Chapter 4 The World
as Percept
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[1] Through thinking,
concepts
and ideas arise.
What
a concept
is
cannot be expressed
in words.
Words
can do
no more than draw
our attention
to the fact
that we
have concepts.
When someone
sees a tree,
his thinking
reacts to
his observation,
an ideal element
is added
to the object,
and
he considers
the object
and the ideal complement
as belonging together.
When
the object disappears
from his field
of observation,
only the ideal counterpart
of it remains.
This latter
is the concept
of the object.
The more
our range
of experience
is widened,
the greater
becomes
the sum
of our concepts.
But
concepts
certainly do not stand
isolated
from one another.
They combine
to form
a systematically ordered whole.
The concept "organism",
for instance,
links up
with those
of "orderly development"
and "growth".
Other concepts
which
are based on single objects
merge together into a unity.
All concepts
I may form of lions
merge
into the collective concept "lion".
In this
way all the separate
concepts
combine to form
a closed conceptual system
in which
each has its special place.
Ideas
do not differ qualitatively
from concepts.
They are
but fuller,
more saturated,
more comprehensive concepts.
I must attach
special importance
to the necessity
of bearing
in mind,
here,
that I
make thinking my starting point,
and
not concepts
and ideas
which
are first gained
by means of thinking.
For
these latter already presuppose thinking.
My remarks
regarding
the self-supporting and self-determined nature
of thinking cannot,
therefore,
be simply transferred
to concepts.
(I make special
mention of this,
because it
is here
that
I differ
from Hegel,
who regards
the concept
as something primary and original.)
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[2] Concepts
cannot be gained
through observation.
This follows
from the simple fact
that the growing human being
only slowly
and gradually forms
the concepts corresponding
to the objects
which surround him.
Concepts
are added
to observation.
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[3] A philosopher widely read
at the present day
-- Herbert Spencer, --
describes
the mental process
which
we carry out
with respect
to observation
as follows:
[4] If,
when walking
through the fields some day
in September,
you hear
a rustle
a few yards
in advance,
and
on observing
the ditch-side
where
it occurs,
see
the herbage agitated,
you will probably turn towards
the spot to learn
by what
this sound
and motion are produced.
As you
approach
there
flutters
into the ditch a partridge;
on seeing
which
your curiosity
is satisfied
-- you have
what
you call an explanation
of the appearances.
The explanation,
mark,
amounts to this;
that whereas
throughout life
you
have had
countless experiences of disturbance
among small stationary bodies,
accompanying the movement
of other bodies
among them,
and have generalized
the relation
between such disturbances
and such movements,
you consider
this particular disturbance explained
on finding
it
to present
an instance
of the like relation.
A closer analysis
shows
matters
to stand very differently
from the way described above.
When
I hear a noise,
I first look
for the concept
which fits this observation.
It is this concept
which
first leads me
beyond the mere noise.
If one
thinks no further,
one simply hears
the noise
and is content
to leave
it
at that.
But my reflecting
makes
it clear
to me
that
I have
to regard
the noise
as an effect.
Therefore not until
I have connected
the concept
of effect
with the perception
of the noise,
do I
feel the need to go
beyond the solitary observation
and
look
for the cause.
The concept
of effect
calls up that of cause,
and my next step.
is to look
for the object
which is being the cause,
which
I find
in the shape
of the partridge.
But these concepts,
cause and effect,
I can never gain through
mere observation,
however many instances the observation
may cover.
Observation
evokes thinking,
and
it is thinking that
first shows me how
to link
one separate experience
to another.
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[5] If one
demands
of a
"strictly
objective science"
that it should take
its content
from observation alone,
then
one must
at the same time
demand
that it
should forego all thinking.
For thinking,
by its very nature,
goes
beyond what
is observed.
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[6] We must now pass
from thinking
to the being
that thinks;
for it
is
through the thinker
that thinking
is combined
with observation.
