Chapter 4 The World As Percept
Chapter 4 The World
as Percept
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[1] Through thinking,
concepts
and ideas arise.
What
a concept
is
cannot be expressed
in words.
Words
can do
no more than draw
our attention
to the fact
that we
have concepts.
When someone
sees a tree,
his thinking
reacts to
his observation,
an ideal element
is added
to the object,
and
he considers
the object
and the ideal complement
as belonging together.
When
the object disappears
from his field
of observation,
only the ideal counterpart
of it remains.
This latter
is the concept
of the object.
The more
our range
of experience
is widened,
the greater
becomes
the sum
of our concepts.
But
concepts
certainly do not stand
isolated
from one another.
They combine
to form
a systematically ordered whole.
The concept "organism",
for instance,
links up
with those
of "orderly development"
and "growth".
Other concepts
which
are based on single objects
merge together into a unity.
All concepts
I may form of lions
merge
into the collective concept "lion".
In this
way all the separate
concepts
combine to form
a closed conceptual system
in which
each has its special place.
Ideas
do not differ qualitatively
from concepts.
They are
but fuller,
more saturated,
more comprehensive concepts.
I must attach
special importance
to the necessity
of bearing
in mind,
here,
that I
make thinking my starting point,
and
not concepts
and ideas
which
are first gained
by means of thinking.
For
these latter already presuppose thinking.
My remarks
regarding
the self-supporting and self-determined nature
of thinking cannot,
therefore,
be simply transferred
to concepts.
(I make special
mention of this,
because it
is here
that
I differ
from Hegel,
who regards
the concept
as something primary and original.)
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[2] Concepts
cannot be gained
through observation.
This follows
from the simple fact
that the growing human being
only slowly
and gradually forms
the concepts corresponding
to the objects
which surround him.
Concepts
are added
to observation.
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[3] A philosopher widely read
at the present day
-- Herbert Spencer, --
describes
the mental process
which
we carry out
with respect
to observation
as follows:
[4] If,
when walking
through the fields some day
in September,
you hear
a rustle
a few yards
in advance,
and
on observing
the ditch-side
where
it occurs,
see
the herbage agitated,
you will probably turn towards
the spot to learn
by what
this sound
and motion are produced.
As you
approach
there
flutters
into the ditch a partridge;
on seeing
which
your curiosity
is satisfied
-- you have
what
you call an explanation
of the appearances.
The explanation,
mark,
amounts to this;
that whereas
throughout life
you
have had
countless experiences of disturbance
among small stationary bodies,
accompanying the movement
of other bodies
among them,
and have generalized
the relation
between such disturbances
and such movements,
you consider
this particular disturbance explained
on finding
it
to present
an instance
of the like relation.
A closer analysis
shows
matters
to stand very differently
from the way described above.
When
I hear a noise,
I first look
for the concept
which fits this observation.
It is this concept
which
first leads me
beyond the mere noise.
If one
thinks no further,
one simply hears
the noise
and is content
to leave
it
at that.
But my reflecting
makes
it clear
to me
that
I have
to regard
the noise
as an effect.
Therefore not until
I have connected
the concept
of effect
with the perception
of the noise,
do I
feel the need to go
beyond the solitary observation
and
look
for the cause.
The concept
of effect
calls up that of cause,
and my next step.
is to look
for the object
which is being the cause,
which
I find
in the shape
of the partridge.
But these concepts,
cause and effect,
I can never gain through
mere observation,
however many instances the observation
may cover.
Observation
evokes thinking,
and
it is thinking that
first shows me how
to link
one separate experience
to another.
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[5] If one
demands
of a
"strictly
objective science"
that it should take
its content
from observation alone,
then
one must
at the same time
demand
that it
should forego all thinking.
For thinking,
by its very nature,
goes
beyond what
is observed.
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[6] We must now pass
from thinking
to the being
that thinks;
for it
is
through the thinker
that thinking
is combined
with observation.
