its movements and actions
are so far known
to him
in precisely
the same way
as the changes
of all other
perceived objects,
and would be just
as strange and incomprehensible
to him
if
their sense
were not made
clear
for him
in an entirely different way....
To the subject
of knowledge,
who appears
as an individual
through his identity
with the body,
this body
is given
in two entirely different ways:
once
as a mental picture
for intelligent consideration,
as an object
among objects
and obeying
their laws;
but
at the same time,
in quite
a different way,
namely
as the thing
immediately known
to everyone
by the word will.
Every true act
of his will
is
at once
and without exception
also a movement
of his body:
he cannot will
the act without
at the same time
perceiving
that it appears
as a movement
of the body.
The act
of will
and
the action of the body
are not two things
objectively known
to be different,
which
the bond of causality
unites;
they do not stand
in the relation
of cause
and effect;
they are one
and the same,
but they
are given
in two entirely different ways:
once quite directly
and
once in contemplation
for the intellect."
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Schopenhauer
considers himself
entitled
by these arguments
to find
in the human body
the "objectivity"
of the will.
He believes
that
in the activities
of the body
he feels an immediate reality
-- the thing-in-itself
in the concrete.
Against these arguments
it must be said
that
the activities
of our body
come
to our consciousness
only through percepts
of the self,
and that,
as such,
they are
in no way superior
to other percepts.
If
we want
to know
their real nature,
we can do so only
by a thinking investigation,
that is,
by fitting them
into the ideal system
of our concepts
and ideas.
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[24] Rooted most deeply
in the naïve consciousness
of mankind
is
the opinion that thinking
is abstract,
without
any concrete content;
it can
at most
give us an "ideal" counterpart
of the unity
of the world,
but
never the unity
itself.
Whoever
judges
in this way
has never made
it clear
to himself
what
a percept without the concept
really is.
Let us
see
what this
world of percepts
is like:
a mere juxtaposition
in space,
a mere succession
in time,
a mass
of unconnected
details
-- that is how
it appears.
None of the things
which come and go on
the stage of perception
has any direct connection,
that can be perceived,
with any other.
The world
is thus
a multiplicity
of objects
of equal value.
None
plays
any greater part
in the whole machinery
of the world
than any other.
If it
is
to become
clear
to us
that
this or that fact
has greater significance
than another,
we must consult our thinking.
Were thinking not
to function,
the rudimentary organ
of an animal
which
has
no significance in its life
would appear
equal
in value
to the most important limb
of its body.
The separate
facts
appear
in their true significance,
both
in themselves
and for the rest
of the world
only
when thinking
spins its threads
from one entity
to another.
This activity
of thinking
is
one full of content.
For it
is only through a quite definite
concrete content
that
I can know
why
the snail
belongs
to a lower level
of organization
than the lion.
The mere appearance,
the percept,
gives me
no content which
could inform me
as to the degree
of perfection
of the organization.
[25] Thinking
offers
this content
to the percept,
from man's world
of concepts and ideas.
In contrast
to the content
of percept
which
is given
to us from
without,
the content
of thinking
appears inwardly.
The form
in which
this first makes
its appearance
we will call intuition.
Intuition
is
for thinking
what observation
is for percept.
Intuition
and
observation are the sources
of our knowledge.
An observed
object
of the world
remains unintelligible
to us
until we
have within ourselves
the corresponding intuition
which adds
that part
of reality
which
is lacking
in the percept.
To anyone
who is incapable
of finding intuitions
corresponding
to the things,
the full reality
remains inaccessible.
Just
as the color-blind person
sees only differences
of brightness
without any color qualities,
so can
the person
without intuition
observe
only unconnected
perceptual fragments.
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[26] To explain a thing,
to make
it intelligible,
means nothing else
than
to place
it
into the context
from which
it has been torn
by the peculiar character
of our organization
as already described.
A thing
cut off
from the world-whole
does not exist.
All isolating
has only
subjective validity
for our organization.
For us
the universe
divides itself
up
into above and
below,
before and after,
cause and effect,
thing and mental
picture,
matter and force,
object
and subject,.etc.
What appears
to us
in observation
as separate parts
becomes combined,
bit by bit,
through the coherent,
unified world
of our intuitions.
By thinking
we fit
together
again into one
piece all
that we
have taken apart
through perceiving.
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| |
[27] The
enigmatic character of an object
consists
in its separateness.
But
this separation
is
our own making
and can,
within the world
of concepts,
be overcome
again.
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| |
[28] Except
through thinking
and
perceiving nothing
is given
to us directly.
The question
now arises:
What is the significance
of the percept,
according to
our line
of argument?
We have learnt
that the proof which
critical idealism
offers
of the subjective nature
of perceptions collapses.
But
insight
into the falsity
of the proof
is not alone sufficient
to show
that the doctrine
itself is erroneous.
Critical idealism does not base
its proof
on the absolute nature
of thinking,
but relies on
the argument
of naïve realism,
when followed
to its logical conclusion,
cancels itself out.
How does
the matter
appear
when we
have recognized
the absoluteness
of thinking?
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| |
[29] Let us assume that
a certain perception,
for example,
red,
appears
in my consciousness.