Human consciousness
is the stage
upon which concept
and observation
meet
and become
linked
to one another.
In saying
this
we have in fact characterized
this (human) consciousness.
It is the mediator
between thinking
and observation.
In as far as we
observe
a thing it appears
to us as given;
in as far as we think,
we appear
to ourselves
as being active.
We regard
the thing
as object
and ourselves
as thinking subject.
Because
we direct our thinking
upon our observation,
we have consciousness of objects;
because
we direct it upon ourselves,
we have consciousness of ourselves,
or self-consciousness.
Human consciousness
must
of necessity
be
at the same time
self-consciousness
because it
is a consciousness
which thinks.
For when
thinking contemplates
its own activity,
it makes
its own essential being,
as subject,
into a thing,
as object.
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[7] It must,
however,
not be overlooked
that
only with the help
of thinking
am
I able
to determine myself
as subject and
contrast myself with objects.
Therefore thinking
must never be regarded
as a merely subjective activity.
Thinking
lies
beyond subject
and object.
It produces
these two concepts
just
as it produces
all others.
When,
therefore,
I,
as thinking subject,
refer a concept
to an object,
we must not regard
this reference
as something
purely subjective.
It is not the subject
that makes the reference,
but thinking.
The subject
does not think
because it is a subject;
rather it
appears
to itself
as subject
because it can think.
The activity
exercised
by man
as a thinking being is thus
not merely subjective.
Rather is it something
neither subjective
nor objective,
that transcends both these concepts.
I ought never
to say
that my individual subject
thinks,
but much more
that my individual subject lives
by the grace
of thinking.
Thinking is thus
an element
which
leads
me out
beyond myself and
connects me
with the objects.
But
at the same time
it separates me from them,
inasmuch as
it sets me,
as subject,
over against them.
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[8] It is just
this
which constitutes
the double nature
of the human being.
We think,
and thereby embrace
both ourselves and the rest
of the world.
But
at the same time
it is
by means
of thinking
that
we determines ourselves
as an individual confronting
the things.
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[9] We must next
ask ourselves how
that other element,
which we
have so far simply called
the object
of observation
and
which meets
the thinking
in our consciousness,
comes
into our consciousness
at all.
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[10] In order to
answer
this question
we must eliminate
from our field
of observation
everything
that has been imported
by thinking.
For
at any moment
the content
of our consciousness
will already be interwoven
with concepts
in the most varied ways.
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[11] We must imagine
that
a being
with fully developed
human intelligence
originates
out of nothing
and confronts
the world.
What
it would be aware
of,
before it
sets
its thinking
in motion,
would be
the pure content
of observation.
The world
would
then appear
to this
being
as nothing
but
a mere disconnected aggregate
of objects
of sensation:
colors,
sounds,
sensations
of pressure,
of warmth,
of taste
and smell;
also feelings
of pleasure and pain.
This aggregate
is the content
of pure,
unthinking observation.
Over against it
stands thinking,
ready
to begin
its activity
as soon
as a point
of attack
presents itself.
Experience
shows
at once
that this does happen.
Thinking is able
to draw
threads
from one element
of observation
to another.
It links definite concepts
with these elements
and thereby establishes
a relationship
between them.
We have already seen how
a noise
which
we hear
becomes
connected
with another observation
by our identifying the former
as the effect
of the latter.
[12] If now
we recollect
that the activity
of thinking
is
on no account
to be considered
as merely subjective,
then we
shall also not be tempted
to believe
that
the relationships
thus established
by thinking
have merely subjective validity.
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[13] Our next task
is to discover
by means
of thoughtful reflection
what relation
the immediately given content
of observation
mentioned
above has
to the conscious subject.
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[14] The ambiguity of current speech
makes it necessary
for me to come
to an agreement
with my readers
concerning the use
of a word
which
I shall have
to employ
in what follows.
I shall apply
the word "percept"
to the immediate objects
of sensation
enumerated above,
in so far
as the conscious subject
apprehends them
through observation.
