Chapter 3 Thinking
as the Instrument
of Knowledge
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Paragraph 18 - 32
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[18] For everyone,
however,
who has
the ability
to observe
thinking
-- and
with good will
every normal man
has this ability --
this observation
is
the most important one
he can possibly make.
For
he observes
something
of which
he himself
is the creator;
he finds himself
confronted,
not by
an apparently foreign object,
but
by his own activity.
He knows how
the thing he is observing
comes into being.
He sees
into its connections
and relationships.
A firm point
has now been reached
from which one can,
with some
hope of success,
seek an explanation
of all other phenomena
of the world.
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[19] The feeling
that he
had found
such
a firm point led
the father
of modern philosophy,
Descartes,
to base
the whole
of human knowledge
on the principle:
I think,
therefore I am.
All other things,
all other events,
are there
independently of me.
Whether
they be truth,
or illusion,
or dream,
I know not.
There is only one thing
of which
I am absolutely certain,
for I
myself give it
its certain existence;
and that is my thinking.
Whatever
other origin it
may ultimately have,
may it come
from God or from elsewhere,
of one thing
I am certain:
that it exists
in the sense
that I myself bring it
forth.
Descartes had,
to begin with,
no justification
for giving
his statement more meaning
than this.
All that he
had any right to assert
was
that
within the whole world content
I apprehend myself
in my thinking
as in that activity
which is most uniquely my own.
What the attached
"therefore
I am"
is supposed
to mean
has been much debated.
It can have
a meaning
on one condition
only.
The simplest assertion
I can make
of a thing
is
that it is,
that it exists.
How this existence
can be further defined
in the case
of any particular thing
that appears
on the horizon
of my experience,
is at first sight impossible
to say.
Each
object
must first be studied
in its relation
to others
before we
can determine
in what
sense
it can be said
to exist.
An experienced event
may be a set
of percepts
or
it may be a dream,
an hallucination,
or something else.
In short,
I am unable
to say in what
sense it exists.
I cannot gather
this
from the event
in itself,
but
I shall find it
out
when
I consider the event
in its relation
to other things.
But here
again
I cannot know more than just
how
it stands
in relation
to these other things.
My investigation
touches
firm
ground only
when
I find an object
which
exists
in a sense
which
I can derive
from the object
itself.
But
I am myself such
an object in that
I think,
for
I give to my existence
the definite,
self-determined content
of the thinking activity.
From here
I can go on
to ask
whether
other things
exist
in the same
or in some other sense.
[20] When
we make
thinking
an object
of observation,
we add
to the other
observed contents of the world something
which usually escapes our attention,
But the way
we stand
in relation
to the other things
is in no way altered.
We add to the number
of objects
of observation,
but
not to the number
of methods.
While we
are observing the other things,
there enters
among the processes
of the world
-- among
which I
now include observation --
one process
which is overlooked.
Something is present which
is different
from all other processes,
something
which
is not taken
into account.
But
when
I observe
my own thinking,
no such neglected element
is present.
For
what
now
hovers
in the background
is once more just thinking itself.
The object of observation
is qualitatively identical
with the activity
directed
upon it.
This is
another characteristic feature
of thinking.
When
we make it
an object
of observation,
we are not compelled
to do so
with the help
of something
qualitatively different,
but can remain
within the same element.
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[21] When I
weave an independently given
object
into my thinking,
I transcend my observation,
and
the question arises:
What
right
have
I to do this?
Why do
I not simply let
the object
impress itself upon me?
How is it possible
for my thinking
to be related
to the object?
These are
questions
which everyone
must put to himself
who reflects
on his own thought
processes.
But all these questions
cease to exist
when
we think
about thinking itself.
We
then add
nothing
to our thinking
that is foreign
to it,
and therefore have
no need to
justify any such addition.
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[22] Schelling says,
"To know
Nature
means
to create Nature."
If
we take
these words
of this
bold Nature-philosopher literally,
we shall have
to renounce
for ever all hope
of gaining knowledge
of Nature.
For Nature
is
there already,
and
in order to create it
a second time,
we must first know
the principles
according to
which it
has originated.
