Jeffrey says in the middle of a long comment:

(Daniel) Dennett has written a dense book on free will. I don't like it all that much, but he is very enthusiastic about free will and how it fits with science. My niece was in a classroom in New York that Dennett visited and he spoke to the children about science. My sister says that Dennet inspired many of the children to recognize that it is up to them to ask questions and seek answers for themselves and that they can help bring about a wonderful future by trusting the capacity of their own minds to find new questions and new answers.

It would be such a shame if that enthusiasm would need to be minimized due to theoretical disagreements.

This sounds good, so good that he must have withheld his view of freedom when inspiring the youth about using their brain (I don't think he belives in a mind beyond the brain). I did some quick web research to try and find Dennett’s understanding of free will. He describes freedom as the ability to control our own lives through deliberation. We are able to deliberate and make choices about our future on the basis of reasons. Deliberation results in control of our lives and self-control of ourselves. Sounds good up to this point.

Dennett says this kind of freedom is compatible with determinism because deliberation itself is behavior that might be determined by heredity and past environment.

Dennett's view sounds like this Philosophy of Freedom view found in chapter 1.

1-6 [10] It is said that man is free when he is controlled only by his reason and not by his animal passions. Or again, that to be free means to be able to determine one's life and action by purposes and deliberate decisions.

I found an article by a behaviorist who said Dennett's view of freedom was compatible with Behaviorism. Never mind that the deliberation process is merely the result of past conditioning. “Free will is real, but it...is not what tradition declares it to be: a God—like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world.” Bennet believes in a level of freedom where we can choose between determinisms for our own reasons. This is progress toward freedom.

A compatibilist theory of free will proposed by philosopher Daniel Dennett defines free will as deliberation before action (Dennett, 1984). As long as I deliberate over eating the ice cream (Will it make me fat? Could I offset its effects with exercise later? Can I be happy if I am always dieting?), my eating the ice cream is freely chosen.

Steiner's response to the freedom based upon 'reason':

1-6 [11] Nothing is gained by assertions of this sort. For the question is just whether reason, purposes, and decisions exercise the same kind of compulsion over a man as his animal passions. If without my co-operation, a rational decision emerges in me with the same necessity with which hunger and thirst arise, then I must needs obey it, and my freedom is an illusion.

Bennett changed the definition of freedom so that it would fit into the materialism of natural science. He believes we are unable to free ourselves from our past conditioning. If this idea inspires the youth how much more will they be inspired to here about what a moral intuition is and that a path exists for them to achieve it. The materialistic view is too narrow minded when it speaks of laws. I think we need to work within the laws of the universe, material and spiritual, but as human beings we are able to create our own laws of behavior. POF chapter 9:

9-5 [24] Among the levels of characterological disposition, we have singled out as the highest the one that works as pure thinking or practical reason. Among the motives, we have just singled out conceptual intuition as the highest. On closer inspection it will at once be seen that at this level of morality driving force and motive coincide; that is, neither a predetermined characterological disposition nor the external authority of an accepted moral principle influences our conduct. The action is therefore neither a stereotyped one which merely follows certain rules, nor is it one which we automatically perform in response to an external impulse, but it is an action determined purely and simply by its own ideal content.
[25] Such an action presupposes the capacity for moral intuitions. Whoever lacks the capacity to experience for himself the particular moral principle for each single situation, will never achieve truly individual willing.