It is,
then,
not the process
of observation
but the object
of observation
which I
call the "percept".
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[15] I do not choose
the term "sensation",
since this
has a definite meaning
in physiology
which is narrower
than
that
of my concept
of "percept".
I can speak
of a feeling
in myself (emotion)
as percept,
but not
as sensation
in the physiological sense
of the term.
Even my feeling
becomes
known
to me
by becoming
a percept
for me.
And the way
in which
we
gain
knowledge
of our thinking
through observation
is
such that
thinking too,
in its first appearance
for our consciousness,
may be called
a percept.
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[16] The naïve man
regards
his percepts,
such as
they appear
to his immediate apprehension,
as things
having an existence wholly independent
of him.
When
he sees
a tree
he believes
in the first instance
that it stands
in the form
which
he sees,
with the colors
of its various parts,
and so on,
there on the spot towards which
his gaze
is directed.
When the same man
sees
the sun
in the morning
appear
as a disc
on the horizon,
and follows
the course
of this disc,
he believes
that all this
actually exists and happens just
as he
observes it.
To this belief
he clings until
he meets with further percepts
which
contradict
his former ones.
The child
who
as yet has
no experience
of distance
grasps
at the moon,
and only corrects
its picture
of the reality,
based
on first impressions,
when a second percept
contradicts the first.
Every extension
of the circle
of my percepts
compels me
to correct
my picture
of the world.
We see this
in everyday life,
as well as in
the spiritual development
of mankind.
The picture
which
the ancients
made
for themselves
of the relation
of the earth
to the sun
and other heavenly
bodies had to be replaced
by another
when Copernicus
found that it
was not
in accordance
with some percepts,
which
in those early days
were unknown.
A man
who had been born blind said,
when operated on
by Dr. Franz,
that the picture
of the size
of objects
which he
had formed
by his sense
of touch
before his operation,
was
a very different one.
He had
to correct
his tactual percepts
by his visual percepts.
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[17] How is it
that we
are compelled
to make
these continual corrections
to our observations?
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[18] A simple reflection
gives the answer
to this question.
When
I stand
at one end
of an avenue,
the trees
at the other end,
away from me,
seem smaller and nearer
together than
those
where I stand.
My percept-picture changes
when
I change
the place
from
which I am looking.
Therefore the form
in which
it
presents itself
to me
is dependent
on a condition
which is due
not to the object
but to me,
the perceiver.
It is all the same
to the avenue
wherever I stand.
But
the picture
I have of it
depends essentially
on just this viewpoint.
In the same way,
it makes
no difference
to the sun
and the planetary system
that human beings
happen
to look
at them
from the earth;
but
the percept-picture
of the heavens
presented
to them
is determined
by the fact
that they
inhabit the earth.
This dependence
of our percept-picture
on our place
of observation
is the easiest one
to understand.
The matter
becomes more difficult
when
we realize how
our world of percepts
is dependent
on our bodily
and spiritual organization.
The physicist
shows us
that
within the space
in which
we
hear
a sound there are vibrations
of the air,
and also
that the body
in which
we seek
the origin of the sound
exhibits
a vibrating movement
of its parts.
We perceive
this movement
as sound only
if we
have a normally constructed ear.
Without this
the world
would be
for ever silent
for us.
Physiology
tells us
that there are
people
who perceive
nothing
of the magnificent splendor
of color
which surrounds us.
Their percept-picture
has only degrees
of light and dark.
Others are blind only
to one color,
for example,
red.
Their world picture
lacks
this hue,
and
hence
it is actually
a different one
from
that
of the average man.
I should like
to call
the dependence
of my percept-picture
on my place
of observation,
"mathematical",
and its dependence
on my organization,
"qualitative".
The former
determines the proportions
of size
and mutual distances
of my percepts,
the latter their quality.
The fact
that
I see a red surface
as red
-- this qualitative determination --
depends
on the organization
of my eye.
