Imagine an anthroposophical conversation taking place in real time. Suppose someone says,

(1) Plants have such perfume because their flowers are sensitive noses for everything that streams into the universe from Venus.

What happens physically when something like (1) is said?

The causal theory of the reference of names, proposed in 1980 by the logician Saul Kripke, holds that when something like (1) is uttered or otherwise realized in a mind, and a name is contained in it, a causal chain connecting that utterance or mind to the initial baptism of the object to which the name refers is invoked. Thus when we say or think “Venus,” we are connected physically to a moment in time and space when the first person to say or think “Venus,” and thereby to give it an objective status, actually did so.

In a real sense, on Kripke’s theory, when we use the name, we resonate with the dawning of Venus in human consciousness.

Are we thereby connecting with Venus herself? Possibly. We will probably need a lot of experience with Goethean conversation before we will be in a position to say whether or not Venus actually seems to be present in a careful conversation that makes reference to her.

For now, let us say:

(P3) Principle of causal reference (names invoke objects).