Human consciousness
is the stage
upon which concept
and observation
meet
and become
linked
to one another.
In saying
this
we have in fact characterized
this (human) consciousness.
It is the mediator
between thinking
and observation.
In as far as we
observe
a thing it appears
to us as given;
in as far as we think,
we appear
to ourselves
as being active.
We regard
the thing
as object
and ourselves
as thinking subject.
Because
we direct our thinking
upon our observation,
we have consciousness of objects;
because
we direct it upon ourselves,
we have consciousness of ourselves,
or self-consciousness.
Human consciousness
must
of necessity
be
at the same time
self-consciousness
because it
is a consciousness
which thinks.
For when
thinking contemplates
its own activity,
it makes
its own essential being,
as subject,
into a thing,
as object.
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[7] It must,
however,
not be overlooked
that
only with the help
of thinking
am
I able
to determine myself
as subject and
contrast myself with objects.
Therefore thinking
must never be regarded
as a merely subjective activity.
Thinking
lies
beyond subject
and object.
It produces
these two concepts
just
as it produces
all others.
When,
therefore,
I,
as thinking subject,
refer a concept
to an object,
we must not regard
this reference
as something
purely subjective.
It is not the subject
that makes the reference,
but thinking.
The subject
does not think
because it is a subject;
rather it
appears
to itself
as subject
because it can think.
The activity
exercised
by man
as a thinking being is thus
not merely subjective.
Rather is it something
neither subjective
nor objective,
that transcends both these concepts.
I ought never
to say
that my individual subject
thinks,
but much more
that my individual subject lives
by the grace
of thinking.
Thinking is thus
an element
which
leads
me out
beyond myself and
connects me
with the objects.
But
at the same time
it separates me from them,
inasmuch as
it sets me,
as subject,
over against them.
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[8] It is just
this
which constitutes
the double nature
of the human being.
We think,
and thereby embrace
both ourselves and the rest
of the world.
But
at the same time
it is
by means
of thinking
that
we determines ourselves
as an individual confronting
the things.
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[9] We must next
ask ourselves how
that other element,
which we
have so far simply called
the object
of observation
and
which meets
the thinking
in our consciousness,
comes
into our consciousness
at all.
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[10] In order to
answer
this question
we must eliminate
from our field
of observation
everything
that has been imported
by thinking.
For
at any moment
the content
of our consciousness
will already be interwoven
with concepts
in the most varied ways.
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[11] We must imagine
that
a being
with fully developed
human intelligence
originates
out of nothing
and confronts
the world.
What
it would be aware
of,
before it
sets
its thinking
in motion,
would be
the pure content
of observation.
The world
would
then appear
to this
being
as nothing
but
a mere disconnected aggregate
of objects
of sensation:
colors,
sounds,
sensations
of pressure,
of warmth,
of taste
and smell;
also feelings
of pleasure and pain.
This aggregate
is the content
of pure,
unthinking observation.
Over against it
stands thinking,
ready
to begin
its activity
as soon
as a point
of attack
presents itself.
Experience
shows
at once
that this does happen.
Thinking is able
to draw
threads
from one element
of observation
to another.
It links definite concepts
with these elements
and thereby establishes
a relationship
between them.
We have already seen how
a noise
which
we hear
becomes
connected
with another observation
by our identifying the former
as the effect
of the latter.
[12] If now
we recollect
that the activity
of thinking
is
on no account
to be considered
as merely subjective,
then we
shall also not be tempted
to believe
that
the relationships
thus established
by thinking
have merely subjective validity.
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[13] Our next task
is to discover
by means
of thoughtful reflection
what relation
the immediately given content
of observation
mentioned
above has
to the conscious subject.
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[14] The ambiguity of current speech
makes it necessary
for me to come
to an agreement
with my readers
concerning the use
of a word
which
I shall have
to employ
in what follows.
I shall apply
the word "percept"
to the immediate objects
of sensation
enumerated above,
in so far
as the conscious subject
apprehends them
through observation.