[19] My percept-pictures,
then,
are
in the first instance subjective.
The recognition
of the subjective character
of our percepts
may easily lead us
to doubt
whether
there is
any objective basis
for them at all.
When we
realize that a percept,
for example
that
of a red color
or of a certain tone,
is not possible
without a specific structure
of our organism,
we may easily be led
to believe
that it
has no permanency
apart from our subjective organization
and that,
were it
not for our act
of perceiving
it as an object,
it would not exist
in any sense.
The classical representative
of this view
is George Berkeley,
who held
that
from the moment
we realize the importance of
the subject
for perception,
we are
no longer able
to believe
in the existence
of a world
without a conscious Spirit:
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"Some truths
there are so
near and obvious
to the mind
that man
need
only open
his eyes
to see them.
Such
I take this
important one
to be,
to wit,
that all the choir
of heaven
and furniture
of the earth,
in a word,
all those bodies
which
compose the mighty frame
of the world,
have not any subsistence
without a mind,
that their being
is to be perceived
or known;
that,
consequently,
so long
as they
are not actually perceived
by me,
or do not exist
in my mind
or that
of any other created spirit,
they must either
have no existence
at all,
or else
subsist
in the mind
of some Eternal Spirit."
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On this view,
when
we take away
the fact
of its
being perceived,
nothing
remains
of the percept.
There is
no color
when none
is seen,
no sound
when none
is heard.
Extension,
form,
and
motion
exist
as little
as color
and sound apart
from the act
of perception.
Nowhere do
we see
bare extension
or shape,
but these
are always bound up
with color
or some other quality
unquestionably dependent
upon our subjectivity.
If these latter
disappear
when we
cease to perceive them,
then the former,
being bound up
with them,
must disappear likewise.
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[20] To the objection
that there must be
things that exist apart
from consciousness
and
to which
the conscious percept-pictures
are similar,
even though figure,
color,
sound,
and so on,
have no existence
except
within the act
of perceiving,
the above view
would answer
that a color
can be similar
only to a color,
a figure
only to a figure.
Our percepts
can be similar
only to our percepts
and to nothing else.
Even
what
we call
an object is nothing
but a collection of percepts
which
are connected
in a particular way.
If
I strip a table
of its shape,
extension,
color,.etc.
-- in short,
of all that is
merely my percept
-- then nothing
remains over.
This view,
followed
up logically,
leads
to the assertion
that
the objects of my perceptions
exist only through me,
and indeed
only in
as far as,
and as long as,
I perceive them;
they disappear
with my perceiving
and have
no meaning apart
from it.
Apart from my percepts,
I know of no
objects and cannot know
of any.
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[21] No objection
can be made
to this assertion
as long
as I am merely referring
to the general fact
that the percept
is partly determined
by the organization
of myself
as subject.
The matter
would appear very different
if we
were
in a position
to say just
what part
is played
by our perceiving
in the bringing forth
of a percept.
We should
then know
what happens
to a percept
while it
is being perceived,
and
we should also be able
to determine
what character it
must already possess before it
comes
to be perceived.
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[22] This
leads us
to turn
our attention
from the object
of perception
to the subject
of perception.
I perceive not only
other things,
but also myself.
The percept of myself
contains,
to begin with,
the fact that
I am
the stable element
in contrast
to the continual coming
and
going
of the percept-pictures.
The percept
of my "I"
can always come up
in my consciousness
while
I am having other percepts.
When
I am absorbed
in the perception
of a given
object
I am
for the time
being aware
only of this object.
To this
the percept
of my self
can be added.
I am
then conscious
not
only of the object
but also of my own
personality
which
confronts
the object
and observes
it.
I do not
merely see a tree,
but
I also know
that it
is
I who am seeing it.
I know,
moreover,
that something
happens
in me
while
I am observing the tree.