From the Nature
that already exists
we should have
to borrow
or
crib
the fundamental principles
for the Nature
we want to begin
by creating.
This borrowing,
which
would have
to precede the creating,
would
however
mean
knowing Nature,
and
this would still be so even
if after the borrowing no creation
were
to take place.
The only kind
of Nature
we could create
without first having
knowledge
of it would be
a Nature
that does not yet exist.
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[23] What
is impossible
for us with regard to Nature,
namely,
creating
before knowing,
we achieve
in the case of thinking.
Were
we to refrain
from thinking until
we had first gained knowledge
of it,
we would never come
to it
at all.
We must resolutely plunge
right
into the activity
of thinking,
so that afterwards,
by observing
what we
have done,
we may gain knowledge
of it.
For the observation
of thinking,
we ourselves first
create an object;
the presence
of all other
objects
is taken care of
without any activity
on our part.
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[24] My contention
that
we must think before we
can examine
thinking
might easily be countered
by the apparently equally
valid contention that
we cannot wait
with digesting until
we have first observed
the process
of digestion.
This objection
would be similar
to
that brought
by Pascal
against Descartes,
when
he asserted that
we might also say,
"I walk,
therefore
I am."
Certainly
I must go straight
ahead with
digesting and
not wait until
I have studied
the physiological process
of digestion.
But
I could only compare
this
with the study
of thinking if,
after digestion,
I set myself not
to study
it
by thinking,
but
to eat
and digest it.
It is
after all
not without reason
that,
whereas digestion cannot become
the object
of digestion,
thinking
can very well become
the object of thinking.
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[25] This
then is indisputable,
that
in thinking
we have
got hold
of one corner
of the whole world process
which
requires
our presence
if anything
is to happen.
And
this is just
the point
upon which everything turns.
The very
reason
why things
confront me
in such a puzzling way
is just
that
I play no
part
in their production.
They are simply given
to me,
whereas
in the case
of thinking
I know how
it is done.
Hence for the study
of all
that happens
in the world
there can be
no more fundamental starting
point
than
thinking itself.
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[26] I should now like
to mention
a widely current error
which
prevails
with regard to thinking.
It is often said
that thinking,
as it is in itself,
is nowhere given
to us:
the thinking that connects
our observations
and weaves
a network
of concepts
about them
is not
at all the same
as
that
which
we subsequently extract
from the objects
of observation
in order to make it
the object
of our study.
What we
first weave unconsciously
into the things
is said
to be quite
different
from what
we consciously extract
from them again.
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[27] Those
who
hold
this view do not see
that it
is impossible
in this way
to escape from thinking.
I cannot get
outside thinking
when
I want
to study it.
If
we want
to distinguish
between thinking
before we
have become conscious
of it,
and thinking
of which
we have subsequently become aware,
we should not forget
that this distinction
is a purely external one
which has nothing
to do
with the thing
itself.
I do not
in any way alter
a thing
by thinking
about it.
I can well imagine that
a being
with quite differently constructed
sense organs
and
with a differently functioning intelligence,
would have
a very different mental picture
of a horse
from mine,
but
I cannot imagine
that my own thinking
becomes
something different
through the fact
that I observe it.
I myself observe
what
I myself produce.
Here
we are not talking
of how my thinking looks
to an intelligence other
than mine,
but of
how
it looks
to me.
In any case the picture
of my thinking which
another
intelligence
might have
cannot be
a truer one than my own.
Only
if
I were not myself
the being doing the thinking,
but
if the thinking
were
to confront me
as the activity
of a being quite foreign
to me,
might I
then say that
although
my own picture
of the thinking
may arise
in a particular way,
what the thinking
of
that being
may be like
in itself,
I am quite unable
to know.
[28] So far,
there is not
the slightest reason
why
I should regard
my own thinking
from any point of view other
than my own.
After all,
I contemplate
the rest
of the world
by means of thinking.
Why should
I make
my thinking an exception?
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[29] I believe
I have
give sufficient reasons
for making
thinking
the starting
point
for my study
of the world.