It is,
then,
not the process
of observation
but the object
of observation
which I
call the "percept".
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[15] I do not choose
the term "sensation",
since this
has a definite meaning
in physiology
which is narrower
than
that
of my concept
of "percept".
I can speak
of a feeling
in myself (emotion)
as percept,
but not
as sensation
in the physiological sense
of the term.
Even my feeling
becomes
known
to me
by becoming
a percept
for me.
And the way
in which
we
gain
knowledge
of our thinking
through observation
is
such that
thinking too,
in its first appearance
for our consciousness,
may be called
a percept.
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[16] The naïve man
regards
his percepts,
such as
they appear
to his immediate apprehension,
as things
having an existence wholly independent
of him.
When
he sees
a tree
he believes
in the first instance
that it stands
in the form
which
he sees,
with the colors
of its various parts,
and so on,
there on the spot towards which
his gaze
is directed.
When the same man
sees
the sun
in the morning
appear
as a disc
on the horizon,
and follows
the course
of this disc,
he believes
that all this
actually exists and happens just
as he
observes it.
To this belief
he clings until
he meets with further percepts
which
contradict
his former ones.
The child
who
as yet has
no experience
of distance
grasps
at the moon,
and only corrects
its picture
of the reality,
based
on first impressions,
when a second percept
contradicts the first.
Every extension
of the circle
of my percepts
compels me
to correct
my picture
of the world.
We see this
in everyday life,
as well as in
the spiritual development
of mankind.
The picture
which
the ancients
made
for themselves
of the relation
of the earth
to the sun
and other heavenly
bodies had to be replaced
by another
when Copernicus
found that it
was not
in accordance
with some percepts,
which
in those early days
were unknown.
A man
who had been born blind said,
when operated on
by Dr. Franz,
that the picture
of the size
of objects
which he
had formed
by his sense
of touch
before his operation,
was
a very different one.
He had
to correct
his tactual percepts
by his visual percepts.
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[17] How is it
that we
are compelled
to make
these continual corrections
to our observations?
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[18] A simple reflection
gives the answer
to this question.
When
I stand
at one end
of an avenue,
the trees
at the other end,
away from me,
seem smaller and nearer
together than
those
where I stand.
My percept-picture changes
when
I change
the place
from
which I am looking.
Therefore the form
in which
it
presents itself
to me
is dependent
on a condition
which is due
not to the object
but to me,
the perceiver.
It is all the same
to the avenue
wherever I stand.
But
the picture
I have of it
depends essentially
on just this viewpoint.
In the same way,
it makes
no difference
to the sun
and the planetary system
that human beings
happen
to look
at them
from the earth;
but
the percept-picture
of the heavens
presented
to them
is determined
by the fact
that they
inhabit the earth.
This dependence
of our percept-picture
on our place
of observation
is the easiest one
to understand.
The matter
becomes more difficult
when
we realize how
our world of percepts
is dependent
on our bodily
and spiritual organization.
The physicist
shows us
that
within the space
in which
we
hear
a sound there are vibrations
of the air,
and also
that the body
in which
we seek
the origin of the sound
exhibits
a vibrating movement
of its parts.
We perceive
this movement
as sound only
if we
have a normally constructed ear.
Without this
the world
would be
for ever silent
for us.
Physiology
tells us
that there are
people
who perceive
nothing
of the magnificent splendor
of color
which surrounds us.
Their percept-picture
has only degrees
of light and dark.
Others are blind only
to one color,
for example,
red.
Their world picture
lacks
this hue,
and
hence
it is actually
a different one
from
that
of the average man.
I should like
to call
the dependence
of my percept-picture
on my place
of observation,
"mathematical",
and its dependence
on my organization,
"qualitative".
The former
determines the proportions
of size
and mutual distances
of my percepts,
the latter their quality.
The fact
that
I see a red surface
as red
-- this qualitative determination --
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