When
the tree disappears
from my field
of vision,
an after-effect
of this process
remains
in my consciousness
-- a picture
of the tree.
This picture
has become
associated
with my self
during my observation.
My self
has become enriched;
its content
has absorbed
a new element.
This element
I call my mental picture
of the tree.
I should never have
occasion
to speak
of mental pictures
did
I not experience them
in the percept
of my own self.
Percepts
would come
and go;
I should let them
slip by.
Only
because
I perceive
my self,
and observe
that
with each percept
the content
of my self, too,
is changed,
am
I compelled
to connect
the observation
of the object
with the changes
in my own condition,
and
to speak
of my mental picture.
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[23] I perceive
the mental picture
in my self
in the same sense
as I perceive color,
sound, etc.,
in other objects.
I am now also able
to distinguish
these other objects
that confront me,
by calling them
the outer world,
whereas
the content
of my percept
of my self
I
call my inner world.
The failure
to recognize
the true relationship
between mental picture
and object
has led
to the greatest misunderstandings
in modern philosophy.
The perception
of a change
in me,
the modification my self
undergoes,
has been
thrust
into the foreground,
while
the object
which
causes
this modification is lost sight
of altogether.
It has been said
that
we perceive
not objects
but
only our mental pictures.
I know,
so
it is said,
nothing
of the table
in itself,
which is the object
of my observation,
but
only of the change
which
occurs
within me
while
I am perceiving the table.
This view
should not be confused
with the Berkeleyan theory
mentioned above.
Berkeley
maintains
the subjective nature
of the content
of my percepts,
but he
does not say
that my knowledge
is limited
to my mental pictures.
He limits
my knowledge
to my mental pictures
because,
in his opinion,
there are
no
objects apart
from mental picturing.
What
I take to be
a table no longer
exists,
according to Berkeley,
when
I cease
to look at it.
This is
"The first fundamental proposition
which
the philosopher
must bring to clear
consciousness
is the recognition
that our knowledge,
to begin with,
is limited
to our mental pictures.
Our mental pictures
are
the only things that
we know directly,
experience directly;
and
just
because we
have direct experience of them,
even
the most radical doubt
cannot rob us
of our knowledge
of them.
On the other hand,
the knowledge
which
goes
beyond my mental pictures
-- taking mental
pictures here
in the widest possible sense,
so
as to include all
psychical processes --
is not proof
against doubt.
Hence,
at the very
beginning
of all philosophizing
we must explicitly set
down all
knowledge
which goes beyond mental pictures
as being
open
to doubt."
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These are
the opening sentences
of Volkelt's
book
on Immanuel Kant's
Theory
of Knowledge.
What is
here
put forward
as an immediate
and self-evident truth
is
in reality
the result
of a thought operation
which
runs
as follows:
The naïve man
believes
that things,
just
as we perceive them,
exist also outside
our consciousness.
Physics,
physiology,
and psychology,
however,
seem to teach us
that
for our percepts
our organization
is necessary,
and that
therefore
we cannot know
anything about external
objects
except
what our organization
transmits to us.
Our percepts
are thus modifications
of our organization,
not things-in-themselves.
This train of thought
has in fact been characterized
by Eduard von
Hartmann
as the one
which
must lead
to the conviction
that
we can have
direct knowledge
only of our mental pictures.
Because,
outside our organism,
we find vibrations
of physical bodies
and of the air
which
are perceived
by us as sound,
it is concluded
that
what
we call sound
is nothing
more than
a subjective reaction
of our organism
to these motions
in the external world.
Similarly,
it is concluded
that color
and
warmth are merely modifications
of our organism.
And,
further,
these two kinds of percepts
are held
to be produced
in us
through processes
in the external world
which are utterly different
from what
we experience
as warmth or as color.
When
these processes
stimulate the nerves
in my skin,
I have the subjective percept
of warmth;
when they
stimulate the optic nerve,
I perceive
light and color.