When Archimedes
had discovered the lever,
he thought
he could lift
the whole cosmos
from its hinges,
if only
he could find
a point
of support
for his instrument.
He needed something
that was supported
by itself
and by nothing else.
In thinking
we have a principle
which subsists through itself.
Let us try,
therefore,
to understand
the world
starting
from this basis.
We can grasp
thinking
by means
of itself.
The question is,
whether
we can also grasp anything else
through it.
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[30] I have so far spoken
of thinking
without taking account
of its vehicle,
human consciousness.
Most present-day philosophers
would object
that
before there can be thinking,
there must be
consciousness.
Hence
we ought to start,
not from thinking,
but
from consciousness.
There is
no thinking,
they say,
without consciousness.
To this
I must reply
that
in order to clear
up the relation
between thinking
and consciousness,
I must think about it.
Therefore
I presuppose thinking.
Nevertheless
one could still argue
that although,
when the philosopher
tries to understand consciousness
he makes use of
thinking
and
to that
extent presupposes it,
yet in the ordinary course
of life
thinking
does arise
within consciousness
and
therefore
presupposes consciousness.
Now
if this answer
were given to the world-creator
when he
was about to create thinking,
it would doubtless
be to the point.
Naturally
it is not possible
for thinking
to arise before consciousness.
The philosopher,
however,
is not concerned
with creating the world
but
with understanding
it.
Accordingly he
has to seek
the starting points
not
for the creation
of the world
but for the understanding
of it.
It seems
to me very strange
that the philosopher
should be reproached
for troubling himself first
and foremost
about the correctness
of his principles
instead of
turning straight
to the objects
which
he seeks
to understand.
The world creator
had above all
to know how
to find
a vehicle
for thinking,
but the philosopher
has
to seek
a secure foundation
for his attempts
to understand
what already exists.
How does
it
help us to start
with consciousness
and
subject it
to our thinking contemplation,
if we
do not first know
whether
thinking
is
in fact able
to give us
insight
into things
at all?
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[31] We must first consider thinking
quite impartially,
without reference
to a thinking subject
or
a thought object.
For both subject
and object
are
concepts
formed by thinking.
There is no
denying
that
before anything else
can be understood,
thinking must be understood.
Whoever
denies this
fails to realize
that man
is not the first link
in the chain
of creation but the last.
Therefore,
in order to
explain the world by means
of concepts,
we cannot start
from the elements
of existence
which
came first
in time,
but
we must begin
with that element
which
is given
to us
as the nearest
and most intimate.
We cannot at one bound
transport ourselves
back
to the beginning
of the world
in order to
begin our studies
from there,
but
we must start
from the present moment
and
see
whether
we can ascend
from the later
to the earlier.
As long
as Geology
assumed fantastic catastrophes
to explain
the present condition
of the earth,
it groped
in darkness.
It was only
when
it began to study
the processes
at present
at work
on the earth,
and from these
to argue
back to the past,
that it
gained a firm foundation.
As long
as Philosophy
goes
on assuming all sorts
of basic principles,
such as atom,
motion,
matter,
will,
or the unconscious,
it will hang
in the air.
Only
if the philosopher
recognizes that
which
is
last
in time
as his first point
of attack,
can
he reach his goal.
This absolutely last thing
at which
world evolution has arrived
is in fact thinking.
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[32] There
are
people
who
say it is impossible
to ascertain
with certainty
whether
our thinking
is
right or wrong,
and thus
our starting
point
is in any
case a doubtful one.
It would be just
as sensible
to doubt
whether
a tree is in itself
right or wrong.
Thinking
is
a fact,
and
it is meaningless
to speak
of the truth
or falsity
of a fact.
I can,
at most,
be in doubt
as to
whether
thinking
is correctly applied,
just
as I can doubt
whether
a certain tree
supplies
wood adapted
to the making
of
this or that useful object.
To show how
far the application
of thinking
to the world
is
right or wrong,
is precisely
the task
of this book.
I can understand anyone doubting
whether,
by means
of thinking,
we can gain knowledge
of the world,
but it
is incomprehensible
to me
how
anyone
can doubt
the rightness
of thinking
in itself.
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