To continued observation,
this percept
shows itself
to be connected
with other percepts,
for example,
a definite figure
and with certain temperature-
and touch-percepts.
This combination
I call an object
belonging
to the sense-perceptible world.
I can now ask myself:
Over
and above
the percepts just mentioned,
what else
is there
in the section
of space
in which they appear?
I shall
then find mechanical,
chemical
and
other processes
in that section
of space.
I next
go further
and study
the processes
I find
on the way
from the object
to my sense organs.
I can find movements
in an elastic medium,
which
by their very nature
have not
the slightest in common
with the percepts
from which I started.
I get
the same result
when
I go on
and examine
the transmission
from sense organs
to brain.
In each
of these fields
I
gather new percepts,
but the connecting medium
which
weaves through all
these spatially
and temporally separated
percepts is thinking.
The air vibrations
which
transmit
sound
are given
to me
as percepts just like
the sound itself.
Thinking alone
links all these percepts
to one another
and shows them
to us
in their mutual relationship.
We cannot speak of anything
existing
beyond what
is directly perceived
except
what can be recognized
through the ideal connections
of percepts,
that is, connections accessible
to thinking.
The way objects as percepts
are related
to the subject
as percept
-- a relationship that
goes
beyond what
is merely perceived --
is therefore purely ideal,
that is,
it can be expressed only
by means
of concepts.
Only
if
I could perceive how
the percept object affects
the percept subject,
or,
conversely,
could watch
the building up
of the perceptual pattern
by the subject,
would
it be possible
to speak
as modern physiology
and
the critical idealism based
on it do.
Their view
confuses
an ideal relation
(that
of the object
to the subject)
with a process
which
we could speak of only
if
it were possible
to perceive it.
The proposition,
"No color
without a color-sensing eye,"
cannot be taken
to mean
that the eye
produces the color,
but only
that an ideal relation,
recognizable
by thinking,
subsists
between the percept "color"
and
the percept "eye".
Empirical science
will have
to ascertain how
the properties
of the eye and
those
of the colors
are related
to one another,
by
what means
the organ of sight
transmits the perception
of colors,
and so forth.
I can trace
how
one percept
succeeds
another
in time
and is related
to others
in space,
and
I can formulate
these relations
in conceptual terms,
but
I can never perceive how
a percept
originates
out of the non-perceptible.
All attempts
to seek any relations
between percepts other
than
thought
relations
must
of necessity fail.
[30] What,
then is a percept?
The question,
asked
in this general way,
is absurd.
A percept
emerges always
as something
perfectly definite,
as a concrete content.
This content
is directly given
and is completely contained
in what
is given.
The only question one
can ask concerning
the given content
is
what it
is apart from perception,
that is,
what it
is for thinking?
The question
concerning
the "what"
of a percept can,
therefore,
only refer
to the conceptual intuition
that corresponds
to this percept.
From this point of view,
the question
of the subjectivity
of percepts,
in the sense
of critical idealism,
cannot be raised
at all.
Only
what is perceived
as belonging
to the subject
can be termed
"subjective."
To form
a link
between something subjective
and
something objective
is impossible
for any process
that is "real"
in the naïve sense,
that is,
one
that can be perceived;
it is possible
only for thinking.
Therefore
what appears
for our perception
to be
external
to the percept
of myself
as subject is
for us "objective".
The percept
of myself
as subject remains perceptible
to me
after the table
which
now stands
before me
has disappeared
from my field
of observation.
The observation of the table
has produced
in me
a modification which likewise persists.
I retain
the faculty
to produce
later
on an image
of the table.
This faculty
of producing
an image
remains
connected
with me.
Psychology
calls this image
a memory-picture.
It is
in fact
the only thing
which can justifiably be called
the mental picture
of the table.
For it
corresponds
to the perceptible modification
of my own state
through the presence
of the table
in my visual field.
Moreover,
it does not mean
a modification
of some
"Ego-in-itself" standing
behind the percept
of the subject,
but
the modification
of the perceptible
subject itself.
The mental picture is,
therefore,
a subjective percept,
in contrast
with the objective percept
which
occurs
when
the object
is present
in the field
of vision.
Confusing
the subjective percept
with the objective percept
leads
to the misconception
of contained
in idealism
-- that the world
is my mental picture.
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[31] Our next task
must be
to define
the concept
of
"mental
picture"
more closely.
What
we have said about it
so far does not give us
the concept
of it
but only shows us whereabouts
in the perceptual field
the mental picture
is to be found.
The exact
concept of mental picture
will make it possible
for us
also
to obtain
a satisfactory explanation
of the way
that mental picture
and object
are related.
This will
then lead us
over the border line
where the relationship
between the human subject
and
the object belonging
to the world
is brought down
from the purely conceptual field
of cognition
into concrete individual life.
Once
we know
what
to make
of the world,
it will be
a simple matter
to direct ourselves accordingly.
We can only act
with full energy
when
we know
what it
is
in the world
to which
we
devote our activity.
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Author's addition,
1918
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| |
[1] The view
I have outlined
here may be regarded
as one
to which man
is
at first quite naturally driven
when
he begins
to reflect
upon his relation
to the world.