Light,
color,
and warmth,
then,
are the responses
of my sensory nerves
to external stimuli.
Even the sense
of touch
reveals to me,
not the objects
of the outer world,
but only states
of my own body.
In the sense
of modern physics
one could somehow think
that bodies
consist
of infinitely small particles
called molecules,
and that these molecules
are not in direct contact,
but are
at certain distances
from one another.
Between them,
therefore,
is empty space.
Across this space
they act
on one another
by forces
of attraction
and repulsion.
If
I put
my hand
on a body,
the molecules
of my hand
by no
means
touch those
of the body directly,
but there remains
a certain distance
between body
and hand,
and
what
I experience
as the body's resistance
is nothing
but the effect
of the force
of repulsion
which its molecules
exert on my hand.
I am absolutely external
to the body and
perceive only its effects
on my organism.
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[24] In amplification
of this discussion,
there is
the theory
of the so-called Specific Nerve Energies,
advanced
by J. Müller (1801-1858).
It asserts
that each sense
has
the peculiarity that it responds
to all external stimuli
in one particular way only.
If
the optic nerve
is stimulated,
perception
of light results,
irrespective
of whether
the stimulation
is due to what
we call light,
or
whether mechanical
pressure
or an electric current works
upon the nerve.
On the other hand,
the same external stimulus
applied
to different senses
gives
rise
to different percepts.
The conclusion from these facts
seems
to be
that our senses
can transmit only
what occurs
in themselves,
but nothing
of the external world.
They
determine our percepts,
each
according to
its own nature.
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[25] Physiology
shows
that there can be
no direct knowledge
even of the effects
which objects produce
on our sense organs.
Through following
up the processes
which
occur
in our own bodies,
the physiologist
finds that,
even in the sense organs,
the effects
of the external movement
are transformed
in the most manifold ways.
We can see
this most clearly
in the case
of eye and ear.
Both are very
complicated organs
which
modify the external stimulus considerably
before they
conduct it
to the corresponding nerve.
From the peripheral end
of the nerve
the already modified stimulus
is
then conducted
to the brain.
Only now can
the central organs
be stimulated.
Therefore it
is concluded
that the external process
undergoes
a series
of transformations
before it
reaches
consciousness.
What goes on
in the brain
is connected
by so many intermediate links
with the external process,
that
any similarity to the latter
is out of the question.
What
the brain
ultimately transmits
to the soul
is
neither external
processes,
nor processes
in the sense organs,
but
only such as
occur
in the brain.
But
even these
are not perceived directly
by the soul.
What we
finally have in consciousness
are not
brain processes at all,
but sensations.
My sensation
of red
has absolutely
no similarity
to the process
which
occurs
in the brain
when
I sense red.
The redness,
again,
only appears
as an effect
in the soul,
and
the brain
process
is merely
its cause.
This is
why
Hartmann says,
"What the subject perceives,
therefore,
are always only modifications
of his own
psychical states
and nothing else."
When I
have the sensations,
however,
they are
as yet very far
from being grouped
into what
I
perceive as "things".
Only single sensations
can be transmitted
to me
by the brain.
The sensations
of hardness
and softness
are transmitted
to me
by the sense
of touch,
those
of color
and light
by the sense
of sight.
Yet all
these are
to be found
united
in one
and the same object.
This unification,
therefore,
can only be brought about
by the soul
itself;
that is,
the soul
combines
the separate sensations,
mediated
through the brain,
into bodies.
My brain
conveys
to me singly,
and
by widely different paths,
the visual,
tactile,
and auditory sensations
which the soul
then combines
into the mental picture
of a trumpet.
It is just
this very last link
in a process
(the mental picture
of the trumpet)
which
for my consciousness
is
the very first thing
that is given.
In it nothing
can any longer
be found of what
[26] It would be hard
to find
in the history
of human culture
another
edifice of thought
which
has been built up
with greater ingenuity,
and which yet,
on closer analysis,
collapses
into nothing.
Let us
look
a little closer
at the way it
has been constructed.
One starts with what
is given in naïve consciousness,
with the thing
as perceived.
Then one shows
that none of the qualities
which
we find
in this thing
would exist
for us
had
we no sense organs.
No eye
-- no color.
Therefore
the color is not yet
present
in that
which affects the eye.
It arises first through
the interaction
of the eye
and the object.
The latter is,
therefore,
colorless.
But
neither is the color
in the eye,
for
in the eye
there is only
a chemical or physical process
which
is first conducted
by the optic nerve
to the brain,
and there initiates
another process.
Even
this is not yet
the color.
That is only produced
in the soul
by means
of the brain process.
Even then it
does not yet enter
my consciousness,
but is first transferred
by the soul
to a body
in the external world.
There,
upon this body,
I finally believe myself
to perceive it.
We have traveled
in a complete circle.
We became conscious
of a colored body.
That is
the first thing.
Here the thought operation starts.
If I
had no eye,
the body
would be,
for me,
colorless.
I cannot therefore attribute
the color
to the body.
I start
on the search
for it.
I look for it
in the eye
-- in vain;
in the nerve
-- in vain;
in the brain
-- in vain once more;
in the soul
-- here
I find it indeed,
but not attached
to the body.
I find
the colored body again
only on
returning
to my starting point.
The circle
is completed.
I believe that
I am cognizing
as a product
of my soul
that
which the naïve man
regards
as existing outside him,
in space.
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[27] As long
as one stops here
everything
seems
to fit beautifully.
But
we must go over
the whole thing
again from the beginning.
Hitherto
I
have been dealing with something
-- the external percept --
of which,
from my naïve standpoint,
I have had until now
a totally wrong conception.
I thought that
the percept,
just
as I perceive it,
had
objective existence.
But
now
I observe
that it disappears together
with my mental picture,
that it
is only a modification
of my inner state
of soul.
Have I,
then,
any right
at all
to start from it
in my arguments?
Can
I say of it
that it acts
on my soul?
I must henceforth treat
the table,
of which formerly
I believed
that it acted
on me
and produced
a mental picture
of itself
in me,
as itself
a mental picture.
But
from this
it follows logically that
my sense organs
and the processes
in them
are also merely subjective.
I have
no right
to speak
of a real eye
but only of my mental picture
of the eye.
Exactly
the same is true
of the nerve paths,
and
the brain process,
and no less
of the process
in the soul
itself,
through which
things
are supposed
to be built up
out of the chaos
of manifold sensations.
If,
assuming the truth
of the first circle
of argumentation,
I run
through the steps
of my act
of cognition once more,
the latter
reveals itself
as a tissue
of mental pictures
which,
as such,
cannot act
on one another.
I cannot say
that my mental picture
of the object
acts
on my mental picture
of the eye,
and
that
from this interaction my mental
picture
of color results.
Nor is it necessary
that
I should say this.
For
as soon
as I see clearly
that my sense organs
and their activity,
my nerve and soul processes,
can also be known
to me
only through perception,
the train
of thought
which
I have outlined
reveals itself
in its full absurdity.
It is quite true
that
I can have no percept
without the corresponding sense organ.
But
just
as little can
I be aware
of a sense organ
without perception.
From the percept
of a table
I can pass
to the eye
which sees it,
or the nerves
in the skin
which touch it,
but
what takes place
in these
I can,
in turn,
learn only
from perception.
And
then I
soon notice that there is
no trace
of similarity
between the process
which
takes place
in the eye
and the color
which I perceive.
I cannot eliminate
my color percept
by pointing
to the process
which
takes place
in the eye
during this perception.
No more can
I rediscover
the color
in the nerve
or
brain processes.
I only add new percepts,
localized
within the organism,
to the first percept,
which the naïve man
localizes
outside his organism.
I merely pass
from one percept
to another.
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[28] Moreover
there is
a gap
in the whole argument.