He
then finds himself
caught
in a system
of thoughts
which dissolves for him
as fast
as he frames
it.
The thought formation
is
such that
it requires
something more than mere
theoretical
refutation.
We have
to live through
it
in order to
understand the aberration into which
it leads us and
thence
to find
the way
out.
It must figure
in any discussion
of the relation
of man
to the world,
not for the sake
of refuting others
whom
one believes to be holding
mistaken views about this relation,
but
because it
is necessary
to understand
the confusion
to which
every first effort
at reflection
about such
a relation
is apt
to lead.
One needs to arrive
at just
that insight
which
will enable
one
to refute
oneself
with respect
to these
first reflections.
This is
the point of view
from
which
the arguments
of the preceding chapter
are put forward.
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| |
{2] Whoever
tries
to work out
for himself
a view
of the relation
of man
to the world
becomes aware
of the fact
that
he creates this relation,
at least in part,
by forming mental
pictures
about the things
and events
in the world.
In consequence,
his attention
is deflected
from what
exists outside
in the world and
is directed
towards his inner world,
the life
of his mental pictures.
He begins
to say
to himself:
It is impossible
for me
to have
a relationship
to any thing
or event
unless
a mental picture appears
in me.
Once we
have noticed this fact,
it is
but a step
to the opinion:
After all,
I experience only
my mental pictures;
I know
of a world outside
me only in so far
as it
is a mental picture
in me.
With this opinion,
the standpoint
of naïve realism,
which man
takes up
prior to all reflection
about his relation
to the world,
is abandoned.
So long
as he keeps
that standpoint,
he believes
that he
is dealing with real things,
but
reflection about himself
drives him away from it.
Reflection
prevents him
from turning
his gaze
towards a real world
such as naïve
consciousness believes it
has before it.
It allows him
to gaze only
upon his mental picture â€"
these interpose themselves
between his own
being
and a supposedly real world,
such as the naïve
point of view
believes itself
entitled
to affirm.
Man can no longer
see
such a real world
through the intervening world
of mental pictures.
He must suppose
to that he
is blind
to this reality.
Thus
arises
the thought
of a "thing-in-itself" which
is inaccessible
to knowledge.
[3] So long
as we considers only
the relationship
to the world,
into
which man
appears
to enter
through the life
of his mental pictures,
we cannot escape
from this form
of thought.
Yet
one cannot remain
at the standpoint
of naïve
realism
except
by closing one's mind
artificially to the craving
for knowledge.
The very existence
of this
craving
for knowledge
about the relation
of man
to the world
shows
that
this naÃ
naïve point of view
must be abandoned.
If the naïve
point of view
yielded
anything
we could acknowledge as truth,
we could never experience
this craving.
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[4] But
we do not arrive
at anything else which
we could regard as truth
if
we merely abandon
the naïve point of view
while
unconsciously retaining
the type
of thought
which
it necessitates.
This is just
the mistake made
by the man
who says to himself:
"I experience only
my mental pictures,
and
though
I believe
that
I am dealing with realities,
I am actually conscious
only of my mental pictures
of reality;
I must therefore suppose that
the true reality,
the
'things-in-themselves',
exist only
beyond the horizon
of my consciousness,
that
I know absolutely nothing
of them directly,
and
that
they somehow approach me
and influence me
so that
my world of mental pictures
arises
in me."
Whoever
thinks
in this way
is merely adding
another world
in his thoughts
to the world
already spread out
before him.
But
with regard to this
additional world,
he ought strictly
to begin
his thinking activity all
over again.
For the unknown
"thing-in-itself",
in its relation
to man's own nature,
is conceived
in exactly
the same way
as is
the known thing
in the sense
of naive realism.
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| |
[5] One only avoids
the confusion into which one
falls through
the critical attitude based
on this
naive standpoint,
if one notices that,
inside everything
we can experience
by means
of perceiving,
be it
within ourselves
or outside in the world,
there is
something
which cannot suffer
the fate
of having
a mental picture
interpose itself
between the process
and the person
observing it.
This something
is thinking.
With regard to thinking,
we can maintain
the point of view
of naïve realism.
If
we fail
to do so,
it is only
because we
have learnt
that
we must abandon it
in the case
of other things,
but overlook
that
what we
have found
to be
true
for these
other things
does not apply
to thinking.
When
we realize this,
we open
the way
to the further insight
that
in thinking
and through thinking man
must recognize
the very thing
to which
he has apparently blinded himself
by having
to interpose
his life
of mental pictures
between the world
and himself.
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| |
[6]
From a source greatly respected
by the author
of this book
comes
the objection
that this discussion
of thinking remains
at the level
of a naive realism
of thinking,
just
as one
might object
if
someone
held
the real world
and the world
of mental pictures
to be one
and the same.
However,
the author
believes himself
to have shown
in this very discussion
that the validity
of this
"naive realism"
for thinking
results inevitably
from an unprejudiced observation
of thinking;
and that naïve realism,
in so far
as it
is invalid
for other things,
is overcome
through the recognition
of the true nature
of thinking. |
|