I can follow the processes
in my organism
up to those
in my brain,
even though
my assumptions
become more and more hypothetical
as I
approach the central processes
of the brain.
The path of external observation
ceases
with the process
in my brain,
more particularly
with the process
which
I should observe
if I
could deal
with the brain
using
the instruments
and methods
of physics and chemistry.
The path of inner observation
begins
with the sensation,
and continues
up to the building
of things
out of the material
of sensation.
At the point
of transition
from brain
process
to sensation,
the path of observation
is interrupted.
[29] The way
of thinking here
described,
known
as critical idealism,
in contrast
to the standpoint
of naïve
consciousness known
as naïve realism,
makes the mistake
of characterizing
the one percept
as mental picture
while
taking
the other
in the very same sense
as does
the naïve realism
which
it apparently refutes.
It wants to prove
that percepts
have the character
of mental pictures
by naïvely
accepting
the percepts
connected
with one's own organism
as objectively valid facts;
and over and above
this,
it fails
to see
that it confuses two spheres
of observation,
between which
it can find no connection.
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[30] Critical idealism
can refute
naïve
realism
only by itself assuming,
in naïve-realistic fashion,
that one's own organism
has objective existence.
As soon
as the idealist
realizes
that the percepts connected
with his own
organism
are exactly
of the same nature
as those which naïve realism
assumes
to have
objective existence,
he can no longer
use
those percepts as a safe foundation
for his theory.
He would have
to regard even
his own
subjective organization
as a mere complex
of mental pictures.
But
this removes
the possibility
of regarding
the content
of the perceived world
as a product
of our spiritual organization.
One would have
to assume
that the mental picture
"color" was only a modification
of the mental picture "eye".
So-called critical idealism
cannot be proved
without borrowing
from naïve realism.
Naive realism
can be refuted only if,
in another sphere,
its own assumptions
are accepted
without proof
as being valid.
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[31] This much,
then,
is certain:
Investigation
within the world
of percepts
cannot establish critical idealism,
and consequently,
cannot strip percepts
of their objective character.
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[32] Still less
can
the principle
"the perceived world
is my mental
picture"
be claimed
as obvious
and needing no proof.
Schopenhauer
begins his chief work
with the words:
The world
is my mental
picture
-- this is a truth
which holds good
for everything that lives
and cognizes,
though man alone
can bring
it
into reflective and abstract consciousness.
If
he really does this,
he has attained
to philosophical discretion.
It
then becomes
clear and certain
to him
that
he knows no
sun and no earth,
but
only
an eye
that sees a sun,
a hand that
feels an earth;
that
the world which surrounds him
is there only
as mental picture,
that is, only
in relation
to something else,
to the one
who pictures it,
which
is he himself.
If any truth
can be asserted a priori,
it is this one,
for it
is the expression
of that form
of all possible
and thinkable experience
which is more universal
than all others,
than time,
space,
or causality,
for all
these presuppose it.
This whole theory is wrecked
by the fact,
already mentioned,
that
the eye
and the hand
are percepts
no
less than
the sun
and the earth.
Using Schopenhauer's expressions
in his own sense,
we could reply:
My eye that
sees the sun,
my hand that
feels the earth,
are my mental
pictures just
as much as
the sun
and the earth themselves.
That with this
the whole theory
cancels itself,
is clear
without further argument.
For only my real eye
and
my real hand
could have
the mental pictures "sun"
and "earth"
as modifications
of themselves;
the mental pictures "eye"
and "hand" cannot have them.
Yet
it is only
of these mental
pictures
that critical idealism
is allowed
to speak.
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[33] Critical idealism
is totally unfitted
to form
an opinion
about the relationship
between percept
and mental
picture.
It cannot begin
to make the distinction,
mentioned above,
between
what happens
to the percept
in the process
of perception and
what must be inherent
in it
prior to perception.
We must,
therefore,
tackle this problem
in another way. |
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